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Pacific Myths

Paul Krugman on the economic miracle that isn't.
Kim Dae Jung on the Asian values that never were.
Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern on the political community that will not be.

Intervention

Delusions of Impartiality
RICHARD K. BETTS

In Defense of Activism
TONY SMITH

The People's Views
KOHUT & TOTH

The Teacup Wars
LESLIE H. GELB

Judith Miller on Islam's Ideologues
Korea's Dangerous Future

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VOLUME 73, NUMBER 6

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As America's involvement in the world deepens, its leaders are responding to new problems with old fears. Outmoded strategies will allow today's core problem—civil wars—to overwhelm us.

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In Central Europe the greatest threat to democracy comes not from the nationalists but from the better-organized former communist parties. Encouraging Western-style conservative parties would provide economic and political competition.

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Developing countries seeking economic vitality should court venture capitalists, the gutsy investors bent on creating Silicon Valleys from economic deserts.

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The Delusion of Impartial Intervention *Richard K. Betts* 20

The United Nations and the United States continue to intervene in wars without forthrightly taking sides. Impartiality may sound sensible enough, but it has hamstrung would-be peacekeepers and worsened conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and, to some degree, Haiti. War is about who rules. If military intervention occurs, outsiders should ensure someone is in charge at the end of the day. Interventions that avoid the root issue and aim to be evenhanded become compromises that kill. They prevent the very peace they seek to create.

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President Clinton has finally done the right thing in Haiti. Expanding democracy abroad squarely fits America's Wilsonian tradition. Historically, this approach has provided a proven alternative to communism and fascism, a healthy outlet for nationalism, and a sturdy pillar of America's Cold War success. A democratic Latin America holds the best prospect for good relations with the United States.

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Americans will readily endorse the use of force in foreign conflicts, if the conflicts impinge on domestic priorities such as oil prices, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration. In other cases, their definitions of "vital interests" vary widely. The last three engagements of U.S. troops—the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Haiti—underscore a common denominator: without a president who leads the nation by clearly articulating the principles at stake and the nature of the mission, the public is chary of taking action. Given President Clinton's approach, forbearance for a sustained Haitian intervention may not last long.

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Pundits point to the awesome growth of East Asia's economies and fret that the West cannot compete. But there is nothing miraculous about the successes of Asia's "tigers." Their rise was fueled by mobilizing resources—increasing inputs of machinery, infrastructure, and education—just like that of the now-derided Soviet economy. Indeed, Singapore's boom is the virtual economic twin of Stalin's U.S.S.R. The growth rates of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia will also slow down. The lesson here for Western policymakers is that sustained growth requires efficiency gains, which come from making painful choices.

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Beijing, and China can promote the goal of eventual reunification if it endorses Taiwan's bid. Given that Taipei has made its U.N. participation negotiable, Beijing should recognize the opening that is being presented.

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The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

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Editor's Note

Springtime for Interventionism

There is upon us an unseasonable blossoming of occasions for interventionism of one degree or another, and the fecundity knows no geographic limits. Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and once again Iraq could readily be supplemented with other percolating crises. Cuba, North Korea, and once again Burundi are but a few of the disparate challenges on the horizon.

Where the goal is peacemaking, political scientist Richard K. Betts starts his analysis in this issue of *Foreign Affairs* by summoning up the physicians' age-old motto: "First, do no harm." He finds that this cautionary note has not sufficiently infused the approaches of the United States or the United Nations. As a result, interventions in civil conflicts, while going well in some cases, have in others unwittingly prolonged suffering where they meant to relieve it. A good part of the trouble, Betts says, comes from following what sounds like common sense: that intervention should be both limited and impartial, thus preserving the legitimacy and effectiveness of outside involvement. While workable for monitoring agreed-on cease fires, the principle becomes a "destructive misconception" when applied to peace enforcement, where belligerents are still battling.

Betts writes, "Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and impose a peace settlement—that is, if it is not limited. Trying to have it both ways usually blocks peace by doing enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make them stop trying." Such has been the case in Bosnia, Somalia, and, to some degree, Haiti. In thumbnail summary, the would-be peacemakers remain ineffectual in Bosnia, bailed out of a looming failure in Somalia, acted forcefully only after much delay in Haiti, and took a pass in Rwanda. The long-term outcomes remain dubious in Haiti and Iraq.

Tony Smith, also a political scientist, comes to the defense of an activist role for the United States in furthering democracy, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, because it will make for a safer world. That, says Smith, is in America's self-interest. Getting Haiti on the right path is most important as a promissory note of the United States' "positive role in the historic transformation of Latin America and a new beginning to hemispheric relations." Believing that democratization is the key to ending civil upheavals in Latin America, Smith argues that the United States should pursue its firm implantation because of

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specific interests (manageable immigration) and general ones (no outside interference in the hemisphere).

On a broader geographic scale, Leslie H. Gelb, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, fingers the outbreak of civil and ethnic violence in a series of "teacup wars" as threatening to "undermine efforts to mold a just and stable international order." Gelb sees responses to these conflicts as the "main strategic challenge for the United States."

Creating a more stable order (Gelb) through democratization (Smith) will not occur without challenge. Between the status quo desire for order and the revolutionary one for justice via democracy there is great tension. Just ask the rulers of Iraq and North Korea. Even an activist such as Smith acknowledges the need for the United States to recognize "the intractability of some problems given the limits of its power"—all of which circles back to the hard questions Betts would want answered before acting to make our wishes come true.

And how, one might ask, does the public feel about the variety of distempers giving rise to interventionist temptations? Not of one mind, is the short answer. Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth of the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press draw on their surveys and others to portray American attitudes toward three post–Cold War interventions: the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia. They write that the data suggest "that the public will be clearly disposed to act militarily in two situations: if it feels America's vital interests are at stake, and if American military force can provide humanitarian assistance without becoming engaged in a protracted conflict. The peacekeeper role evokes an ambiguous response, but the public strongly rejects the peacemaker role." With access to instant, pervasive media, public opinion now operates somewhat, if not entirely, separately from elite opinion.

PACIFIC TRUTHS

Dynamic economic and political changes are inherently difficult to understand. Several *Foreign Affairs* authors take that as a jumping-off place to poke at some of the conventional thinking about Asia. Economist Paul Krugman questions whether rapid Asian growth is much of a model for the West and finds the future prospects for that growth more limited than almost anyone now imagines; analysts Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern question whether the idea of a Pacific community is likely to be realized; political reformer Kim Dae Jung refutes those who find democracy inimical to the Asian way; veteran correspondent Ross H. Munro shows how the coming of democracy to Taiwan may complicate U.S. policy by strengthening the Taiwanese desire for independence from China; political scientist Byung-joon Ahn predicts a period of grave uncertainty on the Korean peninsula, with Kim Jong Il likely to be a transitional ruler.

Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi and Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah are not household names in America. In a profile of both, correspondent Judith Miller sheds light on the two "most important leaders of Islamic literalist movements."

James F. Hoge, Jr.
Editor

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

CHAPPATTE, SWITZERLAND, CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

The danger today is that we will think or at least act as if the world has changed less than it really has.

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Quelling the Teacup Wars

The New World's Constant Challenge

Leslie H. Gelb

Almost 50 years ago and almost 75 years ago, our forebears exulted in their military triumphs and wrote of endings and beginnings. Filled with hope and cynicism, they sketched new international maps and institutions. Idealists and realists alike, most made the same basic error. Most assumed that the world had changed more than it really had.

The danger today is that we may commit the opposite error, namely that we will think or at least act as if the world has changed less than it really has. And by so doing, we will exaggerate old threats and minimize new ones, and thus finally find ourselves overwhelmed by the all-corrosive danger that stares us down daily—the teacup wars filled with countless bodies and horrors, the scourge of civil and ethnic violence.

If we fail to ameliorate and check this scourge, both the victims and the unpunished killers will undo much of what we value and undermine efforts to mold a just and stable international order. Without such an order, there can be little hope to tend the planet, nurture more tolerant societies, sustain economic progress, or contain the perilous spread of military and nuclear power.

Yet even as the physical traces of the Old World vanish, many still cling to its intellectual trappings. While the New World surrounds us and pounds us for attention, we answer mostly, though far more softly, with the old fears and the old strategies.

Though the Soviet Union lies in ashes, we almost expect and plan for the emergence of a new Russian empire. Though Germany has evolved as one of the most stable democracies in the world, we secretly dread its reversion to authoritarianism and militarism. Though the United States has never before been as entangled in the world as it is today, we fear its return to isolationism. Most policy experts still lean on the central strategy of the Cold War: keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Only, we want to execute this strategy on the cheap, at bargain basement prices.

The Cold War's worries should not be tossed aside. On the contrary, we would be naive and irresponsible to ignore the

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Leslie H. Gelb is President of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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possibilities of future Russian expansionism or German brittleness or the chaos of a world without American leadership. But we must examine these concerns with fresh eyes and judge anew whether they should remain at the core of Western strategy or be placed in different focus.

The issue of strategic focus is essential. No strategy can succeed unless it settles on the most compelling threat and defines it correctly. The strategy of containment zeroed in on precisely the right problem. For all the misjudgments and miscalculations committed in the name of halting the spread of communism, containment kept us pointed in the right direction. Now we must look again at the main elements of containment—Russia, Germany, and America—put them in their new context and see whether and how they still fit.

RUSSIA: NO ALARM

It is probably true that Russia today, as the Soviet Union before, has greater potential to disrupt and endanger the international system than any other nation. By its size and location, by its economic gifts and military and nuclear capacities, by its history and ancient ambitions and new nightmares, Russia could reconstitute itself as a Eurasian and even world-sized monster. But it would be rash or worse to assume such monstrous behavior, or assume that the proportions of a new Russian threat would rival the old Soviet one, or, more precisely, that containing such a possible threat should occupy the center of a new Western strategy.

No one envisions a Western-style democracy in Russia's near future. However, the collapse of the Soviet empire has loosed and created political and economic forces that will not bend easily to dictatorship. And while many of these democrats will be infected by historical Russian nationalism and seek to muscle their neighbors, they are unlikely to be old-fashioned militarists. Even new Russian nationalists understand that devouring their neighbors in the short run at least would make Russia itself weaker. Russians generally seem mindful that the new nations bordering their country will not succumb to Moscow's blandishments as easily as their predecessor states. In other words, even assuming the worst happens in Moscow, it would be many years before Russia could pose a serious threat to America's vital interests. For a long time to come, Russia will be a second-tier country with virtually useless nuclear arms, weighed down by a grotesque bureaucracy and pervasive crime, more self-destructive than dangerous to the West.

From this view of Russia as a sharply diminished power, several conclusions flow. First, deterring the possibility of a Russia once again bent on dominating Eurasia should not be at the heart of Western strategy. Such a threat, even if it were probable, is too distant. In any event, the West will have the time necessary to channel and parry future Russian challenges.

Second, while Russia is important and the West must be attentive to its needs, it is not sufficiently important for the West to give Moscow a veto over important policy decisions such as Bosnia and NATO. If the West decides to provide arms to the Bosnian Muslims, it should

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go ahead with or without Moscow's approval. If the West feels NATO's umbrella must be extended eastward to provide leaders there with confidence in their independence—just as the United States established NATO to give confidence to Western Europe's leaders—this, too, should go forward, albeit with due sensitivity toward Russia.

Third, the West should do all it can economically and politically to bolster Russian moderates and a variety of Russian power centers. But because of the immensity and complexity of Russia's problems, Western leaders would be well advised to recognize the huge limits of their influence in Russia's quixotic internal affairs.

Fourth, the West should continue the process of reducing and controlling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Here as well, there will be significant limits on what can be accomplished. We cannot buy a denuclearized Russia. To secure a place at the big-power table, a Russia in inner turmoil needs nuclear weapons as much as before.

GERMANY: STABLE

While the first goal of containment was to restrain Soviet influence, the second and unspoken goal was to keep Germany down and democratic. Westerners chose not to make this point publicly, for Germany had become an ally. But never far from mind was the fact that Germany had started three wars within a hundred years, and the last one, Hitler's war, was from Hell itself. The fear of a resurgent Germany remained so alive and potent throughout the Cold War that West and East long colluded on a central line of policy: to prevent German unification.

Now the deed is done. Germany stands again as one nation. Should it be feared as before? Should the West, and the East for that matter, continue to weave visible and invisible ropes of friendship to bind the German Gulliver and prevent him from once again trampling his neighbors? Yes, if necessary, but it is not necessary. German leaders are dealing with the problem themselves by weaving their own webs to Europe and America. Bonn leads in proposals to bind the German economy, its arms and aims into a larger Western universe, and to restrict its own military power.

Nor should the West be preoccupied by the nightmare of Germany succumbing to another bout of Nazism. Everyone will be watchful, but as far as the eye can see, Germany is and will remain a stable democracy. That is as true of united Germany as it was of West Germany alone.

Our main concern about Germany should be that we are asking its people to do too much. West Germans are already transferring massive wealth to their East German brothers. Germans provide more aid to Russia and Eastern Europe than any other nation. Bonn along with Paris leads the drive for European unity. Bonn along with Britain continues to hold Europe close to America. The strain on German politics is enormous, particularly at this time of structural economic change.

Not to be forgotten is the fact that Germany's economy is only half as large as Japan's and one-quarter the size of America's. Western nations must relieve the German load in dealing with East European refugees and the economies of

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Eastern Europe generally. Yet the West tends to demand too much of German leadership in Europe and elsewhere. At best, this pressure on Germany to deliver is premature. At worst, it will cause democratic German leaders to fail and open the doors to demagogues with easy answers.

It is impossible not to harbor nightmares about a resurgent Germany. But it is dangerously unrealistic to retain this as a preoccupation of Western strategy.

WAITING FOR LEADERSHIP

Neither Germany nor Japan, nor both, can be expected to assume or be pushed into the primary leadership role in the post-Cold War era. Only the United States can and must bear this burden, as before. Are Americans up to it? Yes. Must the West worry again about American isolationism? No.

America's involvement in the world is deep, growing deeper, and irreversible. A huge proportion of the American economy is now tied to international transactions, almost double two decades ago. With leadership from President Clinton, Congress approved the North American Free Trade Agreement and will likely approve the new world trade treaty. Washington maintains over 100,000 troops in Europe and a similar number in Asia. Few question American commitments to Europe and Asia. Nor has the United States shrunk in recent years from deploying ground forces to remote places such as Somalia and Macedonia or air power to Bosnia.

Of course, Americans do not like sending their sons and daughters abroad for combat. But they never did. What country does? It is remarkable how readily, despite internal opposition, Americans will fight for others if the cause is just and rightly explained—even in the absence of an overriding threat from the Soviet Union.

Americans are not turning inward. They are waiting for their president and others to chart a compelling international course. If Americans are to sacrifice when nothing seems to threaten their survival directly, they want to know why and how. Public opinion polls demonstrate not the return of isolationism, but good old American pragmatism.

Americans will not embark on a new crusade to make the world safe for democracy and free markets. These aims are worthy. But most Americans now understand that democracy is a state of grace not readily attained and not within their power to impose. Nor are they eager to expend lives and treasure to transform sinkholes into free enterprise paradises. Americans also understand that lofty goals do not help us decide what to do in Somalia, Eastern Europe, Haiti, Bosnia, or the Persian Gulf.

FOCUS ON CIVIL WARS

Thus discussion circles back to where it must begin—to divining and defining the new core problem in post-Cold War politics that a new strategy must address. Nuclear proliferation, Russia, Germany, new Chinese ambitions, trade wars—all are serious. But the core problem is wars of national debilitation, a steady run of uncivil civil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations. The stronger states tend to

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minimize their stakes in stopping or containing internal wars. Such wars, it is argued, are ruinous to the combatants themselves but not to outsiders. Or outsiders can do little or nothing to quell these domestic fires, it is said, except at unacceptable cost.

Yet the costs of trifling with these wars of national debilitation could prove high. While some of these wars would erupt in any event, many are fueled by a copycat phenomenon, by seeing that guilty parties elsewhere get away with murder and conquest. Thus, Haitian and Rwandan killers shout "Somalia" and "Bosnia." These wars also have a spillover effect. Their victims—50 million now—stream across international borders and become expensive and disruptive wards of their neighbors. The Balkan refugees flooding into Germany are a case in point. Another 50 million displaced persons hover within their own lands far from their own homes. Some civil wars also create vacuums that suck in and entice larger neighbors. Russian troops in Georgia and elsewhere are examples.

For the United States and the West, these wars present a constant challenge to their leaders, demanding attention and drawing off time and funds from important domestic priorities. There is an even more damning cost to stable democracies. The failure to deal adequately with such strife, to do something about mass murder and genocide, corrodes the essence of a democratic society. If democratic leaders turn away from genocide or merely pretend to combat it, their citizens will drink in the hypocrisy and sink into cynicism.

In sum, democracies have a large practical as well as moral stake in finding reasonable responses to wars of national debilitation. The range of responses is no mystery: stronger multilateral organizations, standing peacekeeping and peacemaking forces, preventive action, and, above all, more clear-sighted and courageous national leadership.

NATO needs to be remolded and strengthened as a regional organization. Washington also must nurture a greater sense of cooperation among Latin American and African regional groups for their neighbors. The very long process of shaping a more effective and responsible United Nations must begin. This will require some sacrifices of sovereignty. But sovereignty has already been compromised in the new world. It is impossible for Washington to contemplate unilateral military action in most consequential situations. The Persian Gulf War is a prime example; tiny Haiti is another. Multilateralism, for good or ill, almost always requiring American leadership, has descended on the world. It is a fact not to be debated, but absorbed into American strategy.

The main strategic challenge for the United States is to develop plans for multilateral action to stem civil wars without drowning in them, and to do what it reasonably can to give victims of these wars a chance to live in peace without making them permanent wards. This, and not a bargain basement strategy to contain old ghosts, is what our leaders must refashion from the bricks of the fallen Berlin Wall.

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The Fall and Rise of the Communists

Guess Who's Running Central Europe?

Anne Applebaum

In the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994, Western politicians and journalists were caught off guard by a series of political changes in Central Europe. In Poland, parties led by former communists and their rural allies won a majority of parliamentary seats; in Hungary, the former Communist Party won absolute parliamentary power; in Slovakia, former communists calling themselves Social Democrats replaced former communists calling themselves Nationalists.

If the changes caused surprise in the West, they were greeted with shock by former dissidents and anticommunist intellectuals in Central Europe. In both West and East, observers had assumed that the former communist parties were thoroughly demoralized and defeated and would remain nothing more than a marginal political force. Most believed that the potential for trouble in Central Europe lay elsewhere—in the resurgence of 1930s-style nationalist parties. After all, several Central European nations did have authoritarian or fascist governments before the Second World War, and it was feared that they might well bring such people to power again.

Western, particularly American, diplomats in Central Europe went out of their way to encourage politicians whom they perceived as antinationalist and to discourage "decommunization" programs, which were often favored by politicians whom they perceived as nationalist. This was the case across the former Soviet bloc, even though decommunization projects, sometimes called "lustration," usually did little more than forbid former high-ranking communist party officials from holding office under the new regime. While diplomatic efforts did not determine the political developments in Central Europe—they did not stop the Czechs or Germans from passing laws on lustration—they did have an impact. Right-wing and conservative

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ANNE APPLEBAUM is Deputy Editor of *The Spectator* and author of the recently published book *Between East and West: Across the Borderlands of Europe* (Pantheon, 1994).

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

politicians in Central Europe failed to receive the official approval, invitations, and fellowships given their left and center-left counterparts.

It is now clear that the intense Western fear of nationalism in Central Europe misidentified the problem and that the attempt to thwart the progress of so-called nationalist parties was a mistake. Nowhere in the region has there been a resurgence of 1930s-style nationalism. (Although tragic and shocking, the former Yugoslavia has proved the exception, not the norm. And the causes of the war there are unique, deriving from the region's special history, both before and after the Second World War.) In Central Europe the greatest danger to democracy and stability does not—and never did—come from the new or the old nationalist right. The danger comes from the old left, from the remnants of the communist parties, which remain better organized and better funded than any new right-wing party could ever be. Former communist parties hold political and economic monopolies that will take years to loosen; until they do, politics will not become "normal" in any Western sense in Central Europe or elsewhere in the former Warsaw Pact.

WHAT NATIONALIST DANGER?

Why were both Western and Eastern observers so unprepared for the return of former communist parties to power? Much of the hysteria about nationalism in the last five years originated within the nations of Central Europe, where groups of intellectuals, particularly ex-dissidents, often perceived new right-wing or populist parties as threats. Accusations of nationalism and anti-Semitism were frequently used by one wing of the former Polish dissident movement to discredit the other. In 1990 Adam Michnik, one of

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Poland's leading ex-dissidents, wrote an article accusing then-candidate Lech Walesa of irresponsible nationalism and anti-Semitism on the Op-Ed page of *The New York Times*. Michnik's article was widely received as the work of a neutral, independent intellectual and widely repeated; in fact, Michnik was a leading supporter of a political party that opposed Walesa.

While Walesa has proved in many ways a poor president, irresponsible nationalism is hardly an accurate description of his behavior. He has not used violence, threatened minorities, or made claims on former Polish territories in Ukraine and Lithuania. This is not to say that virulent strains of nationalist rhetoric do not occasionally appear in the Polish media or political arena. Nor is it to deny that President Walesa himself may be privately anti-Semitic or irresponsibly nationalist. But despite the lingering impression of Walesa as a potential dictator, no Polish leader espousing nationalist or racist rhetoric has had anything like the success of, say, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France. In the end, the feuding and rancor that these kinds of accusations created among former dissident allies served only to assist Poland's former Communist Party to victory in the 1993 parliamentary elections.

In other cases, there did seem at first to have been more substance to outside fears of a nationalist resurgence. Take, for example, the conservative Democratic Forum, which ruled Hungary until the former Communist Party came to power in elections last spring. It espouses a philosophy of "Hungarianness," based on its belief in prewar Christian and family values, similar to the "family values" movement in America or Western Europe. This platform was regarded, perhaps rightly, with some suspicion by Hungary's liberal former-dissident intellectuals, who feared that its form of nationalism would grow narrower and more dangerous. The Democratic Forum also has at least one prominent member, István Csurka, who espouses openly anti-Semitic views. Csurka has claimed that Hungarian state television is controlled by communist Jews and has warned his countrymen against an "international Jewish conspiracy" bent on destroying them.

More important than Csurka's rhetoric, however, is the fact that it elicits so little popular support. Csurka has no following to speak of. Indeed, former Prime Minister József Antall's failure to denounce Csurka, a member of his party, is widely believed to have contributed to the Democratic Forum's electoral defeat. Despite the attention paid to Csurka, his existence is not a sign of a growing nationalist or anti-Semitic threat in Hungary. On the contrary, his failure to exert influence of any importance is a sign that Hungarians are wary of and resistant to such language, at least when it is employed for political purposes.

In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the situation is different. No dangerous nationalist rhetoric of any significance has been used in Czech politics. (At the same time, the Czech Republic is one of the two postcommunist states—East Germany is the other—to have carried out a program of lustration.) Evaluating the new Slovak state is more difficult because the nationalism that has developed there is not, as in the case of Poland

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and Hungary, led by prewar nationalists or the nationalist wing of a dissident movement trying to revive prewar nationalism for its own sake. In Slovakia, nationalist rhetoric has been used by former communists to keep themselves in power. The significance of the Slovak example cannot be underestimated. Slobodan Milošević used his base in the Communist Party to follow a similar path to power in Serbia, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, or any other future nationalist, would almost certainly follow the same pattern in Russia.

True, Slovak nationalism did look like another prewar throwback in the early days of secessionist agitation, when portraits of Jozef Tiso, the leader of Slovakia's wartime Nazi puppet regime, appeared in shop windows, and a number of political leaders began directing rhetoric at Slovakia's 600,000-strong Hungarian minority. In 1990, recognizing that the Slovak economy, with its reliance on munitions factories, mining, and steel, would not respond to economic reform as readily as the Czech Republic—and recognizing that their own jobs would be the first to go—much of the Slovak communist nomenklatura, including factory chiefs as well as political bosses, threw their weight behind the Slovak independence movement. They won support from a populace heavily employed in the state sector and who believed in the possibility of "softer" economic reforms, "neither socialist nor capitalist," in the words of the Slovak nationalist leader, Vladimír Mečiar, himself a Moscow-trained apparatchik.

Nonetheless, disillusion is setting in. In practice, "neither socialist nor capitalist" has meant that more of the fruits of privatization have fallen to members of the old regime. Instead of the open system of "voucher privatization" favored in the Czech Republic, the Slovak government has preferred sales that are privately negotiated, and therefore more easily corrupted. Economic reform is widely seen to have failed, and last March Prime Minister Mečiar, the leader of the Slovak independence drive, was removed from office after a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Although recently reelected, he is now caught up in the sorts of political compromises that all democratic politicians are caught up in: the Hungarian minority, for example, has proved adept at using its parliamentary party to influence the government and to erase linguistic and educational discrimination that remains from before 1989.

THE MANY FACES OF COMMUNISM

These are case studies from the most "Western" nations of the former Soviet bloc. Yet the Polish, Hungarian, and even Slovak distaste for extremism is the norm all across Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Vytautas Landsbergis lost last year's elections in Lithuania partly because his enthusiasm for economic reform did not match the fierceness of his nationalist rhetoric; the same was true of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's failure to win reelection in July 1994. Despite fears to the contrary, neither Central Europe nor the Baltic or Slavic regions of the Soviet Union have yet melted in the much-heralded "caldron of nationalist hatred." Across the region, former communists—together with businessmen, bankers, generals, and journalists linked

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to the former communist parties—pose a far greater challenge to healthy democracy and capitalism.

At first glance, this may not seem obvious. There is no ideological threat to democracy in Central Europe; the ideals of Marxism are dead, and the return of totalitarianism is not a threat. Nor is there any point in asking whether the states of Central Europe will be capitalist states, because they nearly are. The question now is what kind of capitalism and democracy Central Europe will have, a problem no one imagined before 1989. But capitalism and democracy do come in different forms. It is not the specter of the 1930s that haunts Central Europe, but the old Italian model—corrupt regimes led by former communist parties that rely on a semi-mafia business class composed mostly of former communists.



PHOTOGRAPH BY FILIP HORVAT, SABA

Menu for Marxim Pizza, Budapest

The return of former communist parties to power reflects the rise of the new economic elite. Links between ex-nomenklatura capitalists and ex-communist politicians remain intact, creating a ruling class that holds power in several spheres, with little room for real competition in political or economic debates. A Polish economist who traced the careers of several hundred top nomenklatura from 1988 to 1993 found that over half of them turned up as top executives in the private sector. Those numbers were even higher in Hungary and higher still in Russia. With better connections, more money, and more property to start with, former communists have indisputably been the largest financial beneficiaries of the last four years of economic reforms. Not surprisingly, former communist parties are much better funded and organized than the often weak, divided post-dissident parties. In coming years these links between politicians and businesses will strengthen as economies recover and the ex-nomenklatura grow wealthier.

Although the return of communists to power is often portrayed as neutral—ex-communists often describe themselves as "experts"—this is not quite the case. Many have come to power using socialist populist rhetoric more familiar to voters than nationalist populist appeals. Party leaders who believe the rhetoric can inflict great damage on the economy. Slovakia and Ukraine provide excellent examples of how the concerted efforts of former communist political classes can hold back entire economies.

Even when former communists have a genuine interest in economic reform, they can still have a stultifying effect on politics. In Hungary, power is now held

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almost exclusively by a small elite of former communists and center-left ex-dissidents—not necessarily an evil elite, but a claustrophobic one nevertheless. In Poland, there is evidence of ruling parties demanding Italian-style kickbacks from their friends in the business sector. The rule of small, secretive elites has a range of negative economic effects. If not broken up by politicians, former secret police networks convert easily into semi-corrupt business structures; ex-communist bankers lend readily to ex-communist factory owners, with little regard for commercial considerations. At their worst, as in Serbia or Romania, former communist parties can use their excellent organizational bases to suppress the growth of other parties. The communist parties of Central Europe will remain special for many years to come because of their past monopoly on power, which has been translated into economic power and now back into political power. They are not "normal" political parties in any Western sense.

MAKING THE RIGHT FRIENDS

For that reason, it is not the center-left that needs Western diplomatic and intellectual encouragement in Central Europe, but the center-right. The development of a healthy Western conservative element within the political system is essential to modern democracy. Ideological considerations aside, a strong center-right or conservative political alternative, which is notably absent in Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine, would provide political competition for the former communist elite and inject an element of competition into the economic system. A strong center-right prime minister, Václav Klaus, has enabled the Czech Republic to privatize further and faster than any other country in the region.

Western diplomats should also be interested in the Central European right and in healthy nationalist movements elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Not all "nationalist" or even "patriotic" emotion is necessarily a symptom of antidemocratic tendencies. Nor is it all extraneous to the progress of reform. The quality of the civil servants, diplomats, and soldiers in Central Europe, for example, will depend largely on whether Central European politicians manage to revive national pride, given that salaries in the public sector will remain low. One of the few emotions that can keep a good Slovak scientist in Slovakia, or a talented Ukrainian entrepreneur in Ukraine, is patriotism.

Across the former communist bloc, the growth of nationalist movements has led to a revival of interest in history and national culture. While this change can lead, as in the former Yugoslavia, to territorial disputes and vicious intolerance, it can also lead national elites into constructive discussions of once-taboo issues. The best example is anti-Semitism in Poland. Since the late 1980s, public debate about the history of the Polish Jews has grown beyond measure. The tone of the discussion may not always appeal to outsiders, and the debate itself can be mistaken for anti-Semitism, but the fact that it is happening means that a younger generation will understand the issues better than their elders. Repressing the past is always more harmful than open debate, however acrimonious.

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Yugoslavia would have been far better off with an honest discussion of the past during the postwar era; open debate about historical and national differences would help relations between Russia and Ukraine. Yet Westerners often mistake the outpouring of pent-up feelings of patriotism—natural in what were effectively occupied countries—for dangerous militancy.

Democracy itself may in the end depend upon the patriotic spirit in another way. Tocqueville once defined rational patriotism as the moment "a man understands the influence that his country's well-being has on his own." When the nation-states of Central Europe were political subordinates of Moscow, this sense of connection to and interest in the fate of the nation-state was not possible. A Pole or a Ukrainian could not feel loyalty to a state that was not his own. Now rational patriotism can create the public spirit that, together with respect for the rule of law, is as important to developed democracy as peaceful borders or parliamentary elections. Those in Central Europe who attempt to revive such emotions after a long spell of suppression are to be commended, not condemned. They deserve Western support, not scorn.

CORRECTION

The September/October issue contained errors in Giandomenico Picco's article, "The U.N. and the Use of Force," which were attributable to the final editing process and not to the author. A Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the United Nations in 1988 not 1989, and the opening sentence under the heading, "The 'Other' Strength," should have read: "To have no army and no central bank is no weakness," not "witness."

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Venture Abroad

Developing Countries Need Venture Capital Strategies

Larry W. Schwartz

At the fall meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, a preeminent international group of free-market scholars, economists wrestled with how best to implement market principles in formerly communist economies. Under certain circumstances, the surest ideological route from Red Square to Mont Pelerin may be via Silicon Valley. The same can be said for other developing countries. A number of economic and political trends signal a more prominent role for Silicon Valley-type growth fueled by venture capital. The challenge is to mesh this dynamic and innovative form of financing with the goals of development aid providers and governments.

WHAT'S GOOD FOR BUSINESS

There is an increased global awareness that a modern economy cannot reach its full potential without nurturing the innovation of its entrepreneurs, and that realization enhances the prospects for venture capital. Venture capitalists provide equity or other types of financing for small- and medium-size enterprises that have growth potential and are not quoted on stock markets. They combine access to cash not available elsewhere with active management support. Their main objective is long-term capital gains to justify their financial risks.

A new emphasis on the entrepreneurial process in developing countries is not enough, however, to increase and accelerate the flow of venture capital, particularly new capital from the developed world. A government-created "enabling framework" is first needed in developing countries to create an attractive playing field and entrepreneurial infrastructure for venture capitalists.

The replacement of centrally planned economies with free-market ones is stimulating the demand for venture capital. The World Bank lists 80 countries that in recent years have made privatization their primary public-policy concern. (More than 7,000 large-scale privatizations have been undertaken, along with 100,000 small- and medium-size companies that have been sold to private parties.) Many of these newly privatized enterprises are

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insolvent and thus will be searching for alternative means of financing. For many of these economies, a logical next step should include a primary role for venture capital to nurture the entrepreneurial seeds planted by the privatization process.

Venture capital has benefited from the growth of strategic investment (acquisitions, joint ventures, and alliances) and financial investment (investment in publicly traded securities listed on stock exchanges) in developing countries that have embraced free-market reforms. For example, in the 18 months that ended at March 1993, foreign companies made approximately 1,700 strategic investments in Eastern Europe, valued at $42 billion. In the case of financial investors, U.S. pension funds increased their foreign holdings by $53 billion in 1993; approximately 25 percent of this was in emerging markets. In addition, U.S. pension funds expect to increase their overseas investments by an average of 50 percent during the next three years, according to a recent survey.

EXIT AHEAD

The increase in strategic investments provides venture capitalists with more and better exit strategies—ways for the initial investors to reap profits and yield their ownership or control to others. In a developed market, a venture capitalist's primary exit strategies are an initial public offering or an acquisition of the company by other investors. Unfortunately, the lack of a stock exchange or over-the-counter market in many developing countries (and the small number of listed companies in countries that have an exchange or market) often precludes an initial public offering as a viable exit. Venture capitalists in developing countries more often rely on exiting by way of an acquisition.

The increase in financial investments is important because they are made by many of the institutional investors who buy into venture funds. The largest source of venture money in the world, representing approximately 40 percent of new committed capital for U.S. venture funds, is the U.S. pension and mutual fund system. Although most investments in developing countries by pension funds have been in exchange-listed securities, a number of these investors have expressed their intention to increase their investments in privately held companies in developing countries. This will help raise money for venture capital funds.

Venture capital is also increasing in developing countries because of growing consumption of industrial and consumer products there. World Bank figures show that 77 percent of the world population lives in developing countries. While many developed markets are struggling, developing world economies are growing at a rate of five to six percent annually, creating vast groups of consumers. The U.S. Commerce Department has projected that developing countries will account for 40 percent of the growth in international trade in the next ten years.

Venture capital investors have been increasingly adopting global perspectives. In 1980, venture capital markets were practically nonexistent outside the United States. By 1990, more than half of the $80 billion of new capital committed

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worldwide by institutions and individuals to venture funds was outside the United States. Equity and quasi-equity investments made by venture capital funds increased in Europe from $1.9 billion in 1985 to $4.6 billion by the end of the decade, and in Japan from $500 million to $1.8 billion over the same period. This growth is not limited to developed countries. In the past decade, venture funds have been formed for a number of developing countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, Russia, and Ukraine.

VENTURE HIGHWAY

All these factors will result in greater venture capital activities in developing countries in coming years. The question is whether a developing country's own government or a development aid provider like the World Bank or the U.S. Agency for International Development can accelerate this trend and increase these activities in a particular market. Current attempts to increase venture capital activities in developing countries are both legislative and non-legislative. Legislative efforts encompass a broad range of incentives, regulations, and policies that are implemented by any governmental, quasi-governmental, or regulatory body. Most of these efforts can be classified as incentives to enter or exit a market.

Entry incentives reduce the initial costs and risks of an investment, thereby making it more attractive. Examples of these include tax credits, rebates, and income tax deductions for investments in eligible venture funds. In a developing country, entry incentives include efforts to enact corporate and securities laws that modernize the domestic regulatory structure. Exit incentives, such as favorable tax treatment of capital gains, the creation of stock exchanges, or over-the-counter markets, make it easier or more attractive for a venture capitalist to exit from a private equity investment.

Non-legislative efforts include the formation of venture capital funds for equity investment in developing countries. Typically, a development aid provider will assist in fund formation and provide a percentage of the capital committed. Other non-leglislative efforts include the creation of professional organizations and networks for venture capital firms, in the hope they will facilitate flows of information and capital between venture capital firms.

What is noticeably absent from most of these efforts, however, is an acknowledgement that an accessible private equity market is the end result of a robust entrepreneurial environment. Yet this is critical to understanding why venture capital flows to certain regions and not to others. To attract venture capital, a government typically focuses on reducing barriers to entry and increasing means of exit for private equity investors. Metaphorically, the government looks to build a road to come in and a road to go out. But ideally it should do more than that: it should provide a climate that encourages innovation and entrepreneurship.

There is a genetic code to economic development, as many commentators have observed, and entrepreneurs and venture capitalists can play a central role in developing that code. While

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many entrepreneurial regions have developed haphazardly, hospitable places for venture capital investment can also be successfully planned.

SILICON VALLEY REDUX

Silicon Valley has been described as having a "social structure of innovation," an interactive system of venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, skilled labor, universities, support services, and entrepreneurial and supplier networks. It is the most sophisticated entrepreneurial infrastructure in the world and has helped make Silicon Valley the global center for venture capital. For a developing country to create such an entrepreneurial climate, an enabling framework would emulate this structure by codifying an intent to develop synergistic relationships between universities, entrepreneurs, established industries, and government.

The first step is to encourage regional clustering of industries. A country's successful industries are often concentrated in a particular geographic region and clustered horizontally or vertically. This is thought to be caused by, and results in, increased information flows and diffusion of innovations. These activities are particularly prevalent in entrepreneurial areas. Regional clusters can be cultivated by a variety of legislative means: land grants, business incubators, zoning regulations, financial assistance programs, and tax incentives.

Concentrated regions of entrepreneurial activity, whether planned, like Taiwan's Hsinchu Industrial Park for more than 140 science-based firms, or unplanned, like Silicon Valley, often evolve from or revolve around academic centers. But the potential benefits are not limited to regions with preeminent, privately owned research centers that focus on high-technology subjects. The Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, for example, contains clusters that successfully compete in a number of low-technology industries, including ceramic tile production and textile manufacturing. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of rigor and uneven quality of programs offered by the predominantly state-run Italian university system, the Emilia region has benefited from the interaction between universities and local industries. Local educational and research programs tailored to the needs of regional enterprises are a unique source of strength for these interactions. Other steps being taken to encourage interaction between the universities and firms include grants for research, encouragement for academic staff to participate in entrepreneurial firms, on-campus workshops for local businesses, and loans and grants to engage students in work-study programs.

A framework needs government set-aside funds for loans, guarantees, or grants to or equity investments in venture capital firms to assist entrepreneurs in raising new capital commitments from local markets. Such funds could also be made available to establish industrial parks or business incubators or fund university research into technologies suitable for commercial application by entrepreneurs. Development aid providers can strengthen enabling frameworks through technical and financial assistance that encourages industrial clusters and helps provide strategic links between industries and universities.

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Tax legislation can provide a comprehensive incentive program for private equity investors and entrepreneurs. Such a program may include capital gains tax relief for gains that are channeled into private equity investments, capital gains tax exemption where gains are derived from private equity investments, income tax or capital tax relief on losses from private equity investments, and up-front tax relief on qualifying investments.

Rather than merely transposing what is working in developed countries' venture capital markets, the framework is an attempt to create a DNA-like social structure of innovation: a small, unique element that holds the promise of a larger, more complex entity. The most prominent features of a regional cluster of innovative firms are the efficiency and rapidity of information and capital flows. A sovereign state desiring to provide its own entrepreneurs with greater access to venture capital or create an entrepreneurial infrastructure should seek to replicate these same qualities.

As developing countries begin to participate in the information-based economy, the challenge will be to find ways to maximize technological innovation and change economic development programs in revolutionary ways. For the World Bank and organizations with similar roles, the first step is to recognize that the dynamics of information and capital flows are not monopolized by Silicon Valley and other high-tech entrepreneurial regions. For sovereign states, the enactment of an enabling framework could usher in a new maxim for economic development in the post-Cold War era: Das (Venture) Kapital.

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Essays

PHOTOGRAPH BY HAVIV/SABA

U.S. troops entering Haiti

For what legitimate purpose can military forces be directed to kill people and break things, if not to take sides?

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The Delusion of Impartial Intervention

Richard K. Betts

PREVENTING PEACE

PHYSICIANS HAVE a motto that peacemakers would do well to adopt: "First, do no harm." Neither the United States nor the United Nations have quite grasped this. Since the end of the Cold War unleashed them to intervene in civil conflicts around the world, they have done reasonably well in some cases, but in others they have unwittingly prolonged suffering where they meant to relieve it.

How does this happen? By following a principle that sounds like common sense: that intervention should be both limited and impartial, because weighing in on one side of a local struggle undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of outside involvement. This Olympian presumption resonates with respect for law and international cooperation. It has the ring of prudence, fairness, and restraint. It makes sense in old-fashioned U.N. peacekeeping operations, where the outsiders' role is not to make peace, but to bless and monitor a cease-fire that all parties have decided to accept. But it becomes a destructive misconception when carried over to the messier realm of "peace enforcement," where the belligerents have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain by fighting.

RICHARD K. BETTS is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Policy Program at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. His latest book is *Military Readiness*, published by the Brookings Institution.

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Limited intervention may end a war if the intervenor takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win—that is, if it is not impartial. Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and impose a peace settlement—that is, if it is not limited. Trying to have it both ways usually blocks peace by doing enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make them stop trying. And the attempt to have it both ways has brought the United Nations and the United States—and those whom they sought to help—to varying degrees of grief in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.

WHO RULES?

WARS HAVE many causes, and each war is unique and complicated, but the root issue is always the same: Who rules when the fighting stops? In wars between countries, the issue may be sovereignty over disputed territory, or suzerainty over third parties, or influence over international transactions. In wars within countries the issue may be which group will control the government, or how the country should be divided so that adversaries can have separate governments. When political groups resort to war, it is because they cannot agree on who gets to call the tune in peace.

A war will not begin unless both sides in a dispute would rather fight than concede. After all, it is not hard to avert war if either one cares primarily about peace—all it has to do is let the other side have what it claims is its due. A war will not end until both sides agree who will control whatever is in dispute.

Is all this utterly obvious? Not to those enthusiasts for international peace enforcement who are imbued with hopes for global governance, unsympathetic to thinking of security in terms of sovereignty, or viscerally sure that war is not a rational political act. They cannot bring themselves to deal forthrightly in the currency of war. They assume instead that outsiders' good offices can pull the scales from the eyes of fighting factions, make them realize that resorting to violence was a blunder, and substitute peaceful negotiation for force. But wars are

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rarely accidents, and it is no accident that belligerents often continue to kill each other while they negotiate, or that the terms of diplomatic settlements usually reflect results on the battlefield.

Others sometimes proceed from muddled assumptions about what force should be expected to accomplish. In a bizarre sequence of statements last spring, for instance, President Clinton threatened air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, then said, "The United States is not, and should not, become involved as a partisan in a war." Next he declared that the United States should lead other Western nations in ending ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, only to say a moment later, "That does not mean that the United States or the United Nations can enter a war, in effect, to redraw the lines . . . within what was Yugoslavia."

This profoundly confused policy, promulgated with the best of lawyerly intentions, inevitably cost lives on all sides in Bosnia. For what legitimate purpose can military forces be directed to kill people and break things, if not to take the side of their opponents? If the use of deadly force is to be legitimate killing rather than senseless killing, it must serve the purpose of settling the war—which means determining who rules, which means leaving someone in power at the end of the day.

How is this done without taking someone's side? And how can outside powers pretend to stop ethnic cleansing without allocating territory—that is, drawing lines? Yet Clinton and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did not make threats to protect recognized or viable borders, but to enforce naturally unstable truce lines that made no sense as a permanent territorial arrangement. Such confusion made intervention an accessory to stalemate, punishing either side for advancing too far but not settling the issue that fuels the war.

Some see a method in the madness. There are two ways to stop a war: having one side impose its will after defeating the other on the battlefield or having both sides accept a negotiated compromise. The hope for a compromise solution accounts for a misconceived impartiality.

When is compromise probable? When both sides believe that they have more to lose than to gain from fighting. Because leaders are often

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE,1963

From the U.N. intervention in the Congo, 1963

sensible, this usually happens before a war starts, which is why most crises are resolved by diplomacy rather than combat. But peaceful compromise has to seem impossible to the opponents for a war to start, and once it begins, compromise becomes even harder. Emotions intensify, sunk costs grow, demands for recompense escalate. If compromise was not tolerable enough to avert war in the first place, it becomes even less attractive once large amounts of blood and treasure have been invested in the cause.

If neither side manages to pound the other into submission and a stalemate emerges, does a compromise peace become more practical? Not for a long time, and not until many more lives have been

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invested in the contending quests for victory. Stalemates rarely seem solid to those with a strong stake in overcoming them. Belligerents conjure up one set of military stratagems and schemes after another to gain the upper hand, or they hope for shifts in alliances or outside assistance to tilt the balance of power, or they gamble that their adversary will be the first to lose heart and crack. Such developments often do break stalemates. In World War I, for example, trench warfare in France ebbed and flowed inconclusively for four years until the Russian capitulation. This allowed the Germans to move armies from the east and achieve a breakthrough that unglued the Western Front and almost brought them victory in the spring of 1918. Then the Allies rebounded, turned the tables with newly arrived American armies, and won the war six months later.

Stalemate is likely to yield to negotiated compromise only after it lasts so long that a military solution appears hopeless to both sides. In the Iran-Iraq War, where U.N. mediation was useful, the two sides had fought ferociously but inconclusively for eight years. The United Nations smoothed the way for both sides to lay down their arms, but it is hard to credit that diplomatic intervention with as much effect in bringing peace as the simple exhaustion and despair of war-makers in Tehran and Baghdad. Mediation is useful, but it helps peacemaking most where peacemaking needs help least.

COMPROMISES THAT KILL

IF THERE is any place where peacemaking needs help most, and fails most abjectly, it is Bosnia. There, the West's attempt at limited but impartial involvement abetted slow-motion savagery. The effort wound up doing things that helped one side, and counterbalancing them by actions that helped the other. This alienated both and enabled them to keep fighting.

The United Nations tried to prevent the Serbs from consolidating their victory, but without going all the way to consistent military support of the Muslims and Croats. The main U.N. mission was humanitarian delivery of food and medicine to besieged communities, but this amounted to breaking the sieges—a military and

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political effect. It is hardly surprising that the Serbs interfered when they could get away with it. In line with the humanitarian rationale, the United Nations supported "safe areas"—pockets of Muslims and Croats hanging on in areas conquered by the Serbs. Apart from such limited action to frustrate the last phase of territorial rearrangement by force, U.N. and U.S. attempts to settle the war were limited to diplomatic mediation, an arms embargo, a "no-fly zone," and economic sanctions on Belgrade.

For over a year, the U.N. presence inhibited forceful reaction to Bosnian Serb provocations because French, British, and other units on the ground were hostage to retaliation. U.S. and U.N. threats were not just weak and hesitant; by trying to be both forceful and neutral, they worked at cross-purposes. First, after much dancing around and wringing of hands, the United Nations and NATO used force on behalf of the Bosnian government, albeit with only a few symbolic "pinprick" air raids against Serb positions. But the outside powers did this while refusing to let those they were defending buy arms to defend themselves. Given the awkward multilateral politics of the arms embargo, this may have been understandable. But as strategy, it was irrational, plain and simple.

Despite the best of lawyerly intentions, an irrational strategy cost lives in Bosnia.

Impartiality compounded the absurdity in August 1994, when the U.N. military commander also threatened the Bosnian government with attack if it violated the weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. U.N. strategy thus bounced between unwillingness to undertake any combat at all and a commitment to fight on two fronts against both belligerents. Such lofty evenhandedness may make sense for a judge in a court that can enforce its writ, but hardly for a general wielding a small stick in a bitter war.

Overall, U.N. pressures maintained a teetering balance of power among the belligerents; the intervenors refused to let either side win. Economic sanctions worked against the Serbs, while the arms embargo worked against the Muslims. The rationale was that evenhandedness would encourage a negotiated settlement. The result was not peace or an end to the killing, but years of military stalemate, slow bleeding, and delusionary diplomatic haggling.

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The desire for impartiality and fairness led outside diplomats to promote territorial compromises that made no strategic sense. The Vance-Owen plan and later proposals mimicked the unrealistic 1947 U.N. partition plan for Palestine: geographic patchworks of noncontiguous territories, vulnerable corridors and supply lines, exposed communities, and indefensible borders. If ever accepted, such plans would create a territorial tinderbox and a perpetual temptation to renew the conflict. Yet the one case in which Washington said it was willing to thrust tens of thousands of American troops into the Bosnian tangle was to enforce just such an accord.

In Somalia, the United States succeeded laudably in relieving starvation. Then, fearful that food supply would fall apart again after withdrawal, Washington took on the mission of restoring civil order. This was less limited and more ambitious than the outside powers' "strategy" in Bosnia, but it stopped short of taking charge and imposing a settlement on the warring factions.

Incongruously, the international operation in Somalia worked at throwing together a local court and police organization before establishing the other essential elements of government, an executive or legislature. Then U.S. forces set out to arrest General Mohamed Farah Aidid—who was not just a troublemaker but one of the prime claimants to governing authority—without championing any other contender. The U.S. attempts failed, but killed a large number of Somalis and further roiled the political waters in Mogadishu. Stung by casualties to U.S. forces, Washington pulled out and left U.N. troops from other countries holding the bag, maintaining an indecisive presence and taking casualties of their own.

It may have been wise to avoid embroilment in the chaos of conflict between Somali clans. But then it was naive to think that intervention could help to end the local anarchy. As author Michael Maren asked in *The New York Times*, "If the peacekeepers aren't keeping the peace, what are they doing?"—especially since the cost of intervention topped $1.5 billion. The U.N. operation was not only indecisive, Maren argued, but fueled the fighting by letting the feuding factions compete for U.N. jobs, contracts, and cash. In areas where U.N. forces were absent, the parties reached accommodation in order to

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reestablish commerce, rather than jockeying for U.N. resources.

After early forceful rhetoric by President Clinton had raised expectations about U.S. action, Bosnia and Somalia helped to brake enthusiasm in New York and Washington for taking on other peace operations. It is indeed wise to be more selective than in the heady days of hope for collective security that followed the end of the Cold War, but it will be unfortunate if the Western powers and the United Nations abandon such missions altogether. If they do not quit completely, the same problem—an attempt to bring peace turning out to postpone peace—can arise again if the misconceptions that produced it are not recognized.

Washington dithered with sanctions against Haiti, then signed a deal with the junta.

Of course, not all problems are due to impartiality. In Haiti, for example, the United States and United Nations clearly did choose sides, supporting the exiled president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. And eventually the unmistakable U.S. willingness to invade forced the junta in Port-au-Prince to back down. Even here, however, suffering was prolonged by the initially limited character of the intervention.

For over a year after the junta reneged on the Governor's Island agreement, Washington relied on economic sanctions against Haiti, a "trickle-up" strategy of coercion that was bound to hurt the innocent long before the guilty. The blockade gradually devastated the health and welfare of the country's masses, who were powerless to make the policy changes demanded by Washington and on whose behalf the sanctions were supposedly being applied. Yet sanctions offered no incentive to Haiti's kleptocratic elites to cut their own throats, and sanctions were not what made the generals sign the accord brokered by former President Jimmy Carter. Instead, the many months during which sanctions were left to work were used by the junta to track down and murder Aristide supporters at a steady pace.

Meddling in the long tragic saga of Haitian misgovernment is a dubious gamble for the United States, considering the formidable durability of the country's predatory political culture. While the relatively peaceful entry of the occupying U.S. forces was welcome, the fledgling

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Haitian experiment in democracy may not outlive the departure of U.S. armed forces. The September agreement did not disband the Haitian military or even completely purge its officer corps, whose corruption and terror tactics have long been most of the problem. Even worse, the accord hinted that—for the first time in the crisis—Washington might have again erred on the side of impartiality. American leaders spoke of the generals' "military honor," U.S. troops were ordered to cooperate with the usurpers' security forces, and many of the anti-Aristide gangsters were left free to plot to regain power. Deciding whether to intervene in Haiti was agonizing. Once that was done, however, picking a side was certainly wise. But that choice was weakened by dithering too long with sanctions, then appearing to waver in support for the chosen side when U.S. military force was finally applied.

Impartiality nonetheless remains a norm in many other cases. It has worked in cases that lie beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as the cease-fire mediation between Iran and Iraq, or the political receivership of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). When looking at the reasons for their success, however, it becomes apparent that impartiality works best where intervention is needed least: where wars have played themselves out and the fighting factions need only the good offices of mediators to lay down their arms. Impartiality is likely to work against peace in the more challenging cases—where intervention must make the peace, rather than just preside over it—because it reflects deeper confusion over what war is about.

IMPERIAL IMPARTIALITY

IF OUTSIDERS such as the United States or the United Nations are faced with demands for peace in wars where passions have not burned out, they can avoid the costs and risks that go with entanglement by refusing the mandate—staying aloof and letting the locals fight it out. Or they can jump in and help one of the contenders defeat the other. But can they bring peace sooner than exhaustion from prolonged carnage would, if they remain impartial? Not with a gentle, restrained impartiality but with an active, harsh impartiality that overpowers both sides: an imperial impar-

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tiality. This is a tall order, seldom with many supporters, and it is hard to think of cases where it has actually worked.

The best example of imperial impartiality is the U.N. operation in Cambodia—a grand-scale takeover of much of the administrative authority in the country, and a program for establishing a new government through supervised elections and a constituent assembly. Despite great obstacles and tenuous results, UNTAC fulfilled most of its mandate. This success should be given its due. As a model to rescue the ideal of limited and impartial intervention, however, it falls short.

First, the United Nations did not nip a horrible war in the bud. As with Iran and Iraq, it capitalized on 15 years of exhaustion and bloody stalemate. The outside powers recognized that the main order of business was to determine who rules, but they did not act before the local factions were weary enough to agree on a procedure for doing so.

Second, U.N. intervention was limited only in one sense: it avoided direct enforcement of the transition agreement when local contenders proved recalcitrant. Luckily, such incidents were manageable, or the whole experiment would have been a fiasco. In other respects, the scale of involvement was too huge to provide a model. Apart from the wars in Korea and Kuwait, UNTAC was the most massive U.N. intervention in history. It involved thousands of personnel from a host of countries and billions of dollars in expenditures. The Cambodia operation proved so expensive, at a time when other demands on the United Nations were escalating dramatically, that it cannot be repeated more than once in a blue moon.

Third, although UNTAC should count as a success—especially after the election it conducted against all odds in 1993—the operation's results have been unstable. Despite a tremendous U.N. presence, the terms of the transition agreement were never faithfully followed by all the local combatants and continued to erode after UNTAC's departure. For example, because the Khmer Rouge reneged, none of the Cambodian factions disarmed to the degree stipulated in the agreement; after the election, the constituent assembly never seriously debated a constitution, but more or less rubber-stamped Prince Norodom Sihanouk's demands; and sporadic fighting between the Khmer Rouge and other parties continued before and after UNTAC left.

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Fourth, and more to the point, the U.N. success was linked with impartiality only in principle, not in effect. The real success of the transition overseen by UNTAC was not in fostering a final peaceful compromise among the parties in Cambodia, but in altering the balance of power among them and marginalizing the worst one. The transition did not compel an end to violent strife, but it did facilitate the realignment of parties and military forces that might bring it about. The old Cold War alignment of Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh was transformed into a new coalition of everyone against the Khmer Rouge. Any peace Cambodia is likely to achieve will come from the new balance of power.

MEDDLING WITHOUT MUDDLING

THE "PEACEKEEPING" that has been the United Nations' forte can help fortify peace, but it does not create peace as "peace enforcement" is supposed to do. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and the United Nations have stumbled into several imbroglios where it was not clear which of the two missions they were up to, and there has been much head-scratching about the gray area between operations under Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. Washington and New York have responded to rough experiences by remaining mired in indecision and hamstrung by half-measures (Bosnia), facing failure and bailing out (Somalia), acting only after a long period of limited and misdirected pressure (Haiti), or holding back from action where more awesome disaster than anywhere else called for it (Rwanda). To do better in picking and choosing, it would help to be clearer about how military means should be marshaled for political ends.

Recognize that to make peace is to decide who rules. Making peace means determining how the war ends. If Americans or U.N. forces are going to intervene to make peace, they will often have to kill people and break things in the process. If they choose to do this, it should be after they have decided who will rule afterward.

If claims or capabilities in the local fracas are not clear enough to make this judgment, then they are not clear enough for intervention

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to bring peace. By the same token, international forces should not mix in the dangerous business of determining who governs without expecting deadly opposition. An intervention that can be stopped in its tracks by a few dozen fatalities, like the U.S. operation in Somalia was, is one that should never have begun.

Avoid half-measures. If the United States or the United Nations wish to bring peace to violent places before tragedy unfolds in full, gruesome detail, they should act decisively—by either lending their military weight to one side or forcing both to compromise. In either case, leaders or outside powers should avoid what the natural instincts of successful politicians and bureaucrats tell them is sensible: a middle course.

Half-measures often make sense in domestic politics, but that is precisely because peace already exists. Contending interests accept compromises negotiated in legislatures, adjudicated in courts, and enforced by executives because the state has a monopoly on organized force; the question of "Who rules?" is settled. That is the premise of politics in peace. In war, that premise is what the fighting is all about. A middle course in intervention—especially a gradual and symbolic use of force—is likely to do little but muddy both sides' calculations, fuel their hopes of victory, or kill people for principles only indirectly related to the purpose of the war. If deadly force is to make a direct contribution to peace, it must engage the purposes most directly related to war—the determination of borders and the distribution of political power.

Do not confuse peace with justice. If outside powers want to do the right thing, but do not want to do it in a big way, they should recognize that they are placing a higher premium on legitimacy than on peace. Most international interventions since the end of the Cold War were not driven by the material interests of the outside powers but by their moral interests: securing peace and justice. Peace and justice, however, are not natural allies, unless right just happens to coincide with might.

Outside intervention in a civil war usually becomes an issue when the sides are closely enough matched that neither can defeat the other quickly. And when material interests are not directly involved, it is

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impractical to expect great powers or the United Nations to expend the resources for an overwhelming and decisive military action. So if peace should take precedence, intervention should support the mightiest of the rivals, irrespective of their legitimacy. If the United Nations had weighed in on the side of the Serbs, or had helped Aidid take control in Mogadishu rather than trying to jail him, there might well have been peace in Bosnia and Somalia long ago. If justice takes precedence, however, limited intervention may well lengthen a conflict. Perhaps putting an end to killing should not be the first priority in peacemaking, but interventionists should admit that any intervention involves such a choice.

Tension between peace and justice also arises in assessing territorial divisions like those proposed for Bosnia. If the aim is to reduce violent eruptions, borders should be drawn not to minimize the transfer of populations and property, but to make borders coherent, congruent with political solidarity, and defensible. This, unfortunately, makes ethnic cleansing the solution to ethnic cleansing. It also will not guarantee against later outbreaks of revanchism. But it can make war less constant. Better the model of India and Pakistan than that of Lebanon.

Do not confuse balance with peace or justice. Preventing either side from gaining a military advantage prevents ending the war by military means. Countries that are not losing a war are likely to keep fighting until prolonged indecision makes winning seem hopeless. Outsiders who want to make peace but do not want to take sides or take control themselves try to avoid favoritism by keeping either side from overturning an indecisive balance on the battlefield. This supports military stalemate, lengthens the war, and costs more lives.

Make humanitarian intervention militarily rational. Sometimes the imperative to stop slaughter or save the starving should be too much even for the most hard-boiled realists, and intervention may be warranted even if it does not aim to secure peace. This was a motive in Bosnia and Somalia, but interventions there involved presence in battle areas, constant friction with combatants or local political factions, and skirmishes that escalated without any sensible strategic plan. Bad experiences in those cases prevented rapid multilateral intervention in the

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butchery in Rwanda, which could have saved many more lives.

Operation Provide Comfort, the U.S. humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq, and the recent unilateral French action in Rwanda provide better models. In these cases, the intervening forces carved out lines within which they could take command without fighting, but which they could defend if necessary—areas within which the intervenors themselves would rule temporarily. Then they got on with ministering to the needy populations and protecting them from assault. Such action is a stopgap, not a solution, but it is less likely to make the war worse.

In Bosnia, by contrast, the "safe areas," weapons exclusion zones, and towns supplied by American airdrops were islands surrounded by hostile forces and represented messy territorial anomalies in what was effectively a Serb conquest. It was no surprise that the Serbs would hover, waiting to pounce whenever they thought they might be able to get away with it, probing and testing the resolve of the outsiders to fight, waiting for the international community to tire of the effort to keep the enclaves on life support.

Calling attention to mistakes, confusions, and uncomfortable choices is not intended to discredit intervention altogether. It is meant to argue for caution, because confusion about what is at issue can make such undertakings cause conflict rather than cure it. Doing it right is not impossible. The United States and United Nations have collaborated successfully in peacemaking in the past, most notably in the wars over Korea and Kuwait. Enthusiasm for widespread involvement in local conflicts in the early 1990s was based on expectations that it would require a small proportion of the effort of those two huge enterprises. Unfortunately, this was probably true in some cases where the United Nations held back, as in Rwanda, and untrue in some cases where it jumped in, as in Bosnia. Peacemaking will not always cost as much as it did in Korea and Kuwait. The underlying issues, however, are much the same—who is in charge, and in what pieces of territory, after a war ends. Intervention that proceeds as if the issues are different, and can be settled by action toward the belligerents that is both evenhanded in intent and weak in capability, will more likely prevent peace than enforce it.

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In Defense of Intervention

Tony Smith

THE WILSONIAN MISSION

THE CLINTON administration's stand on the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad pleases no one. Some criticize the president for lacking the courage of his repeated conviction that America should take an active role on behalf of these principles; not even the intervention in Haiti satisfies them that he has finally found his voice in foreign affairs. Others, to the contrary, fervently regret that he has such convictions at all and hope that the Haiti involvement will leave him chastened.

Those who criticize the president's convictions call on him to stop making impractical pledges to sponsor unrealistic reform abroad, commitments that serve no vital interests while requiring substantial outlays of power and prestige without clear promise of success. In their view, Washington should restrain its emotions over human rights abuses in China, limit itself to humanitarian assistance to Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa, and offer little more than diplomatic good offices for Bosnia. Involvement that includes armed intervention, as in Bosnia or Haiti, or harsh economic sanctions, as with China or North Korea, is quite unlikely to produce the desired political outcomes. America will bog down in imbroglios of no real importance to the national interest.

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From this point of view, the current involvement in Haiti may well turn out to be a difficult and in many ways futile undertaking. Such a negative reading is only somewhat mitigated by the president's good fortune at securing a last-minute victory thanks to the efforts of the team led by former President Jimmy Carter to secure an agreement for a peaceful transition from the regime of General Raoul Cédras to a restoration of Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The hope should be that Clinton has learned his lesson from a brush with armed invasion and will rein in any remaining enthusiasm for future adventures.

By contrast, those of us who share the president's convictions lament his failure to stand more forcibly by them. Whether with respect to Bosnia, China, Rwanda, or Haiti, we deplore the way the White House has struck rhetorical poses in favor of protecting oppressed foreign citizenries from governmental or military abuses, only to back down at the first sign that those who deny human rights or attack democratic order might seriously challenge its policy or that public opinion polls show the American public is unconcerned by these outrages. Much suffering could be spared if the United States, working with other countries through multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), or NATO, took a clear position on what is not tolerable in world affairs and then moved decisively to enforce the collective will in areas where such efforts could produce results. A historically critical opportunity to give structure and meaning to the post-Cold War world is being missed and will be ever more difficult to recover later.

In this view, the current Haiti intervention is to be welcomed, as are U.N. Security Council resolutions 917 and 940 authorizing American action. But the decision to act came so late and was surrounded by so many hesitations—including not only those of the president but also of Congress and most U.S. allies—that it scarcely appears able to set the kind of precedent that might intimidate Cuban President Fidel Castro or warn the Bosnian Serbs of Washington's toughness. To many of us, it appears that Clinton bungled his way into Haiti and so will fail to make the best use of an opportunity he should have more willingly embraced.

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In the case of Haiti, how much can the American intervention accomplish if a general amnesty covers the military and if plans for the country's reorganization involve a continued political role for many who worked under Cédras? Studies of Panama five years after the U.S. invasion there show how threadbare a "democratic restoration" may be if it lacks comprehensiveness. By contrast, the best model for how to proceed in Haiti might be to follow the example of Costa Rica, which long ago disbanded its standing army. If events in Haiti redound to America's credit, if the OAS ends up revitalized by a worthwhile mission successfully accomplished, then the groundwork may have been laid for a new beginning in U.S.-Latin American relations based on a common adherence to human rights and democratic government. What the Clinton administration must avoid is ending the occupation before a credible start has been made toward constitutional rule (a process that should allow the Americans to leave by early 1996). At the same time, Washington should do its best to involve the OAS as much as possible in the process of democratic reconstruction.

Clinton needs to articulate a clear definition of America's interest in Haiti.

Most critically, the Clinton administration needs to articulate a clear definition of the American self-interest to be served by defending human rights and democracy in a place like Haiti. The American public needs to understand that good relations with Latin America have historically been in the American interest, but that the nationalist sentiments of many Latin countries—understandably suspicious of American power and hence reluctant to support action even in a case like Haiti, where standards to which most of the hemisphere subscribes have been flagrantly violated—have long precluded the kind of close relations that exist between the United States and Western Europe. Today, consolidation of democracy in Latin America offers the best prospect for good relations since American gunboats first appeared in Latin American waters almost a century ago. The most important reason to defend democracy in Haiti is therefore that it promises the United States a positive role in the historic transformation of Latin America and a new beginning to hemispheric relations.

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DEMOCRACY MATTERS

UNIQUE AS THE current debate is in many respects, its basic points recapitulate familiar positions. Whether the United States should promote democracy abroad has been one of the major questions of twentieth-century American foreign policy. From debates over Cuba and the Philippines in the late nineteenth century through the debates over the democratization of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Americans have argued the relevance to their own national interest in encouraging democracy for others, and the proper means for doing so where appropriate.

Promoting democracy abroad has served America's national security interest in three distinct ways. First, goading peoples oppressed by powers hostile to the United States to dream of their eventual emancipation through democratic government is to channel nationalist energies in a direction favorable to this country. Here was the tactic Eisenhower adopted when he encouraged nationalist forces in the "captive nations" of Eastern Europe to continue the struggle against Soviet domination.

The tactic is still used today in messages to the Cuban people and those under Iraqi domination, reminding them that a proven alternative to the political system they now endure exists outside, if only they can find a way to dislodge the power that governs them. However, because the United States today has no great power rivals, such appeals to resist oppression are not so often heard as they were from the 1940s through the 1980s.

A second and more enduring reason to foster democracy abroad was particular to Latin America. Washington hoped that democracy would provide modern, constitutional government and stability where civil conflict threatened to open the door for rival powers to enter the Western hemisphere, a preoccupation first expressed by the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. In the second decade of this century, Woodrow Wilson believed that democratic governance could provide political stability and end the region's chronic civil strife that had long presented a security concern to the United States. American interventions were poorly handled, however, and the local

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social and economic facilitators of democratization were weak.

With the Cold War and successful communist revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua, Washington was once again challenged to find a political solution to a problem that defied easy military response. Presidents Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, and Bush found themselves imitating Wilson and calling for the creation of democratic states. As these later policies imply, the term "Wilsonian" has described those who have insisted that ultimately democratic governments alone could provide the stability the United States needs abroad in areas where its security interests are compelling. But as with the first reason to promote democracy abroad, so too with the second: the end of the Cold War significantly reduces American concern over Latin America's civil upheavals.

There is, however, a third traditional reason for America to promote democracy abroad, one which remains operative today. The expansion of democratic government should create better relations with our neighbors to the south and provide an improved framework for hemispheric understanding. With the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the outlook for increased economic exchange with Latin America has brightened substantially, and the region's increased prosperity may well have the important collateral advantage of reducing the flow of economic refugees to the United States. Democratic government increases the likelihood that the United States can build trade with Latin America and better control its own borders.

But the critical goal for the United States has little to do with commerce or borders or military security. Instead, its major interest should be to seek a greater sense of mutual respect and understanding with Latin nations based on a common hemispheric adherence to democratic institutions and values. In the past 15 years, democracy has shown new vigor throughout Latin America. This strength reflects not only domestic forces, such as the strong support of the Roman Catholic Church for human rights, which moderated the region's right. It also reflects international changes, including the end of the Cold War, which moderated the region's left, and the consolidation of democratic states in Spain and Portugal, long the political lodestars for many Latin elites. Now is the moment for the United States to weigh in.

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America's Cold War victory rested on expanding prosperity and democratic institutions in Europe and Japan and linking those political values to the character of its allies, allowing them to overcome the worst vanities and suspicions common to nationalism. The promotion of democracy provided the moral and institutional framework for cooperation in the past, and it promises the creation of a peaceful world community in the future. Democracies tend to be less militaristic than authoritarian states, and their relations with each other have been especially pacific. The intuitive feeling of many Americans of the importance of the successful consolidation of democracy, especially in countries as significant as Russia and Mexico, is validated by a growing body of social science analysis.[1]

Similarly, the United States should now strive to overcome the nationalist jealousies and suspicions that remain as obstacles to better relations with Latin nations. The reconciliation of political forms that made Germany suitable for the European Union, and later brought Spain and Portugal into that community, might be duplicated in the Western hemisphere. Such a process of nurturing mutual respect and cooperation in this region is to be all the more hoped for because by the year 2025 as much as a quarter of the American population will be of Latin ancestry.

Admittedly, the obstacles to consolidating democratic government in Latin America are many. The region's authoritarians may be exhausted; George Bush put it well in May 1989 when he declared that in Latin America "the day of the dictator is over." And communism has suffered a serious decline nearly everywhere. Yet by no means is the success of democratic government a foregone conclusion, least of all in Haiti, with its poverty, lack of democratic traditions, and organizational and spiritual devastation caused by three years of cruel military dictatorship.

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[1] A large body of empirical work tends to confirm the argument that relations between democratic states are especially harmonious. See Michael Doyle, "An International Liberal Community," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking American Security: Beyond the Cold War to New World Order*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1991; David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, March 1992; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

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

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

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Indeed, at the time of the September 1991 coup against Aristide, the region's wave of democratic successes was cresting. The return of democracy to Argentina, Chile, and Brazil in the 1980s suggested what might be achieved. The election of Violeta Chamorro as president of Nicaragua in 1990 was still more evidence of the success of the ambition. The trend culminated in a June 1991 agreement in Santiago, Chile, by the OAS to take joint steps in defense of democratic government in the hemisphere. Unfortunately, when Aristide fell only three months later, no effective action was taken. The weakness of the OAS may have contributed to Alberto Fujimori's coup the following April in Peru and to the coup attempts in Venezuela and Guatemala.

Hence the disappointment of Wilsonians today. After decades of successful cooperation among the democracies, problems like those of Bosnia appear to defy multilateral solution, aid to emergencies like Rwanda has been distressingly meager, and where action has occurred, as with Haiti, it has been done in a manner that does not encourage the expectation that it will readily be duplicated elsewhere. One can understand why Czech President Václav Havel may fear how the fine words of NATO's "partnership for peace" will sound if ever Eastern Europe is menaced by a new wave of Russian imperialism.

A SPLENDID LITTLE WAR

THE CLINTON administration initially gave good reason to think that it would act forcibly to promote human rights and democracy. And the administration itself helped build the expectation that multilateral institutions like NATO, the OAS, the United Nations, and various government-backed international economic organizations might reach new levels of maturity by working aggressively for those ends.

As a candidate, Clinton had declared that "no national security issue is more urgent than securing democracy's triumph around the world." Less than three weeks after the new administration took office, Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke of a "broader imperative" moving the president "to become actively and directly engaged in the multilateral effort to reach a just and workable solution" to conflict in the Balkans. "The world's response to the violence

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in the former Yugoslavia," Christopher said, "is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of the ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War world."

But in short order the prolonged spectacle began to unfold of a presidency whose warnings were merely bluffs. In due course, the multilateral institutions that, thanks to American support were presumably to find a new role in world affairs, were instead used by Washington as scapegoats or excuses for inaction.

Expanding democracy should create better relations with our neighbors to the south.

For two critical reasons the Clinton presidency may now be ready to enter a new phase in its foreign policy that puts this unhappy record behind it. First, while Clinton's priority has been to get the national economy moving again, there is a general consensus that a substantial recovery is underway. Perhaps the improvement began at the end of the Bush presidency; perhaps it should be more robust; perhaps its character has little to do with the economic design that the new administration initially claimed would guide it. None of these observations is relevant to the point that after nearly two years in office, Clinton is presiding over a healthy economy, thus alleviating his major concern about reelection and presumably freeing him to act more boldly in world affairs.

The second consideration is that the administration surely came to realize that it badly needs to demonstrate that it can act forcibly in foreign affairs. Clinton did not need an engagement on the scale of Bush in the Arabian peninsula, but a "splendid little war," like the American action in Cuba in 1898, in which Theodore Roosevelt showed himself to be an effective commander in chief, would do his presidency no harm. Something had to be done to reverse the image of a president whose backing down over Bosnia surely contributed to a successful resistance to American power in Somalia, which in turn presumably emboldened the Chinese, then the Haitians, next the North Koreans, the Cubans, and finally the Iraqis to test American intentions.

For an intervention such as that in Haiti to be more than a political quick fix for the administration, however, it should be done with the

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intention of promoting democracy and strengthening the ability of international institutions to defend human rights in different parts of the world. Critics charge that the United States cannot become the moral policeman of the world, and they warn darkly against exaggerated reliance on multilateral institutions that might compromise American sovereignty. But the contentions that if Washington responds to some problems abroad it must act on all, or that the United Nations might one day usurp presidential or congressional powers, need to be rejected as groundless objections against the exercise of American leadership. America can recognize the intractability of some problems given the limits on its power without becoming isolationist.

The advent of democracy throughout the Western hemisphere holds the promise of bringing political and economic stability to Latin America and, in the process, to serve at once America's commercial interests, the need to control its borders, and the goal of creating a community of feeling that might one day rival that which now exists with much of Europe. President Clinton was fully justified in his speech of September 15, when he declared his determination to restore Aristide to power:

> History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region, and more likely to create free markets and economic opportunity and to become strong, reliable trading partners, and they're more likely to provide their own people with the opportunities that will encourage them to stay in their nations and to build their own futures.

Admittedly, there is something to the argument that the United States in effect sponsored refugee flows from Cuba and Haiti with its embargoes on those two countries. But the human rights abuses of Castro's regime and its economic ineptitude have been continuing for 35 years now, while the brutal treatment of the Haitian population by the Cédras regime began the moment the Haitian military toppled the Aristide government. To see the refugees as the creation of American policy is substantially to understate the responsibility of these dictatorships for the desperation of their peoples. When hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Cédras or Castro dictatorships may arrive

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suddenly on America's shores, the United States has a right to act to establish legitimate governments in those lands as a way of controlling its own borders. In these circumstances, American tradition and interests dictate that a new order in Haiti (or in Cuba, in the unlikely event that the Castro regime should fall soon) be democratically constituted.

Long-term security requires not only that Washington's policy be credible but also that America inspire multilateral alliances and institutions with a sense of mission. While leadership may require unilateral action on occasion, multilateral institutions are the most effective way to address ethnic, nationalist, and religious hatreds, the human rights abuses of neofascist governments, the critical environmental and economic decisions needed in an era of galloping demographic expansion, and the rising threat of nuclear proliferation. If, despite its enormous relative power and prestige, Washington's leadership is seldom to be found setting and enforcing the rules and norms of world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, it is not only the weak in Haiti or Bosnia or Somalia or Cuba who will suffer but the very idea of an international community with a shared sense of duty and direction, and ultimately the United States itself.

The contention that if Washington responds to some problems abroad it must act on all is groundless.

It is an extraordinary spectacle, after all, that the alliance put in place by the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and their allies in the Pacific should not respond more effectively to crises of the proportion of those in the Balkans or the Caribbean. Despite the problems at its doorstep, NATO appears unable to find a new mission for itself in the post-Cold War world. Some wonder if the OAS is any more effective than the Organization of African Unity in protecting human rights in the region. Why did Poland, Israel, and Bangladesh offer to second an American intervention in Haiti when, with the exception of Argentina, all the prominent countries in Latin America remained silent?

Wilsonians fear that the United States has won the Cold War only to lose the opportunities that its power provides, as was the case after 1918. They recall events after 1945, when America stepped forward

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with a political agenda for world order capable of providing for the nation's security through a recognition that leadership was required to affirm an international rule of law embodied in a host of effective international institutions. Trying to remedy the evident weakness of many of these institutions, they point out that a willingness and an ability to work multilaterally is most likely to occur with fellow democracies that themselves respect the rule of law and understand the historical challenges facing their way of life. They assert that contemporary Americans would do well to recall Woodrow Wilson's words on April 2, 1917, as he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany:

> Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.

LEADING THE CHARGE

A SERIOUS PROBLEM with making support for human rights and democracy a cornerstone of American foreign policy is that the American people generally require a clear statement of the national interest before they will support prolonged and costly interventions. And calling on the nation to rally round the flag simply for the sake of doing good for others has never persuaded many Americans to respond.

As a geographically and militarily secure democratic country with a liberal, anti-expansionist culture, the United States has a strong tendency toward isolationism. Historically, America has had to believe itself directly menaced before it would act, and even then, as events of the 1930s demonstrate, it may be slow indeed to see the challenge. Here is a part of today's problem, much as it was after World War I: the United States enjoys a preeminent role in world affairs, but many see no self-evident stake in world affairs bidding it to act. Human rights may be trampled on in Bosnia, China, Rwanda, Cuba, or Haiti, yet lacking a rationale for action spelled out in national security terms, Americans are reluctant to engage in more than humanitarian gestures. American democracy itself will put a stop to

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quixotic calls to sponsor democracy worldwide; any president who fails to recognize the force of public opinion will lose his mandate.

In the face of these obstacles, leadership is called for to articulate the American interest in fostering democracy abroad in terms the American public will accept. The historical record shows that such an ambition has been intrinsic to the country's greatest successes in foreign policy since the Second World War. Victory in the Cold War has contributed directly to the strength and prestige of democratic government around the world at the end of the twentieth century. Most recently, until the current disagreements broke out over policy toward Haiti, efforts to promote human rights and democracy abroad have had bipartisan support and had become an integral part of America's established framework for foreign policy. (Whatever the objections raised by Republican Senators Robert Dole of Kansas and Richard Lugar of Indiana to Clinton's policies in the Caribbean, the most Wilsonian of Wilson's successors was Ronald Reagan.)

Wilsonianism's success in world affairs depends on its resonance with international history in the twentieth century. By trying to foster democratic government abroad, Washington was in step with the times, responding to the desperate need of nationalist forces for some blueprint of popular sovereignty that might give their people dignity. The genius of Wilsonianism has been that it has not tried to challenge so much as to channel this upsurge of nationalist sentiment. Admittedly, the effort has at times been destructive, as when Wilson's own efforts to promote the democratization of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic in the second and third decades of this century ended up creating the circumstances that led to the Somoza and Trujillo dictatorships.

But the argument that efforts to encourage democracy are sometimes mistaken does not mean that they are always fruitless, as the history of American involvement in Europe and the current strength of democratic government in Latin America and parts of the Far East clearly illustrate. By suggesting that democracy be the framework for stable constitutional government, the United States has countered the appeal of fascism and communism and helped bring stability to parts of the world where imperialist struggles or the triumph of hostile

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nationalist forces might otherwise have occurred. For reasons particular to the dynamics of world history in the twentieth century, democracy has had an appeal far beyond its region of birth.

For the Clinton administration to ally itself with the tradition of fostering democracy abroad is to join an approach to world leadership that has already demonstrated its worth. This tradition has historically been acceptable to the American public, provided that a credible security rationale is articulated on its behalf.

Of course, such assertions should not mean a blank check to go charging about the world on a white horse of promises with respect to democracy and human rights. The United States must recognize the limits on its power and cooperate with the many peoples whose political systems are not like its own. In today's world, prudence dictates that although the United States should do what it can to foster human rights and democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe (including Russia), it should be far more reserved on these matters with respect to China, most of the Muslim world, and Africa. And this country would do well to spend more time tending to its own problems than trying to set everyone else's houses in order. But the criticism that fostering human rights and democratic government abroad is idealistic, utopian, or moralistic, and hence unsuited to furthering American interests, needs to be confronted. In Eastern Europe, Central America, and the Caribbean, the establishment of democratic governments holds the best promise of stability and the emergence of states feeling a community of interests with the West. A forward-looking policy in defense of human rights and democracy in these circumstances is not only morally appealing, but it is also in the security interests of the United States.

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Arms and the People

Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth

THE MIND OF AMERICA ON FORCE

SINCE THE end of the Cold War, the American public has shown three different faces with respect to using U.S. military force abroad: full support for the Gulf War, transitory support in Somalia, and no support in Bosnia. An examination of public opinion and media coverage of these cases provides a paradigm of the opportunities and obstacles faced by policymakers in seeking to assess the likely public response to American involvement abroad, as in Haiti. American attitudes toward these three crises suggest that the public will be clearly disposed to act militarily in two situations: if it feels America's vital interests are at stake, and if American military force can provide humanitarian assistance without becoming engaged in a protracted conflict. The peacekeeper role evokes an ambiguous response, but the public strongly rejects the peacemaker role.

The patterns of response suggest that early in a crisis the public will seriously consider the use of force, but that even when it feels the United States has a responsibility to act in its national interest, large percentages (sometimes majorities) will favor no action unless they

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ANDREW KOHUT is Director of the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press, a public service arm of the Times Mirror Co. His is also former President of the Gallup Organization and founder of Princeton Survey Research. ROBERT C. TOTH, a former foreign and national security correspondent of the *Los Angeles Times*, is a Senior Associate at the center. CAROL J. BOWMAN, Director of Research at the center, assembled the survey data for this article.

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are swayed by presidential leadership. All of these factors may be missing in the case of Haiti.

GUNG-HO FOR THE GULF

THE PERSIAN Gulf War enjoyed popular support because it was relatively cost-free and ended well. But even in the earliest stages of the crisis, long before the outcome of the war was certain, public opinion was positive enough to convince policymakers that Americans would support the war effort. Several reasons can be cited. From the start, there was a strong belief that the United States should play a significant role in helping defend the Saudi Arabian oil fields and evicting Iraq from Kuwait. The Bush administration did a very good job of communicating to the public the purpose of the Persian Gulf deployment, including its initial defensive mission and later offensive mission. Multilateral contributions of money and manpower boosted public support for a military option. The congressional debate and vote to authorize the use of force in the Persian Gulf fortified American opinion. Finally, extensive media coverage of the crisis, and later the war, solidified public opinion and kept public attention focused on the crisis.

The amount of television coverage was unprecedented. The Tyndall Report, which tracks television news coverage, found that the amount of Persian Gulf–related news aired on the three U.S. broadcast networks in 1990, before the war began, was nearly four times more than the amount for the top story of 1989, the Tiananmen Square crackdown. And network news coverage was not the key media element in this war. The viewing of live news on CNN played a well-recognized, crucial role in the public's continuous connection to the Persian Gulf from August 1990 onward; CNN was overwhelmingly the medium of choice in this respect. Probably for this reason, public attitudes toward the Gulf deployment differed substantially from reactions to previous major U.S. military involvements. More of the American public had an opinion about the decision to commit U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia (92 percent) than about the decisions on Vietnam two decades ago (78 percent) or South Korea in 1950 (85 percent).

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First reactions to American troops in the Persian Gulf, Panama, and Somalia were also more positive than first reactions to troops in Vietnam and Korea and all, as we will discuss, were considerably more positive than the reaction to the dispatch of troops in Haiti. It may be that the public, watching events unfold on television, feels it is taking greater part in go-to-war decisions than 40 years ago. Again, however, Haiti stands out as an exception. Table 1 summarizes this data.

The public seemed persuaded from the start on moral and practical grounds that force was justifiable in the Persian Gulf. In a *New York Times*/CBS poll in early August 1990, more Americans saw a parallel between stopping Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and stopping Hitler (61 percent) than between the Persian Gulf and Vietnam (42 percent).[1] In the same survey, two out of three Americans agreed that the United States should have a say in who controls Mideast oil. But while first reactions to Persian Gulf troop deployment (portrayed as a move to defend Saudi Arabia and oil fields) were very positive, the conditionality of that public approval is striking. First reactions to the possibility of offensive action against Iraq were quite negative. The public opposed bombing Iraqi military targets to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait by almost two to one: 59 percent to 27 percent (WP).

The public remained ambivalent about going to war right up until Bush ordered air strikes. At the end of the prewar period, it was still closely divided on whether economic sanctions should be given more time to work. While large majorities throughout the prewar period agreed with the general proposition that the United States should do what was required to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait, including using force, when pollsters asked more pointed, "hard" questions about military operations, they got more dovish answers. In mid-November 1990, 53 percent said that, based on all they had heard or read, the United States should not go to war against Iraq over the Mideast

[1] *The New York Times*/CBS poll, hereafter identified as NYT. For brevity, most polls in this article will be identified by the initials of the polling organizations. In partnerships, only one organization is cited. Other abbreviations are: WP for *The Washington Post*/ABC, TMC for the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press, LAT for *Los Angeles Times*, NBC for NBC/*The Wall Street Journal*, Time for *Time*/CNN, ATI for Americans Talk Issues, and UM for the University of Maryland.

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(LAT). Responses to "hard" questions changed with the U.N. Security Council vote in November that set the January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Before that vote, majorities opposed going to war with Iraq; afterward, majorities favored it every time the question was asked (Gallup).

EARLY RESPONSES TO THE USE OF FORCE

TABLE 1.	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	UNCERTAIN
KOREA			
AUGUST 1950	65	20	15
VIETNAM			
JANUARY 1965	50	28	22
MAY 1965	52	26	22
NOVEMBER 1965	64	21	15
GRENADA			
NOVEMBER 1983	63	29	8
PANAMA			
JANUARY 1990	72	18	10
IRAQ / KUWAIT			
AUGUST 1990	75	17	8
JANUARY 1991	77	15	8
SOMALIA			
DECEMBER 1992	74	21	5
HAITI			
SEPTEMBER 1994	41	52	7

Positive response refers to "should be involved," "not a mistake," "a good idea," and "right decision;" negative response refers to the opposite. Polls were conducted by Gallup, except for Panama and Somalia, where the surveys were done by NBC/*The Wall Street Journal*; the January 1991 poll on Iraq, by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press; and the Haiti poll, by *The New York Times*.

The contributions of men and money from allied governments added support to this sentiment, but more important was the congressional debate and subsequent vote in early January 1991 for war. All major polls found majorities, some as high as 82 percent (*Newsweek*), supporting Bush's intention to seek congressional approval before using force. After the vote, support for immediate military action increased sharply (WP).

A final factor was the Bush administration's communication skills in justifying the war. In early August 1990, the public was divided over whether Bush had "explained clearly what's at stake and why he is sending troops to Saudi Arabia": 50 percent yes, 41 percent no (NYT). One month later, 77 percent said that they had a clear idea on the matter (WP). At no point during the military buildup and debate about military action did approval ratings for Bush fall below 55 percent on his handling of the crisis.

SHIFTING SANDS OF SOMALIA

THE FIRST post–Gulf War overseas commitment of U.S. forces began with an American public more positively disposed toward

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and confident in its military than at any time since the Vietnam era. The initial purpose of the Somalia mission, providing humanitarian aid, was one the public easily embraced, and extensive, supportive media coverage attended the arrival of American forces there. Immediately after the deployment was ordered, 66 percent of the public surveyed in December 1992 approved sending "American military forces to assure distribution of relief supplies" (*Newsweek*). The next month, after the U.S. Marines landed, their mission was approved overwhelmingly by 84 percent, of whom 53 percent "strongly approved" (LAT).

Nonetheless, warning signs were apparent. The public overwhelmingly understood the mission to be humanitarian, not fighting: 59 percent in December 1992 said the main objective was to "deliver relief supplies"; only 31 percent said it was to "also attempt to bring a permanent end to the fighting" (Gallup). The public expected the mission to be short: 62 percent believed the United States would not get bogged down in Somalia, but would get out quickly (WP), 51 percent believed it would be over within six months, and 69 percent said it would end within a year (LAT).

Even after the first clashes with Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid and initial U.S. casualties, the American public remained behind the effort. At the end of March, 84 percent of Americans approved (56 percent "approved strongly") of the use of U.S. forces for humanitarian purposes (ATI). Even in June, after the mission had broadened dramatically, with a full-scale attack on Aidid camps in retaliation for the deaths of 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, 65 percent of Americans approved of U.S. participation in U.N. efforts against a warlord (Gallup).

But the development of public support for the new mission was inhibited by American television screens going virtually blank on Somalia for half a year after the Marines landed. Public interest plummeted from 52 percent who said they followed the issue "very closely" in January to 16 percent in June (TMC, Gallup). In the fall, when the networks and public attention returned to the story, the nature and danger of the mission were very different, and support withered rapidly.

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

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

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In September, as the U.S. death toll mounted and violence increased, the public divided evenly (46 percent disapproved vs. 43 percent approved) over "the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia" (*Time*). The same month a majority said U.S. troops should leave (53 percent) rather than stay in a limited capacity to preserve peace (46 percent). A larger majority, 57 percent, said military combat against warlords should stop (Gallup). As many as 69 percent said U.S. troops should be responsible only for food delivery (*Time*). The next month brought a battle between U.S. Army Rangers and Aidid gunmen that ended in tragedy and precipitated the firestorm of public opposition to the Somalian operation. Eighteen soldiers were killed; television news showed some of their bodies violated by crowds and a battered helicopter pilot who had been captured and interrogated. In October 1993 the proportion of Americans who followed Somalian events "very closely" jumped to 34 percent (TMC) as the amount of television coverage leaped out of the doldrums (although the coverage reached only half the level during the Marines' landing). Soon thereafter, 69 percent of people surveyed called for withdrawal of American troops, 43 percent right away (Gallup). Public confidence that U.S. forces would not get bogged down plummeted to 44 percent (WP) from 62 percent a year earlier. Approval of U.S. involvement in Somalia was halved to 34 percent (NBC) compared to 74 percent a year earlier.

Somalia underscored the American aversion to the use of force for peacemaking.

Part of the reversal can be blamed on lack of sustained communication to the public by the Bush and Clinton administrations, especially as the mission in Somalia changed from humanitarian aid to peacekeeping between factions and then to peacemaking and "nation-building." The first significant raid on Aidid's camp, which occurred January 7, 1993, was portrayed by Bush aides as a shift of tactics rather than strategy. The Clinton administration, sworn into office days later, embraced the approach and made subsequent changes in the mission without trying seriously to justify them. During an impromptu news conference three days after a huge raid on Aidid, Clinton referred to the peacemaking effort only in passing: "We cannot have a situation

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where one of these warlords, while everybody else is cooperating, decides that he can go out and slaughter 20 peacekeepers."

Somalia also illustrates the capacity of the media to be almost embarrassingly enthusiastic for a mission, then turn abruptly against it when pictures of the human cost begin to appear in American homes. However, the American public's impulse to use force for humanitarian reasons survived the embarrassment in Somalia. In October 1993, after the Ranger tragedy, 56 percent of the public approved "sending U.S. military forces to Asian or African countries in order to prevent famines and mass starvation" (TMC). And in December 62 percent said the United States did the "right thing" to send troops to Somalia to "make sure shipments of food got through" (NYT). Even when asked if the intervention was worth the "loss of American life, the financial costs, and other risks involved," a plurality of 48 percent said yes.

Somalia nonetheless underscored American aversion to the use of force for peacekeeping, and particularly for nation-building and peacemaking. Asked whether the United States should keep troops in Somalia "until the situation is peaceful," two out of three said the troops should "get out as quickly as possible" (TMC). Ironically, the same survey that found majority support for the humanitarian mission in Somalia at its end also found 60 percent opposed to using U.S. forces to restore law and order if governments break down in Africa or Asia and 53 percent opposed if that occurs in Latin America or the Caribbean (TMC).

BALKANIZED ATTENTION

YUGOSLAVIA BEGAN to break up into ethnic republics in 1991 with the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. But the media spotlight turned on the civil war only when multiethnic Bosnia separated in April 1992. In the first polls, taken as U.S. airdrops of food began, 67 percent of the public said the United States does not have "a responsibility to do something about the fighting," while 24 percent said it did (NYT). The proportion feeling some responsibility has risen only slightly since, judging from a mid-1994 survey that found 31 percent

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agreeing that U.S. "vital interests are at stake in Bosnia" (WP). The media failed to engage the public's attention in Bosnia, let alone sway sentiment toward intervention. At the outset of the war, fewer than one in ten Americans said they were paying "very close" attention to news of that conflict (TMC), and indifference remained high throughout the spring of 1992, despite reports of ethnic cleansing, rape campaigns, and other atrocities that recalled the genocidal horrors of World War II.

Moreover, the level of public interest in Bosnia over the course of the conflict has shown no correlation to the amount of media coverage. Only once did the proportion of the public that followed news of the Balkan conflict "very closely" climb above 20 percent: in May 1993, when U.S. military action appeared likely. But mostly it hovered near 15 percent throughout 1993, dipping to 12 percent in 1994 (TMC).

SHOULD THE U.S. GET INVOLVED IN BOSNIA?

TABLE 2.	YES	NO	UNCERTAIN
APRIL 1994	41	49	10
FEBRUARY 1994	36	53	11
DECEMBER 1993	26	65	9
JUNE 1993	37	51	12
MAY 1993	37	52	11
JANUARY 1993	24	67	9

While most Americans were indifferent to the conflict, those who took sides favored the Bosnians. In early 1993, 30 percent said they were more sympathetic to the Muslim side, compared to only 8 percent for the Serbs (TMC); that changed little throughout that year. To test for possible religious prejudice that might explain the low absolute level of sympathy for the Bosnians, the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press posed the question in two variants: Half of the respondents were asked if he or she had more sympathy toward Serbs or "Bosnians" and the other half were asked about sympathy toward Serbs or "Bosnian Muslims." No significant difference was found: 35 percent were supportive of "Bosnians," 33 percent were supportive of "Bosnian Muslims."

Throughout much of 1993, American air strikes against Serbian military forces were opposed by majorities who said the United States should not get militarily involved: 62 percent in April, 56 percent in May (Gallup). With Serbian attacks and intransigence toward peace efforts rising, however, support for U.S. air strikes against Serbs, in

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conjunction with European allies, drew 51 percent and 60 percent support in August 1993 polls (Gallup, WP).

U.S. air strikes, which some have termed the "American way of war," were clearly favored over committing U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, except if they were part of a peacekeeping force. In early 1993, the public by a 55 percent to 32 percent margin opposed the use of military force to help end the fighting there (TMC). But support for deploying U.S. armed forces as part of a U.N. operation to deliver relief supplies was 57 percent in a December 1992 poll (Gallup), particularly if they were to be part of a peacekeeping force: 68 percent in May 1993 (Gallup) and 73 percent in April 1994 (UM).

When the risk of U.S. forces being subjected to sniper fire was introduced into the question, however, 59 percent in September 1993 opposed their deployment even as peacekeepers (NBC). In 1994, perhaps spurred by the slaughter of 68 civilians in an outdoor market in Sarajevo, there was a steady rise in the view that the United States did have a responsibility to do "something." But despite many hours of media coverage, as well as much editorializing commentary in the print media, the prevailing attitude remained that this was not an American fight. Table 2, using *New York Times* data, shows the evolution of this sense of responsibility.

ARMS AGAINST A SEA OF TROUBLE

IN THE post-Cold War world there is little consensus about what constitutes America's vital interests. In a 1993 survey, the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press found that protecting American oil supplies and preventing nuclear proliferation were the only foreign policy goals shared by both the general public and groups of opinion leaders in nine professional fields, including business, religion, and science.

Polls have found substantial support for using force to prevent a buildup of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Surveys in late 1993 found majority support for U.S. intervention to preempt a North Korean nuclear threat but majority opposition to defending South Korea from North Korean aggression (TMC). When asked in September 1993 about circumstances that might justify using U.S. military force in five situations, public approval ranged from a high of 53

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percent "if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia" to a low of 21 percent "if Russia invaded Ukraine," with 41 percent supporting it if Mexico was "threatened by revolution or civil war" (TMC).

Other polls have approached the issue in more generic terms. A 1993 Roper survey found that virtually all Americans (94 percent) would use force to repel an attack on the United States, and large majorities would use force to strike back when Americans in a foreign country are attacked (79 percent) or close allies are attacked (74 percent). There was surprisingly strong support for interventions related to high-priority domestic issues: 82 percent to stop illegal drugs from abroad, 70 percent to police illegal immigration. At the bottom of this scale, less than 50 percent supported using force to stop genocide or protect innocent lives in a civil war.

The Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press in May 1994 surveyed public attitudes toward the use of force, depending on the justification for intervention (national interest, humanitarian cause, police role) and the kind of force to be used (air or ground). The survey also asked about use of air power "to eliminate an arsenal of nuclear weapons in an unfriendly country such as North Korea or Iran." The poll results underscored the patterns observed in the three cases considered above. It found majority support for the use of force to insure the U.S. oil supply, thwart nuclear proliferation, and provide humanitarian aid. However, there was little support for military intervention to restore law and order. In every case, support for using air power was greater than for ground forces by an average of ten percentage points.

Combining the responses regarding air power and ground troops, slim majorities of Americans supported using force to "make sure U.S. oil supplies are not cut off" (50 percent versus 40 percent), and to "prevent famines and mass starvation" in Africa, Asia, and Latin American countries (52 percent versus 41 percent). But a similar majority opposed the use of force "to restore law and order if the governments break down" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (51 percent versus 41 percent).

Generally, conservative white males supported the so-called national security goals of protecting oil or eliminating nuclear weapons, while Democrats, women, and African-Americans showed greater support for using U.S. force for humanitarian and law-and-order causes. Most striking was the difference in the views of blacks and whites on

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justifiable uses of force. Specifically, the majority of Americans willing to use air and ground forces for protecting oil supplies were more often men than women, young rather than old, white rather than black (52 percent versus 44 percent), Republicans rather than Democrats or Independents, and Bush voters rather than Clinton or Perot voters in 1992. Politically vocal respondents—those who regularly listen to talk radio and/or communicated with their congressmen within the past year—were more supportive of this mission than others.

Among the majority of Americans supporting use of force to deliver famine relief, men and women were in the same proportion overall but with more younger women than younger men, more blacks than whites by a huge margin (69 percent versus 49 percent), more Democrats than Republicans or Independents, and more Clinton voters than Bush or Perot voters.

Americans are more willing to use force to stop illegal drugs than to stop genocide.

No gender gap was found in the minority that supported using force for law and order, but the less educated and poorer respondents approved significantly more than their socioeconomic opposites. Blacks were more in favor of using force for this cause than whites (59 percent versus 38 percent). Democrats were evenly split, but both Republicans and Independents were opposed by large margins. Clinton voters were more supportive than Bush or Perot voters.

Based on this data, we can construct a simple, four-part typology:

- Interventionists, 31 percent of the public, who would use force to protect oil as well as for humanitarian purposes.
- Noninterventionists, 29 percent, against both missions.
- U.S.-centrics, 19 percent, who would use force to protect oil supplies but not to give humanitarian aid.
- One-worlders, 21 percent, who would use force for the humanitarian but not the oil mission.

THE WOOLLY PULPIT

IF THE PUBLIC'S basic opinions about America's responsibility to act drive its response to the potential use of force, we believe that

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media coverage modulates rather than dictates public opinion. Some have given the press more credit or blame.

Many have faulted the so-called "CNN effect"—televised images of combat victims—for the refusal of the American public to tolerate casualties in foreign wars, for example. Images of body bags containing American soldiers shown in family living rooms obviously affect the public's attitude toward use of force. But this is not unique to Americans watching uncensored television. As Edward Luttwak points out, the Soviet Union never let its population see U.S.-style images of its wars, yet "the reaction of Soviet society to the casualties of the Afghan war was essentially identical to the American reaction to the Vietnam War." More often than not, what is blamed on the media is really the public acting on its deep-seated judgments about the basic wisdom of an intervention.

Neither Somalia nor the Persian Gulf War tells us whether the public would tolerate televised casualties for a sustained period in a conflict in which Americans clearly believe their interests were at stake. The media probably has the most negative effect on military operations abroad in the absence of coherent policy and firm leadership that persuasively reiterates the purpose of the use of force throughout the mission. The problem becomes crucial and more difficult in an era in which satellite communications give Americans direct access to news of momentous international events. Political scientist Maxine Isaacs argues that in such an environment, opinion leaders (perhaps even the president) play a less important role in shaping views about foreign affairs because the public can form its own judgments based on observations via the press. Examining the relationship between elite and mass opinion in response to the Tiananmen Square uprising and massacre in mid-1989 and the failed August 1991 coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, she concludes:

> The dependence of mass upon elite opinion (expressed either by policy/opinion leaders or by the media), so long presumed by so many authorities to exist, is not total in two important late twentieth century cases . . . Congruence of elite and mass opinion is possible, but it is not foreordained. Indeed, there is ample evidence that public opinion now operates somewhat, if not entirely, separately from elite opinion.

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Isaacs also found no support for the view that the president, as the most elite of all elite opinion makers, exerts extraordinary influence on the public in foreign policy:

> Sometimes the public supported the President, sometimes it did not. Sometimes the public aligned with the President's critics, and sometimes the public disagreed with both the President and his critics . . . It also appeared that the President did not exert a strong influence on matters of policy with the policy and press elites who did not work for him.[2]

She suggests that a new model is needed to explain how elite and mass opinion on foreign policy are related in the age of mass communications. In part, it would have to deal with "the phenomenon that some public events capture the public's attention while others, sometimes despite massive news coverage such as in the case of Bosnia, fail to engage the public interest." Isaacs, however, dealt with cases that did not involve the use of American forces. We believe that President Bush, his aides, and the Congress were highly influential in shaping public opinion during the Persian Gulf conflict. President Clinton and his aides were significantly less so in Somalia. In Bosnia, neither Bush nor Clinton attempted to persuade the public that the Balkan conflict was worth the risk of American lives, and the public, preoccupied in the post-communist world with domestic issues, did not clamor for war in the Balkans.

The media, which affects mass opinion through the amount of coverage devoted to an issue, if nothing else, increased support for the Persian Gulf War and, initially, for the Somalia intervention. It was also critical in causing the U.S. withdrawal when, in the absence of a coherent and articulated national policy, it presented American casualties to a public that had no underlying sympathy for the peacemaking mission. In Bosnia, the media clearly had no effect.

NO MAN'S ISLAND

FOLLOWING THE military ouster of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and a new surge of Haitian refugees toward U.S. shores, the Ameri-

[2] Maxine Isaacs, "The Independent American Public: The Relationship Between Elite and Mass Opinion on American Foreign Policy in the Mass Communication Age," Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1994, pp. 378-383 (1994).

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can public in late 1993 approved the oil embargo of Haiti by 63 percent (WP), and approved U.S. participation in a naval blockade to enforce U.N. sanctions by 46 percent to 37 percent (NYT). But its attitude toward sending troops depended on the mission. Seventy-seven percent favored using force if the purpose was to evacuate U.S. citizens (NYT), and 69 percent approved force to prevent illegal immigration (WP). But the public strongly and consistently opposed U.S. force to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti: 69 percent against in October 1993 (WP), 68 percent against in May 1994 (*Time*), and two-thirds opposed in June, July, and early September (NYT, *Newsweek*). Immediately before the intervention, 60 percent said U.S. troops should stay out; immediately afterwards, 52 percent said the same, a relatively small eight-percentage-point drop, even after the forces were committed (NYT).

The public was also dubious that an intervention would be quick and successful. In July 1994 less than half believed it would be as effective as the Persian Gulf War (47 percent), while 22 percent thought it would be like Somalia, and 17 percent said it would be long and costly like Vietnam (*Time*). Similar results were found in a September pre-intervention poll (*Time*).

Public attitudes immediately after the intervention were remarkably similar to initial views about the famine relief effort in Somalia, according to a CNN poll: 61 percent were confident that U.S. casualties in Haiti would be few (64 percent said the same regarding Somalia in December 1992), 50 percent were confident the United States would withdraw in a few months (52 percent were with respect to Somalia), and 52 percent were confident the effort to restore democracy in Haiti would succeed (49 percent believed that about the famine relief effort in Somalia).

In sum, the pattern of post-Cold War approval of U.S. interventions did not extend to Haiti (Table 1). The public could sour quickly on Haiti for several reasons. A majority opposed intervention before the troops landed, and even afterwards. There was significantly less rally-round-the-president and rally-round-the-decision reaction than usually occurs once forces are committed. Clinton did not get Congress' approval, although as much as 78 percent of the public

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wanted him to do so a week before the invasion (WP). He did not convince the public that U.S. interests are at stake. Asked a week before the operation for the main reason that the United States might take part in an invasion, 41 percent said because human rights abuses were severe, 13 percent said because U.S. interests were threatened, and 32 percent said because Clinton "will have political problems if he doesn't carry out his threat to invade" (*Newsweek*).

On the positive side, Clinton put together a multilateral operation, and he went the extra mile for a diplomatic solution that avoided a forcible entry of U.S. troops. But, in the end, public attitudes will probably hinge on whether the promises of short duration and low cost (in lives if not money) will be realized. The public may demand a "zero-casualty" mission, as it did for the humanitarian mission to continue in Somalia, but the Haitian peacemaking mission begins with far less support among the American electorate.

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The Myth of Asia's Miracle

Paul Krugman

A CAUTIONARY FABLE

ONCE UPON a time, Western opinion leaders found themselves both impressed and frightened by the extraordinary growth rates achieved by a set of Eastern economies. Although those economies were still substantially poorer and smaller than those of the West, the speed with which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology. The leaders of those nations did not share our faith in free markets or unlimited civil liberties. They asserted with increasing self-confidence that their system was superior: societies that accepted strong, even authoritarian governments and were willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the common good, take charge of their economies, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests for the sake of long-run growth would eventually outperform the increasingly chaotic societies of the West. And a growing minority of Western intellectuals agreed.

The gap between Western and Eastern economic performance eventually became a political issue. The Democrats recaptured the White House under the leadership of a young, energetic new presi-

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dent who pledged to "get the country moving again"—a pledge that, to him and his closest advisers, meant accelerating America's economic growth to meet the Eastern challenge.

The time, of course, was the early 1960s. The dynamic young president was John F. Kennedy. The technological feats that so alarmed the West were the launch of Sputnik and the early Soviet lead in space. And the rapidly growing Eastern economies were those of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.

While the growth of communist economies was the subject of innumerable alarmist books and polemical articles in the 1950s, some economists who looked seriously at the roots of that growth were putting together a picture that differed substantially from most popular assumptions. Communist growth rates were certainly impressive, but not magical. The rapid growth in output could be fully explained by rapid growth in inputs: expansion of employment, increases in education levels, and, above all, massive investment in physical capital. Once those inputs were taken into account, the growth in output was unsurprising—or, to put it differently, the big surprise about Soviet growth was that when closely examined it posed no mystery.

This economic analysis had two crucial implications. First, most of the speculation about the superiority of the communist system—including the popular view that Western economies could painlessly accelerate their own growth by borrowing some aspects of that system—was off base. Rapid Soviet economic growth was based entirely on one attribute: the willingness to save, to sacrifice current consumption for the sake of future production. The communist example offered no hint of a free lunch.

Second, the economic analysis of communist countries' growth implied some future limits to their industrial expansion—in other words, implied that a naive projection of their past growth rates into the future was likely to greatly overstate their real prospects. Economic growth that is based on expansion of inputs, rather than on growth in output per unit of input, is inevitably subject to diminishing returns. It was simply not possible for the Soviet economies to sustain the rates of growth of labor force participation, average education levels, and above all the physical capital stock that had pre-

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vailed in previous years. Communist growth would predictably slow down, perhaps drastically.

Can there really be any parallel between the growth of Warsaw Pact nations in the 1950s and the spectacular Asian growth that now preoccupies policy intellectuals? At some levels, of course, the parallel is far-fetched: Singapore in the 1990s does not look much like the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew bears little resemblance to the U.S.S.R.'s Nikita Khrushchev and less to Joseph Stalin. Yet the results of recent economic research into the sources of Pacific Rim growth give the few people who recall the great debate over Soviet growth a strong sense of déjà vu. Now, as then, the contrast between popular hype and realistic prospects, between conventional wisdom and hard numbers, remains so great that sensible economic analysis is not only widely ignored, but when it does get aired, it is usually dismissed as grossly implausible.

Popular enthusiasm about Asia's boom deserves to have some cold water thrown on it. Rapid Asian growth is less of a model for the West than many writers claim, and the future prospects for that growth are more limited than almost anyone now imagines. Any such assault on almost universally held beliefs must, of course, overcome a barrier of incredulity. This article began with a disguised account of the Soviet growth debate of 30 years ago to try to gain a hearing for the proposition that we may be revisiting an old error. We have been here before. The problem with this literary device, however, is that so few people now remember how impressive and terrifying the Soviet empire's economic performance once seemed. Before turning to Asian growth, then, it may be useful to review an important but largely forgotten piece of economic history.

'WE WILL BURY YOU'

LIVING IN a world strewn with the wreckage of the Soviet empire, it is hard for most people to realize that there was a time when the Soviet economy, far from being a byword for the failure of socialism, was one of the wonders of the world—that when Khrushchev pounded his shoe on the U.N. podium and declared, "We will bury

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you," it was an economic rather than a military boast. It is therefore a shock to browse through, say, issues of *Foreign Affairs* from the mid-1950s through the early 1960s and discover that at least one article a year dealt with the implications of growing Soviet industrial might.

Illustrative of the tone of discussion was a 1957 article by Calvin B. Hoover.[1] Like many Western economists, Hoover criticized official Soviet statistics, arguing that they exaggerated the true growth rate. Nonetheless, he concluded that Soviet claims of astonishing achievement were fully justified: their economy was achieving a rate of growth "twice as high as that attained by any important capitalistic country over any considerable number of years [and] three times as high as the average annual rate of increase in the United States." He concluded that it was probable that "a collectivist, authoritarian state" was inherently better at achieving economic growth than free-market democracies and projected that the Soviet economy might outstrip that of the United States by the early 1970s.

These views were not considered outlandish at the time. On the contrary, the general image of Soviet central planning was that it might be brutal, and might not do a very good job of providing consumer goods, but that it was very effective at promoting industrial growth. In 1960 Wassily Leontief described the Soviet economy as being "directed with determined ruthless skill"—and did so without supporting argument, confident he was expressing a view shared by his readers.

Yet many economists studying Soviet growth were gradually coming to a very different conclusion. Although they did not dispute the fact of past Soviet growth, they offered a new interpretation of the nature of that growth, one that implied a reconsideration of future

[1] Hoover's tone—critical of Soviet data but nonetheless accepting the fact of extraordinary achievement—was typical of much of the commentary of the time (see, for example, a series of articles in *The Atlantic Monthly* by Edward Crankshaw, beginning with "Soviet Industry" in the November 1955 issue). Anxiety about the political implications of Soviet growth reached its high-water mark in 1959, the year Khrushchev visited America. *Newsweek* took Khrushchev's boasts seriously enough to warn that the Soviet Union might well be "on the high road to economic domination of the world." And in hearings held by the Joint Economic Committee late that year, CIA Director Allen Dulles warned, "If the Soviet industrial growth rate persists at eight or nine percent per annum over the next decade, as is forecast, the gap between our two economies . . . will be dangerously narrowed."

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

The Soviet miracle: perspiration, not inspiration

Soviet prospects. To understand this reinterpretation, it is necessary to make a brief detour into economic theory to discuss a seemingly abstruse, but in fact intensely practical, concept: growth accounting.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE SOVIET SLOWDOWN

IT IS A TAUTOLOGY that economic expansion represents the sum of two sources of growth. On one side are increases in "inputs": growth in employment, in the education level of workers, and in the stock of physical capital (machines, buildings, roads, and so on). On the other side are increases in the output per unit of input; such increases may result from better management or better economic policy, but in the long run are primarily due to increases in knowledge.

The basic idea of growth accounting is to give life to this formula by calculating explicit measures of both. The accounting can then tell us how much of growth is due to each input—say, capital as opposed to labor—and how much is due to increased efficiency.

We all do a primitive form of growth accounting every time we talk

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about labor productivity; in so doing we are implicitly distinguishing between the part of overall national growth due to the growth in the supply of labor and the part due to an increase in the value of goods produced by the average worker. Increases in labor productivity, however, are not always caused by the increased efficiency of workers. Labor is only one of a number of inputs; workers may produce more, not because they are better managed or have more technological knowledge, but simply because they have better machinery. A man with a bulldozer can dig a ditch faster than one with only a shovel, but he is not more efficient; he just has more capital to work with. The aim of growth accounting is to produce an index that combines all measurable inputs and to measure the rate of growth of national income relative to that index—to estimate what is known as "total factor productivity."[2]

So far this may seem like a purely academic exercise. As soon as one starts to think in terms of growth accounting, however, one arrives at a crucial insight about the process of economic growth: sustained growth in a nation's per capita income can only occur if there is a rise in output *per unit of input*.[3]

Mere increases in inputs, without an increase in the efficiency with which those inputs are used—investing in more machinery and infrastructure—must run into diminishing returns; input-driven growth is inevitably limited.

How, then, have today's advanced nations been able to achieve sustained growth in per capita income over the past 150 years? The

[2] At first, creating an index of all inputs may seem like comparing apples and oranges, that is, trying to add together noncomparable items like the hours a worker puts in and the cost of the new machine he uses. How does one determine the weights for the different components? The economists' answer is to use market returns. If the average worker earns $15 an hour, give each person-hour in the index a weight of $15; if a machine that costs $100,000 on average earns $10,000 in profits each year (a 10 percent rate of return), then give each such machine a weight of $10,000; and so on.

[3] To see why, let's consider a hypothetical example. To keep matters simple, let's assume that the country has a stationary population and labor force, so that all increases in the investment in machinery, etc., raise the amount of capital per worker in the country. Let us finally make up some arbitrary numbers. Specifically, let us assume that initially each worker is equipped with $10,000 worth of equipment; that each worker produces goods and services worth $10,000; and that capital initially earns a 40 percent rate of return, that is, each $10,000 of machinery earns annual profits of $4,000. (*Cont'd.*)

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answer is that technological advances have led to a continual increase in total factor productivity—a continual rise in national income for each unit of input. In a famous estimate, MIT Professor Robert Solow concluded that technological progress has accounted for 80 percent of the long-term rise in U.S. per capita income, with increased investment in capital explaining only the remaining 20 percent.

When economists began to study the growth of the Soviet economy, they did so using the tools of growth accounting. Of course, Soviet data posed some problems. Not only was it hard to piece together usable estimates of output and input (Raymond Powell, a Yale professor, wrote that the job "in many ways resembled an archaeological dig"), but there were philosophical difficulties as well. In a socialist economy one could hardly measure capital input using market returns, so researchers were forced to impute returns based on those in market economies at similar levels of development. Still, when the efforts began, researchers were pretty sure about what they would find. Just as capitalist growth had been based on growth in both inputs and efficiency, with efficiency the main source of rising per capita income, they expected to find that rapid Soviet growth reflected both rapid input growth and rapid growth in efficiency.

But what they actually found was that Soviet growth was based on

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(*Cont'd.*) Suppose, now, that this country consistently invests 20 percent of its output, that is, uses 20 percent of its income to add to its capital stock. How rapidly will the economy grow?

Initially, very fast indeed. In the first year, the capital stock per worker will rise by 20 percent of $10,000, that is, by $2,000. At a 40 percent rate of return, that will increase output by $800: an 8 percent rate of growth.

But this high rate of growth will not be sustainable. Consider the situation of the economy by the time that capital per worker has doubled to $20,000. First, output per worker will not have increased in the same proportion, because capital stock is only one input. Even with the additions to capital stock up to that point achieving a 40 percent rate of return, output per worker will have increased only to $14,000. And the rate of return is also certain to decline–say to 30 or even 25 percent. (One bulldozer added to a construction project can make a huge difference to productivity. By the time a dozen are on-site, one more may not make that much difference.) The combination of those factors means that if the investment share of output is the same, the growth rate will sharply decline. Taking 20 percent of $14,000 gives us $2,800; at a 30 percent rate of return, this will raise output by only $840, that is, generate a growth rate of only 6 percent; at a 25 percent rate of return it will generate a growth rate of only 5 percent. As capital continues to accumulate, the rate of return and hence the rate of growth will continue to decline.

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rapid growth in inputs—end of story. The rate of efficiency growth was not only unspectacular, it was well below the rates achieved in Western economies. Indeed, by some estimates, it was virtually nonexistent.[4]

The immense Soviet efforts to mobilize economic resources were hardly news. Stalinist planners had moved millions of workers from farms to cities, pushed millions of women into the labor force and millions of men into longer hours, pursued massive programs of education, and above all plowed an ever-growing proportion of the country's industrial output back into the construction of new factories. Still, the big surprise was that once one had taken the effects of these more or less measurable inputs into account, there was nothing left to explain. The most shocking thing about Soviet growth was its comprehensibility.

This comprehensibility implied two crucial conclusions. First, claims about the superiority of planned over market economies turned out to be based on a misapprehension. If the Soviet economy had a special strength, it was its ability to mobilize resources, not its ability to use them efficiently. It was obvious to everyone that the Soviet Union in 1960 was much less efficient than the United States. The surprise was that it showed no signs of closing the gap.

Second, because input-driven growth is an inherently limited process, Soviet growth was virtually certain to slow down. Long before the slowing of Soviet growth became obvious, it was predicted on the basis of growth accounting. (Economists did not predict the implosion of the Soviet economy a generation later, but that is a whole different problem.)

It's an interesting story and a useful cautionary tale about the dangers of naive extrapolation of past trends. But is it relevant to the modern world?

PAPER TIGERS

AT FIRST, it is hard to see anything in common between the Asian success stories of recent years and the Soviet Union of three decades

[4] This work was summarized by Raymond Powell, "Economic Growth in the U.S.S.R.," *Scientific American*, December 1968.

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ago. Indeed, it is safe to say that the typical business traveler to, say, Singapore, ensconced in one of that city's gleaming hotels, never even thinks of any parallel to its roach-infested counterparts in Moscow. How can the slick exuberance of the Asian boom be compared with the Soviet Union's grim drive to industrialize?

And yet there are surprising similarities. The newly industrializing countries of Asia, like the Soviet Union of the 1950s, have achieved rapid growth in large part through an astonishing mobilization of resources. Once one accounts for the role of rapidly growing inputs in these countries' growth, one finds little left to explain. Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency.[5]

Consider, in particular, the case of Singapore. Between 1966 and 1990, the Singaporean economy grew a remarkable 8.5 percent per annum, three times as fast as the United States; per capita income grew at a 6.6 percent rate, roughly doubling every decade. This achievement seems to be a kind of economic miracle. But the miracle turns out to have been based on perspiration rather than inspiration: Singapore grew through a mobilization of resources that would have done Stalin proud. The employed share of the population surged from 27 to 51 percent. The educational standards of that work force were dramatically upgraded: while in 1966 more than half the workers had no formal education at all, by 1990 two-thirds had completed secondary education. Above all, the country had made an awesome investment in physical capital: investment as a

[5] There have been a number of recent efforts to quantify the sources of rapid growth in the Pacific Rim. Key readings include two papers by Professor Lawrence Lau of Stanford University and his associate Jong-Il Kim, "The Sources of Growth of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries," *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,* 1994, and "The Role of Human Capital in the Economic Growth of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries," mimeo, Stanford University, 1993; and three papers by Professor Alwyn Young, a rising star in growth economics, "A Tale of Two Cities: Factor Accumulation and Technical Change in Hong Kong and Singapore," *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992,* MIT Press; "Lessons from the East Asian NICS: A Contrarian View," *European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,* May 1994; and "The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience," NBER Working Paper No. 4680, March 1994.

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share of output rose from 11 to more than 40 percent.[6]

Even without going through the formal exercise of growth accounting, these numbers should make it obvious that Singapore's growth has been based largely on one-time changes in behavior that cannot be repeated. Over the past generation the percentage of people employed has almost doubled; it cannot double again. A half-educated work force has been replaced by one in which the bulk of workers has high school diplomas; it is unlikely that a generation from now most Singaporeans will have Ph.D.s. And an investment share of 40 percent is amazingly high by any standard; a share of 70 percent would be ridiculous. So one can immediately conclude that Singapore is unlikely to achieve future growth rates comparable to those of the past.

But it is only when one actually does the quantitative accounting that the astonishing result emerges: all of Singapore's growth can be explained by increases in measured inputs. There is no sign at all of increased efficiency. In this sense, the growth of Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore is an economic twin of the growth of Stalin's Soviet Union—growth achieved purely through mobilization of resources. Of course, Singapore today is far more prosperous than the U.S.S.R. ever was—even at its peak in the Brezhnev years—because Singapore is closer to, though still below, the efficiency of Western economies. The point, however, is that Singapore's economy has always been relatively efficient; it just used to be starved of capital and educated workers.

Singapore's case is admittedly the most extreme. Other rapidly growing East Asian economies have not increased their labor force participation as much, made such dramatic improvements in educational levels, or raised investment rates quite as far. Nonetheless, the basic conclusion is the same: there is startlingly little evidence of improvements in efficiency. Kim and Lau conclude of the four Asian "tigers" that "the hypothesis that there has been no technical progress during the postwar period cannot be rejected for the four East Asian newly industrialized countries." Young, more poetically, notes that once one allows for

[6] These figures are taken from Young, *ibid.* Although foreign corporations have played an important role in Singapore's economy, the great bulk of investment in Singapore, as in all of the newly industrialized East Asian economies, has been financed out of domestic savings.

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their rapid growth of inputs, the productivity performance of the "tigers" falls "from the heights of Olympus to the plains of Thessaly."

This conclusion runs so counter to conventional wisdom that it is extremely difficult for the economists who have reached it to get a hearing. As early as 1982 a Harvard graduate student, Yuan Tsao, found little evidence of efficiency growth in her dissertation on Singapore, but her work was, as Young puts it, "ignored or dismissed as unbelievable." When Kim and Lau presented their work at a 1992 conference in Taipei, it received a more respectful hearing, but had little immediate impact But when Young tried to make the case for input-driven Asian growth at the 1993 meetings of the European Economic Association, he was met with a stone wall of disbelief.

In Young's most recent paper there is an evident tone of exasperation with this insistence on clinging to the conventional wisdom in the teeth of the evidence. He titles the paper "The Tyranny of Numbers"—by which he means that you may not want to believe this, buster, but there's just no way around the data. He begins with an ironic introduction, written in a deadpan, Sergeant Friday, "Just the facts, ma'am" style: "This is a fairly boring and tedious paper, and is intentionally so. This paper provides no new interpretations of the East Asian experience to interest the historian, derives no new theoretical implications of the forces behind the East Asian growth process to motivate the theorist, and draws no new policy implications from the subtleties of East Asian government intervention to excite the policy activist. Instead, this paper concentrates its energies on providing a careful analysis of the historical patterns of output growth, factor accumulation, and productivity growth in the newly industrializing countries of East Asia."

Of course, he is being disingenuous. His conclusion undermines most of the conventional wisdom about the future role of Asian nations in the world economy and, as a consequence, in international politics. But readers will have noticed that the statistical analysis that puts such a different interpretation on Asian growth focuses on the "tigers," the relatively small countries to whom the name "newly industrializing countries" was first applied. But what about the large countries? What about Japan and China?

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THE GREAT JAPANESE GROWTH SLOWDOWN

MANY PEOPLE who are committed to the view that the destiny of the world economy lies with the Pacific Rim are likely to counter skepticism about East Asian growth prospects with the example of Japan. Here, after all, is a country that started out poor and has now become the second-largest industrial power. Why doubt that other Asian nations can do the same?

There are two answers to that question. First, while many authors have written of an "Asian system"—a common denominator that underlies all of the Asian success stories—the statistical evidence tells a different story. Japan's growth in the 1950s and 1960s does not resemble Singapore's growth in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan, unlike the East Asian "tigers," seems to have grown both through high rates of input growth and through high rates of efficiency growth. Today's fast-growth economies are nowhere near converging on U.S. efficiency levels, but Japan is staging an unmistakable technological catch-up.

Second, while Japan's historical performance has indeed been remarkable, the era of miraculous Japanese growth now lies well in the past. Most years Japan still manages to grow faster than the other advanced nations, but that gap in growth rates is now far smaller than it used to be, and is shrinking.

The story of the great Japanese growth slowdown has been oddly absent from the vast polemical literature on Japan and its role in the world economy. Much of that literature seems stuck in a time warp, with authors writing as if Japan were still the miracle growth economy of the 1960s and early 1970s. Granted, the severe recession that has gripped Japan since 1991 will end soon if it has not done so already, and the Japanese economy will probably stage a vigorous short-term recovery. The point, however, is that even a full recovery will only reach a level that is far below what many sensible observers predicted 20 years ago.

It may be useful to compare Japan's growth prospects as they appeared 20 years ago and as they appear now. In 1973 Japan was still a substantially smaller and poorer economy than the United States. Its per capita GDP was only 55 percent of America's, while its overall

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GDP was only 27 percent as large. But the rapid growth of the Japanese economy clearly portended a dramatic change. Over the previous decade Japan's real GDP had grown at a torrid 8.9 percent annually, with per capita output growing at a 7.7 percent rate. Although American growth had been high by its own historical standards, at 3.9 percent (2.7 percent per capita) it was not in the same league. Clearly, the Japanese were rapidly gaining on us.

In fact, a straightforward projection of these trends implied that a major reversal of positions lay not far in the future. At the growth rate of 1963-73, Japan would overtake the United States in real per capita income by 1985, and total Japanese output would exceed that of the United States by 1998! At the time, people took such trend projections very seriously indeed. One need only look at the titles of such influential books as Herman Kahn's *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* or Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* to remember that Japan appeared, to many observers, to be well on its way to global economic dominance.

Well, it has not happened, at least not so far. Japan has indeed continued to rise in the economic rankings, but at a far more modest pace than those projections suggested. In 1992 Japan's per capita income was still only 83 percent of the United States', and its overall output was only 42 percent of the American level. The reason was that growth from 1973 to 1992 was far slower than in the high-growth years: GDP grew only 3.7 percent annually, and GDP per capita grew only 3 percent per year. The United States also experienced a growth slowdown after 1973, but it was not nearly as drastic.

If one projects those post-1973 growth rates into the future, one still sees a relative Japanese rise, but a far less dramatic one. Following 1973-92 trends, Japan's per capita income will outstrip that of the United States in 2002; its overall output does not exceed America's until the year 2047. Even this probably overestimates Japanese prospects. Japanese economists generally believe that their country's rate of growth of potential output, the rate that it will be able to sustain once it has taken up the slack left by the recession, is now no more than three percent. And that rate is achieved only through a very high rate of investment, nearly twice as high a share of GDP as in the United States. When one takes into account the growing evidence for

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at least a modest acceleration of U.S. productivity growth in the last few years, one ends up with the probable conclusion that Japanese efficiency is gaining on that of the United States at a snail's pace, if at all, and there is the distinct possibility that per capita income in Japan may never overtake that in America. In other words, Japan is not quite as overwhelming an example of economic prowess as is sometimes thought, and in any case Japan's experience has much less in common with that of other Asian nations than is generally imagined.

THE CHINA SYNDROME

FOR THE skeptic, the case of China poses much greater difficulties about Asian destiny than that of Japan. Although China is still a very poor country, its population is so huge that it will become a major economic power if it achieves even a fraction of Western productivity levels. And China, unlike Japan, has in recent years posted truly impressive rates of economic growth. What about its future prospects?

Accounting for China's boom is difficult for both practical and philosophical reasons. The practical problem is that while we know that China is growing very rapidly, the quality of the numbers is extremely poor. It was recently revealed that official Chinese statistics on foreign investment have been overstated by as much as a factor of six. The reason was that the government offers tax and regulatory incentives to foreign investors, providing an incentive for domestic entrepreneurs to invent fictitious foreign partners or to work through foreign fronts. This episode hardly inspires confidence in any other statistic that emanates from that dynamic but awesomely corrupt society.

The philosophical problem is that it is unclear what year to use as a baseline. If one measures Chinese growth from the point at which it made a decisive turn toward the market, say 1978, there is little question that there has been dramatic improvement in efficiency as well as rapid growth in inputs. But it is hardly surprising that a major recovery in economic efficiency occurred as the country emerged from the chaos of Mao Zedong's later years. If one instead measures growth from before the Cultural Revolution, say 1964, the picture looks more like the East Asian "tigers": only modest growth in efficiency, with

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most growth driven by inputs. This calculation, however, also seems unfair: one is weighing down the buoyant performance of Chinese capitalism with the leaden performance of Chinese socialism. Perhaps we should simply split the difference: guess that some, but not all, of the efficiency gains since the turn toward the market represent a one-time recovery, while the rest represent a sustainable trend.

Even a modest slowing in China's growth will change the geopolitical outlook substantially. The World Bank estimates that the Chinese economy is currently about 40 percent as large as that of the United States. Suppose that the U.S. economy continues to grow at 2.5 percent each year. If China can continue to grow at 10 percent annually, by the year 2010 its economy will be a third larger than ours. But if Chinese growth is only a more realistic 7 percent, its GDP will be only 82 percent of that of the United States. There will still be a substantial shift of the world's economic center of gravity, but it will be far less drastic than many people now imagine.

THE MYSTERY THAT WASN'T

THE EXTRAORDINARY record of economic growth in the newly industrializing countries of East Asia has powerfully influenced the conventional wisdom about both economic policy and geopolitics. Many, perhaps most, writers on the global economy now take it for granted that the success of these economies demonstrates three propositions. First, there is a major diffusion of world technology in progress, and Western nations are losing their traditional advantage. Second, the world's economic center of gravity will inevitably shift to the Asian nations of the western Pacific. Third, in what is perhaps a minority view, Asian successes demonstrate the superiority of economies with fewer civil liberties and more planning than we in the West have been willing to accept.

All three conclusions are called into question by the simple observation that the remarkable record of East Asian growth has been matched by input growth so rapid that Asian economic growth, incredibly, ceases to be a mystery.

Consider first the assertion that the advanced countries are losing

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their technological advantage. A heavy majority of recent tracts on the world economy have taken it as self-evident that technology now increasingly flows across borders, and that newly industrializing nations are increasingly able to match the productivity of more established economies. Many writers warn that this diffusion of technology will place huge strains on Western society as capital flows to the Third World and imports from those nations undermine the West's industrial base.

There are severe conceptual problems with this scenario even if its initial premise is right.[7] But in any case, while technology may have diffused within particular industries, the available evidence provides absolutely no justification for the view that overall world technological gaps are vanishing. On the contrary, Kim and Lau find "no apparent convergence between the technologies" of the newly industrialized nations and the established industrial powers; Young finds that the rates in the growth of efficiency in the East Asian "tigers" are no higher than those in many advanced nations.

The absence of any dramatic convergence in technology helps explain what would otherwise be a puzzle: in spite of a great deal of rhetoric about North-South capital movement, actual capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s have so far been very small—and they have primarily gone to Latin America, not East Asia. Indeed, several of the East Asian "tigers" have recently become significant exporters of capital. This behavior would be extremely odd if these economies, which still pay wages well below advanced-country levels, were rapidly achieving advanced-country productivity. It is, however, perfectly reasonable if growth in East Asia has been primarily input-driven, and if the capital piling up there is beginning to yield diminishing returns.

If growth in East Asia is indeed running into diminishing returns, however, the conventional wisdom about an Asian-centered world economy needs some rethinking. It would be a mistake to overstate this case: barring a catastrophic political upheaval, it is likely that

[7] See Paul Krugman, "Does Third World Growth Hurt First World Prosperity?" *Harvard Business Review*, July 1994.

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growth in East Asia will continue to outpace growth in the West for the next decade and beyond. But it will not do so at the pace of recent years. From the perspective of the year 2010, current projections of Asian supremacy extrapolated from recent trends may well look almost as silly as 1960s-vintage forecasts of Soviet industrial supremacy did from the perspective of the Brezhnev years.

Finally, the realities of East Asian growth suggest that we may have to unlearn some popular lessons. It has become common to assert that East Asian economic success demonstrates the fallacy of our traditional laissez-faire approach to economic policy and that the growth of these economies shows the effectiveness of sophisticated industrial policies and selective protectionism. Authors such as James Fallows have asserted that the nations of that region have evolved a common "Asian system," whose lessons we ignore at our peril. The extremely diverse institutions and policies of the various newly industrialized Asian countries, let alone Japan, cannot really be called a common system. But in any case, if Asian success reflects the benefits of strategic trade and industrial policies, those benefits should surely be manifested in an unusual and impressive rate of growth in the efficiency of the economy. And there is no sign of such exceptional efficiency growth.

The newly industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim have received a reward for their extraordinary mobilization of resources that is no more than what the most boringly conventional economic theory would lead us to expect. If there is a secret to Asian growth, it is simply deferred gratification, the willingness to sacrifice current satisfaction for future gain.

That's a hard answer to accept, especially for those American policy intellectuals who recoil from the dreary task of reducing deficits and raising the national savings rate. But economics is not a dismal science because the economists like it that way; it is because in the end we must submit to the tyranny not just of the numbers, but of the logic they express.

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The Myth of the Pacific Community

Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern

TIMING IS EVERYTHING

When President Clinton steps off Air Force One into the steamy tropical heat of Bogor, Indonesia, to attend November's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, there will be buoyant talk of free trade areas embellished with bold rhetoric heralding a new Pacific community. The notion of a burgeoning community encompassing both sides of an ascendant Pacific Rim has become a veritable article of faith over the past quarter-century and has been a core assumption of U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific since 1989. High profile events like the July 1993 summit for the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations (G-7) in Tokyo and the November APEC meeting in Seattle that same year let President Clinton put his imprimatur on the concept of an American-led Pacific community based on free trade and political cooperation. He articulated a view of the region not only as key to a foreign policy centered on geoeconomics, but as a market opportunity to advance his domestic agenda of revitalizing the American economy.

The Asian "economic miracle" and the attendant idea of a "Pacific century," which gave rise to the Pacific community idea, have become almost clichés. But the region's economies are breathtakingly powerful. Consider the four newly industrialized "tigers"

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(South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), which averaged almost six percent annual growth over the course of a generation, or the Japan boom, or China's takeoff since 1979, or the "new tigers" of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and maybe even Vietnam. They are monuments to the Asian export growth approaches to development that shattered the North-South paradigm. East Asia has become an engine of the global economy and a defining part of the post-Cold War international system.

Yet even now, as the Asia-Pacific's regional institutions are in embryonic form, a host of economic, political, military, and psychological trends suggest that the cherished aspiration—a common psychology of belonging, reflecting shared interests, responsibilities, values, and mutual respect—may prove to be a chimera. The Pacific community idea may be pulled apart by more powerful forces: from above by global economic integration, extra-regional political and security mechanisms, and democratization; and from below by intra-Asian and subregional economic and financial networks and by local security dynamics that are supplanting the U.S. balancing role. For the United States, there is a particularly unfortunate bit of timing at work here. Not only do these conflicting pulls make the very term "Pacific community" an elusive concept, but U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific arena is declining at a historical moment when the American stake in the region is rising.

Trade, investment, and a Pacific coastline do not necessarily make for a broader sense of community. As a recent report warned, might the Pacific "remain more of a rim than a community"?[1] It is perhaps instructive, as that report points out, that there is no Asian word equivalent to "community." Indeed, APEC's decision to include Mexico and Chile among its members, while excluding Russia, India, Vietnam, and Burma, reveals profound ambiguity about where the Pacific community begins and ends. And five years after APEC's inception, the institutional centerpiece of this notional community has yet to produce concrete results beyond creating a secretariat and holding regular top-level meetings.

The Asia-Pacific's vast geographic expanse and its cultural, politi-

[1] "Defining a Pacific Community," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1994, p. 36.

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cal, and historical diversity stand in sharp contrast to today's Europe. The contrast with the Atlantic community begs the question of what the Pacific community is as much as where it is. To begin the process of turning the region into a community, its two giants, China and Japan, will have to work out their relationship's formidable security problems, just as France and Germany did 40 years ago.

Moreover, to the degree that there is a sense of identity, it tends to be Asian, not Pacific: an assertive Confucian culture; an informal, nonconfrontational style; and the self-confidence of the newly industrializing economies as successful postcolonial, nonwhite societies. The unintended consequences of U.S. policies—unilateral pressure on trade, deepening Japanese economic integration into the region from the strengthening of the yen, insistence on prescribing human rights behavior, and inconstant leadership that undermined credibility—sparked a self-defensive Asian reaction. Things improved somewhat with recent midcourse corrections stabilizing relations with China and Japan. But the United States still faces the challenge of defining a workable Pacific partnership that advances both economic growth and regional security.

RISING IN THE EAST

THE SHEER volume of Asia-Pacific commerce animates U.S. dreams of a Pacific community. To put the region's economy in context, the East Asian economies in 1960 comprised 4 percent of the world's GNP. By 1991 they comprised some 25 percent of the world's GNP (roughly equal to that of the United States). By the year 2000, they are projected to account for a third of the world's GNP. Already, the seven leading East Asian economies have 41 percent of global bank reserves, up from 17 percent in 1980. The average savings rate of Asian economies is 30 percent, compared to 8 percent for the G-7 economies. According to World Bank estimates, Asia will account for half of the global GNP growth and half of the global trade growth in the decade from 1990 to 2000.[2]

Moreover, Undersecretary of Commerce Jeffrey E. Garten has pointed out, "East Asia could grow twice as fast as the United States

[2] See "Asia Survey," *The Economist,* October 30, 1993, p. 3.

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in the next decade, and three times the rate of Europe." For the United States, whose two-way trade across the Pacific reached $361 billion in 1993—over 50 percent more than its transatlantic trade—Asia is of critical importance. Equally impressive is the sustained growth of U.S.-Asia trade: from 1978 to 1991, U.S. transpacific trade almost quadrupled to $361 billion from $80 billion. It must be noted that, until 1994, trade in services (where the United States generally runs a large surplus) has not been calculated in standard trade balance figures.

But the notion that Asia's dynamism is drawn largely through the Pacific to the United States—a notion on which the idea of a Pacific community rests—is simply false. European Union trade with the Pacific Rim is also growing substantially: in 1992, EU trade with the Pacific Rim economies totaled $249 billion, surpassing its $206 billion in trade across the Atlantic with the United States.[3] Moreover, the book value of EU investment in the region has not lagged far behind that of the United States over the past decade, and Asians rushed to invest in Europe before 1992 to better position themselves in that market. A glimpse at the trade patterns of most East Asian economies reveals trade roughly equally distributed between the United States, Europe, and the rest of Asia, but with intra-Asian trade and investment growing markedly faster than any other. This globalization factor undermines grandiose notions of a distinct Pacific community.

CLUSTERS OF GROWTH

PERHAPS THE most remarkable aspect of the Asia-Pacific's economic dynamism over the past decade is the exponential advance of "horizontal" integration, which has created an intra-Asian trade and investment network. As each East Asian economy has moved up the ladder of development, it has tended to accelerate the growth of those at the next tier of development. For example, South Korea has for some time competed with Japan in shipbuilding and steel manufacturing, and increasingly competes with it in semiconductors and consumer electronics. Japan has

[3]Roger Cohen, "Like U.S., Western Europe Steps Up Its Trade with Asia," *The New York Times,* November 24, 1993, p. A17.

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relocated production facilities for autos and electronics to Thailand, Malaysia, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations members, both to use as global export platforms and to import products back to Japan. The newly industrializing "tigers" have been relocating labor-intensive industries such as textiles, athletic footwear, toys, and electronic assembly to China, other ASEAN members, and, increasingly, Vietnam.

This pattern is evident in the trade and investment figures. Intra-Asian trade now accounts for about 45 percent of East Asia's total trade. But official figures for intra-Asian trade are understated, as many significant relationships—China-Taiwan, China-Vietnam, North-South Korea, China-Russia—are not fully reported. Taiwan is now the largest foreign investor in Malaysia and Vietnam. The other "tigers" are major investors in ASEAN economies; Hong Kong and Taiwan account for more than two-thirds of foreign direct investment in China. Taipei, which has been one of the East Asian economies most heavily dependent on U.S. export markets, now has a larger volume of trade with Beijing than with Washington. More broadly, the share of East Asian exports to the U.S. market fell to 24.2 percent in 1992 from 34.1 percent in 1986, underscoring the erosion of the region's dependence on the United States. These flows of trade and investment have led to the emergence of "growth clusters," subregional economic networks forming without regard to—and often despite—national borders.

Trade, investment, and a Pacific coastline do not necessarily make for a community.

Against the backdrop of North American and European regional integration, it is hardly surprising that East Asian nations are considering their own regional economic entities, especially given intra-Asian trade and investment patterns. In 1990, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia proposed creating an East Asian Economic Group (which has since evolved into a caucus, known as EAEC), although it remains unclear how its purpose might differ from APEC's. U.S. officials were stunned last spring when ASEAN presented Washington with detailed plans for an EAEC structure. The region's propensity to hedge against uncertainty has turned EAEC into the beast that will not die.

In practice, APEC is inclusive, transpacific, and focused on expand-

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A Community at Sea



ing trade. Several ASEAN states are reluctant to embrace an APEC-wide free trade area because of their suspicions of some hidden American agenda. Such a proposal was put forward in August by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), an august assembly with unofficial status tasked by APEC governments with designing a vision for the future. While the plan appealed to Indonesian President Suharto, who will host the 1994 APEC meeting, as a cost-free way to achieve international prominence and historical symbolism, it raises more questions than it answers.

The EPG's proposal purports to advance "open regionalism." But is that very concept an oxymoron in light of the completed Uruguay Round and the forthcoming World Trade Organization? Would such a futuristic exercise divert efforts from expanding global free trade or from the hard slogging of more modest, unsexy building blocks of liberalizing trade in key growth sectors, or harmonizing standards and customs procedures? Such incremental steps are generally preferred by American business. While incremental trade liberalization yielding concrete results would likely be cheered in Congress, the idea of a massive free trade arrangement that allowed China and Indonesia, with their vast pools of cheap labor, to phase in reciprocal liberalization over two decades after America assumed its obligations is certain to raise the hackles of Congress, which barely approved a free trade

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

agreement with Mexico, whose economy is four percent the size of America's. A free trade area including Japan, whose barriers tend to be informal, invisible, and cultural, would be an even tougher sell.

AMERICA'S SHRINKING ROLE

THE KEY variable in the Asia-Pacific equation—and in the debate over what institutions and political mechanisms would best safeguard the region's prosperity and stability—is the United States. But there is a powerful irony behind the renewed American interest in the region at this point in history. Today, the two traditional pillars of American predominance in Asia—U.S. economic muscle from its markets and overall financial presence and U.S. security muscle from its bilateral alliances and military bases—are both diminishing assets. A further irony is that while in absolute terms U.S. economic engagement in the Pacific is steadily increasing, it is declining in relative terms. What stands out in the region is a shared unease at perceived trends: a contraction of the central economic and military role played by the United States, simultaneous with the ascendance of China and Japan as multifaceted powers. Asian calculations tend to be based on long-term trends. It is not that East Asians do not envision or even

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want the United States to be a major player in the post-Cold War shaping of the region. But they see the traditional U.S. economic and security role as declining amid rising U.S. demands.

Indeed, notwithstanding rhetoric about a transoceanic friendship, the increasingly self-confident Asian partners at the APEC summit will view the United States warily—as illustrated by tensions with the host, Indonesia, over human rights, worker rights, press freedom, the environment, and Jakarta's repression in East Timor. These strains show the potential for an unfolding, unappealing dynamic in which a declining American role shapes East Asian responses to a gradual but pronounced transformation of the Pacific's defining realities: dependence on U.S. markets and security commitments. Washington's challenge is to redefine and sustain its active engagement in a critical region—a region in which it will be an important actor, but no longer the singularly dominant one.

The Clinton administration's approach to East Asia has added to Asian ambivalence about the United States. Despite its auspicious promise of reinvigorated engagement, relations quickly soured, as a leaked memo from Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord explained, precisely because Asians "are beginning to resist the nature of that engagement." As Lord's incisive memo catalogued, over the course of the administration's first 15 months in office, American sensitivities found voice in unusually public economic and political disputes with China (over most-favored-nation trade status, human rights, proliferation), Japan (trade), North Korea (nuclear proliferation), Singapore (the caning of a U.S. citizen), Indonesia (labor rights, trade, and human rights violations in East Timor), Thailand (proliferation and drug trafficking), Myanmar (political legitimacy), and more generally over differing approaches to human rights, labor rights, and the environment. In practice, difficulties balancing the pursuit of interests and the imposition of values have robbed U.S. policy of cogency and resolve even when the right decision is made—as seen dramatically last May, when Clinton boldly reversed his stance on China's human rights record to grant it MFN status. Lord's memo warned of an emerging malaise, arising from East Asian perceptions of Washington as "an international nanny if not bully." The risk, how-

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ever, is not one of malaise but of marginalization—not as the result of a "clash of civilizations," but rather from a lack of understanding of Asian dynamics and the difficulties of fashioning enlightened strategy, tactics, and style to best advance American interests.

While preaching multilateralism, the administration has practiced unilateralism in pursuit of trade and human rights objectives. Its initial "results-oriented" demands allowed Japan, amazingly, to posture before other fearful Asian nations as the defender of free trade. The public spectacle of the United States repeatedly rebuking Singapore for applying its own law—hitherto unnoticed as a human rights violation when only Asians were caned—was a direct confrontation with a government unabashedly advancing U.S. economic and security goals, suggesting the absence of a comprehensive Asian strategy. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor's subsequent opposition to having Singapore, a free trader, host the initial meeting of the World Trade Organization underscored the point. In apparent response to widespread criticism, the Lord memo cautioned that "we must weigh the impact of pursuing short-term goals on our overall long-term interests."

Indeed, however right the policy goals, Washington's behavior worked directly against its own interest in building a community of which the United States is an integral part. Rather, it seemed to galvanize Asian contrariness. At a February 1993 human rights conference in Bangkok, many Asian delegations took a defiant, anti-American stance, emphasizing the role of culture and stages of development, placing economic and social rights ahead of individual rights, and criticizing the hypocrisy of human rights lectures coming from the nation leading the world in rates of murder, per capita incarceration, and gun ownership. American efforts to inject labor and environmental rights at the signing of the Uruguay Round led to an unusual communiqué at the end of a meeting of ASEAN labor ministers, who condemned linking labor and environmental rights to trade as closet protectionism.

THE INSECURITY COUNCIL

THE UNFORTUNATE intersection of Pacific disharmony and waning American influence matters most in the arena of security, which offers

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greater challenges than the economic dimension. Here, the strains and suspicions among fellow members of the supposed Pacific community are exacerbated by the waning security structure anchored in America's military presence.

The security realm, as a result, is riddled with paradoxes. Ironically, in the area where the alteration of the U.S. role, both real and anticipated, is perhaps most pronounced, most Asians would actually welcome more American unilateralism. Yet Washington pursues a humble multilateralism. Even though Asia is more peaceful than at any time in this century—apart from the heavily armed standoff on the Korean Peninsula—all the major actors, and most importantly China and Japan, are devoting more of their respective national resources to the military.

If APEC is still a rudimentary organization, the nascent 21-nation ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—the principal host of the multilateral security dialogues that President Clinton has described as one of several "overlapping plates of armor"—has yet to address any substantive issues, let alone fashion enduring conflict resolution mechanisms or regional security institutions. While more discussion of threats, doctrine, and military procurement is indeed necessary, here too the idea of a Pacific community is likely to be deconstructed by extra-regional mechanisms (such as the U.N. Security Council or the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA) from above, and bilateralism and ultimately Asian balances of power from below.

This situation stems from several factors: the amorphous historical fears of the major powers in the region; uncertainty about generational political transitions in China and North Korea; the divisive and bilateral character of security concerns; and not least, the perception of a reduced U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific. For more than four decades, the U.S. network of bilateral alliances and relationships has essentially been the core security system in the region, rooted in Washington's alliances with Japan and South Korea and its relationship with China. For Washington, its forward-deployed presence in the western Pacific was part of its global strategy of Soviet containment, but the secondary aspect of U.S. political and military engagement—the role of regional security guarantor—continues to entice and benefit local actors. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this ancillary effect has become the prin-

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cipal rationale for a modestly adjusted presence whose importance has not diminished. In 1990, the Bush administration's East Asian Strategy Initiative projected phased reductions in America's military presence, beginning with a 15 percent cut in U.S. troops based in Asia, down to 100,000 troops. But the intensifying crisis over North Korea's nuclear program led then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to freeze a planned 1992 withdrawal of 6,000 troops from Korea.

A RECKONING ON KOREA

As the prospect of North Korean nuclear proliferation has mounted in recent months, Washington has bolstered its military posture in Korea. The looming North Korean threat has quelled any domestic pressure to further downsize the U.S. security presence in Asia. While the most urgent issue is Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, the nuclear issue is inextricably bound up in the longer-term question of Korean reunification—with scenarios that run the spectrum from implosion and a Romania-type collapse to explosion and a second Korean war. As the interests of the four major powers in Northeast Asia intersect on the Korean Peninsula, the way reunification occurs will have major implications for the region and may determine the future of the U.S. forward-deployed military presence in the region.

In the case of either implosion or explosion, the result would be a rapid unification by absorption. Even a more gradual "soft landing" scenario would result in a reunified Korea, probably by the end of this decade. Such an outcome would resolve the nuclear issue. However it occurs, reunification will lead to a reassessment of the U.S. troop presence in Korea. While some in the American and South Korean defense establishments envision a regional role for the United States in Korea, a U.S. troop presence would be politically hard to sustain after a stable, reunified Korea takes shape—unless China replaces the Soviet Union as a full-blown ideological and strategic adversary. A strategic alliance with a unified Korea, however, may be possible.

An American troop withdrawal from Korea would, in turn, put new pressures to reassess, if not restructure, the U.S. military presence in Japan, which would then be the regional host for forward-deployed

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U.S. bases. Such a dynamic could have a destabilizing impact on the East Asian balance or at a minimum heighten the suspicions of the region's major actors. It would also require rethinking the U.S. role in the regional security architecture. Would the United States be defending one democratic, free-market ally against another?

CHINA AND JAPAN'S MOMENT OF TRUTH

ABOVE ALL, a U.S. withdrawal from Korea could force a moment of truth in relations between China and Japan. The mutual need for a peaceful environment and the growing weight of Sino-Japanese economic relations—with some $38 billion in two-way trade in 1993, rapidly expanding investment, and $30 billion in aid since 1980—have shaped a stable and steady improvement in relations.[4] This was dramatized in November 1992 with the unprecedented visit to China of Japanese Emperor Tsugunomiya Akihito, and highlighted more recently by the red-carpet treatment given to Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, Beijing's chief economic planner, during a February 1994 visit to Tokyo.

This deceptive serenity in post-Cold War Sino-Japanese relations is premised on the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and accentuated by the volatility of U.S.-China ties. An independent Japan, operating in the absence of the bilateral alliance or a credible multilateral security arrangement, could resurrect historical Sino-Japanese tensions. These have thus far been dormant even without the Soviet threat.

But one only need glimpse China's behavior—its expansive claims of Chinese sovereignty, forward defense doctrine, continued nuclear modernization, and efforts to attain rapidly force projection capabilities amid the most peaceful environment it has seen in two centuries—to conclude that historic suspicions of Japan still linger beneath the surface.

For its part, Japan, with its hefty defense budget, is acquiring sophisticated dual-use technologies. With the launch of its H-2

[4] Jacob Schlesinger and James McGregor, "Sino-Japanese Trade Soars as Old Enemies Embrace," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 12, 1993, p. 1.

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rocket last February, Tokyo has a potential ballistic missile and independent reconnaissance capability. Its civilian nuclear reprocessing program will give it access to perhaps 50 or more tons of plutonium. It is also increasingly interested in theater missile defenses. While Tokyo is becoming a more independent actor, it does not seek complete autonomy. Rather, it seeks to embed its role in bilateral, regional, and global institutions. The volatility of Japan's surrounding neighbors—Russia in transition, China facing post-Deng uncertainty and turmoil, and reunification ahead in Korea—reinforces Tokyo's desire to maintain the U.S. security umbrella. But it is hedging its bets on the future.

In Asia, both America's economic clout and its military muscle are on the wane.

The evolution of Franco-German relations provides a useful historical analogy for viewing Sino-Japanese ties. For much of the century prior to World War II, Europe was unstable and engulfed in conflict because the two major powers were adversaries. After 1945, France and Germany finally came to terms, permitting the emergence of NATO and the evolution of the European Community. The analogous relationship in the Pacific over the next two or three decades is that between China and Japan.

Moreover, because of their bilateral character, most of the plethora of outstanding territorial disputes—Russo-Japanese, Chinese-Taiwanese, Sino-Vietnamese, Indonesian-Malaysian—do not usually lend themselves to multilateral solutions. No Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is likely to resolve them. Multilateral efforts have made little progress in resolving the region-wide dispute over the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan. That issue is more likely to be resolved by consecutive bilateral deals with China or by the World Court than by ASEAN or the ARF. On the other hand, the attempts of the four major regional powers—America, Russia, China, and Japan—to confront the compelling security challenge in Korea suggest that possibilities for a Northeast Asia framework for political and security cooperation have not been adequately explored.

Other major security concerns tend to have a large extra-regional

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dimension. In Cambodia, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council combined with regional diplomacy to produce the 1991 Paris peace accord. The Security Council and the IAEA are also key instruments in managing the North Korea nuclear issue. And China's nuclear weapons cannot be addressed except on a global basis by the Security Council's five nuclear powers. None of this suggests that it is ill-advised to try forging regional political forums and multilateral instruments to resolve conflicts, strengthening security cooperation, and shaping Asia-Pacific partnership. But it is an overlapping, multitiered system—bilateral, intra-Asian, transpacific, and global—that provides order and stability in the Pacific.

PACIFIC ORDER, U.S. ENGAGEMENT

IF THE Pacific community idea appears more aspiration than reality, this negates neither the importance attached to it by President Clinton nor the possibilities of trans-Pacific cooperation. Nor does it negate the new dialogue and experiments in regional institution-building by a maturing East Asia. The challenge for East Asia is to assume responsibility commensurate with its growing economic success, both within the region and globally. Neither the United States nor East Asia will benefit by drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific.

While American military engagement will likely remain key to stability in East Asia for at least two more decades, the challenge for the United States is to balance competing interests and to utilize its many assets—economic, political, and strategic—to provide leadership and to help shape an emerging order in the Pacific with Washington woven into its political fabric. For all its tentativeness, APEC remains the focal point for governments to build on what has been a largely market-driven process of economic integration.

The U.S. private sector will be the keystone of sustained American engagement in the Pacific in the 21st century. The priority of international economic policy should not only be to enhance U.S. exports to the region, but also to establish an on-the-ground business presence in areas the Commerce Department has identified as key emerging markets. Beyond the urgent need for Congress to grant the

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president "fast-track" trade negotiating authority, there are four guidelines critical to solidifying the U.S. position in the region and strengthening global free trade:

- Pursue a "building block" approach, aimed at concrete, achievable goals to transform APEC into a regional framework for enhancing trade by negotiating major tariff reductions by the leaders' 1996 meetings; adopt an investment code free of escape clauses and with a termination date for exceptions to national treatment; and harmonize customs and certification standards and procedures. No long-term goal should divert attention from the urgent challenge of demonstrating near-term results.
- Forge a link between the North American Free Trade Agreement countries and Asia to demonstrate that NAFTA is not discriminatory and to reinforce the U.S. presence in Asia. Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan have all expressed interest in NAFTA. Such moves could induce East Asians to accelerate economic liberalization.
- Further advance an "open regionalism" compatible with multilateral trade principles by sharing information and designing dispute settlement mechanisms between regional groups to assure that regional rules and regulations reinforce open, nondiscriminatory regionalism, not regional trading blocs.
- Develop sources of domestic support to underpin U.S. engagement in Asia. Some seven million Asian-Americans are a largely untapped link, resource, and constituency for expanded engagement in Asia. This means explaining goals and consequences to the American people, preparing workers for economic competition in an open trade environment, cogent export promotion, and export financing aimed particularly at small and medium-sized businesses.

The widespread hope is that the compelling force of geoeconomics and information age flows of capital, information, and people is creating a new calculus and redefining interests in the Pacific in a way that will offer new possibilities for cooperation. Certainly, long-standing suspicions and historic rivalries have not evaporated. But a clear-eyed pursuit of U.S. interests is likely to lay the best basis for realizing broader political goals in a region that is certain to be one of the decisive voices in the emerging international system.

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The Man Who Would Be Kim

Byung-joon Ahn

KOREA'S DANGEROUS FUTURE

THE KOREAN peninsula has entered a period of grave uncertainty. The death of North Korean President Kim Il Sung on July 8 came at a critical moment. The United States had just resumed talks to probe whether North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for diplomatic recognition and economic assistance. With Kim's death, the answer to that question, which will define the fate of not only the North but the entire peninsula, fell into the untested hands of his son, Kim Jong Il. It is a question that this oddly reclusive man cannot hope to answer. Having assumed power when he did, the younger Kim is caught in a bind that only his father might have had the power, if not the wisdom, to break.

Kim Jong Il's dilemma is this: the North's increasing isolation and impoverishment make political and economic reform imperative; but Kim may find reform impossible. His legitimacy rests almost solely with the mantle of extreme nationalism inherited from his revered father. Kim will have little choice now but to continue down that road. But the need for economic opening is so overwhelming, the North's isolationist course and pursuit of nuclear weapons so untenable, and Kim's apparent abilities so limited that his regime will almost surely be short-lived.

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ONG, NETHERLANDS, CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

The Korean peninsula remains unique. It is a place where the strategic interests of China, Japan, and Russia intersect, and where the United States still keeps 37,000 troops to deter another war. A nuclearized North or its messy breakup can only be averted by strengthening the regional deterrence and defense capabilities of America and its East Asian allies now. A steady and consistent policy of quiet and credible action will help discourage any provocation by the North's insecure but substantially weakened regime. In the meantime, should a reformist clique emerge—one that takes its cues from economic necessity rather than the dangerous imperatives of an outmoded ideology—then a new era of reconciliation and cooperation can commence.

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Despite the Geneva accords, the status of the North's nuclear program is likely to remain unresolved. Washington must be careful not to let Pyongyang divide the United States from its allies. Together they must make clear that a nuclear-armed North is unacceptable. It would not only disrupt the state of deterrence on the peninsula but also threaten East Asia's entire balance of power. The only resolution to the crisis is not merely to contain the North's current program but to roll back any nuclear weapons capability it may have already developed.

WHY KIM WON'T LAST

KIM JONG IL's greatest asset is that he is the North's only alternative. Given the suddenness of his father's death, the ruling North Korean Labor Party, the People's Army, and the state bureaucracy have had little choice but to rally behind him as their supreme leader.

After all, Kim was handpicked by his father, the so-called Great Leader. Groomed since the 1970s to be the "party center," he has cultivated his own support network of "revolutionary small groups" and assumed supreme command of the military in the 1990s. But how long Kim remains in power will depend on his health, whether he can preserve unity among the ruling groups and feed his people, and most important, how he handles the nuclear issue.

Little is known of Kim, who has been strangely shrouded from public view for most of his career. His health seems to be poor; he is known to have diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart problems. His competence and character remain sources of intense speculation. Kim is rumored to have orchestrated the bizarre kidnapping in 1978 of a South Korean actress with whom he had developed a peculiar fascination. He is also suspected of having directed the 1983 bombing in Rangoon that assassinated much of the South Korean cabinet when President Chun Doo Hwan visited there, as well as the 1987 explosion aboard a South Korean airliner that killed 115 people. He may have initiated Pyongyang's move to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, and from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1994. With the exception of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, former Chinese President Yang

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Shangkun, and Cambodia's Prince Norodom Shihanouk, he has rarely met foreign dignitaries. Except for his erratic behavior, Kim is largely an unknown entity.

It is this unheralded man who must now skipper the North's sinking ship through perilously unfamiliar waters. The end of the Cold War has placed the North in the midst of simultaneous political and economic crises. Both the Soviet Union (then Russia) and China have normalized relations with the South, increasing the North's isolation and challenging the rationale of the state. Today, China provides the North's only dependable support, supplying roughly a million tons of oil and a half-million tons of food each year.

The disappearance of communist allies and Pyongyang's autarkic mismanagement have devastated the North's economy. Between 1989 and 1993, gross national product shrank 20 percent to about $20.5 billion, roughly one-sixteenth the size of the South's $328.7 billion economy. The North's foreign trade declined another 1.1 percent in 1993 to a mere $2.4 million, exacerbating the foreign exchange shortage of a treasury that already owes $10 billion in foreign debt. As food and energy shortages worsen, North Koreans have been urged to eat only two meals a day, and factories reportedly operate at 30 percent of capacity. In December 1993, the regime acknowledged for the first time that it had missed the production targets of its third seven-year plan.

Thus, in all aspects except the nuclear field, the competition between the North and the South is over. The South has outperformed the North both economically and politically. The South's economy ranks fifteenth in the world in terms of GNP and thirteenth in trade volume. Although its politics remain volatile, the South has wrought a functioning democracy, electing Kim Young Sam in 1993 as the first civilian president in 32 years. The South, moreover, remains a faithful security ally of the United States, as well as being its seventh-largest trading partner.

Given these circumstances, Kim's primary goal will be survival. Domestically, that means preserving the name of *juche* ideology, his father's founding philosophy of self-reliance and exclusive nationalism based on the principles of independence and grand national unity in a "Koryo Confederal Democratic Republic." Unification policy will

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continue to be based on the rhetoric of "one nation, one country, and two systems, two governments." Foreign policy, however, will be based on two Koreas, in the hopes of protecting the legitimacy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a state.

The North's economic crisis and the nuclear issue will seriously challenge Kim's skills as a political operator. Scenarios for his downfall are many. Intense debates could fracture his elite circle into competing power centers. Internal challengers may seek to undermine Kim's uncertain stature, exposing to the public tales of corruption or other more unsavory aspects of Kim's private life. The specter of mass starvation could spark popular rebellions. A leader as untested as Kim could also inadvertently provoke the kind of domestic or international crisis that would ultimately be his own undoing. Kim's power will remain relatively safe only so long as his competence commands the support of top military and party leaders, such as Marshal O Jin U, Prime Minister Kang Song San, and Kim Il Sung's younger brother Kim Yong Ju, who returned to the Politburo in December 1993 after an unexplained absence of some 20 years. But it is precisely Kim's competence that has long been called into question.

Kim Jong Il's greatest asset is that he is the North's only alternative.

But the real crux of Kim's quandary is that, despite the overwhelming need for economic reform, he has little choice but to continue his father's outmoded policies. For nearly two decades, Kim justified his claim to power as being the heir to his father's mantle in what would be North Korea's first communist dynastic succession, even as the North's political and economic crises turned that inheritance into a liability. Now, the more Kim tries to bolster his credibility by following the political imperatives set by his father, the worse his economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation will become.

Importantly, Kim lacks his father's charisma. Absent the same cult of personality, Kim's reign may not last too long. Kim Il Sung's near-deification as the founder of the Democratic People's Republic allowed him to transcend any challenge to his legitimacy, even as he presided over the North's isolation and economic ruin. The inheritor

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of that "revolutionary" legacy cannot hope to be as lucky. Kim cannot raise his people's standard of living, as Deng Xiaoping has done in China, without jettisoning his father's philosophy of self-reliance and diminishing the mantle of his inheritance. He cannot liberalize the political system, as Boris Yeltsin has done in Russia, without alienating military and party leaders and seriously jeopardizing his grip on power. As long as he "adheres to and brightens our style of socialism," as Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam encouraged him to do in his eulogy for Kim Il Sung, Kim's own future will remain murky indeed.

AFTER THE FALL

IT IS NOT easy to delineate precise scenarios for the North after Kim Jong Il's demise. But two likely possibilities exist: the ascension of a reform-minded military-bureaucratic regime, or a violent collapse of the state. Which will occur depends primarily on the quality of the North's leadership, the cohesion of its elite, the leadership's ability to cope with the economic crisis, and how it manages the nuclear issue. One thing is clear: the regime under the Kim family is unlikely to survive for too long, and North Korea is bound to undergo some kind of structural transformation, with or without reform.

A military-bureaucratic regime would distance itself from the Kim dynasty, following China's example of top-down reform and economic opening. As of now, real reformers, a North Korean Deng or Yeltsin, do not exist. But over time, as the economic crisis deepens and North Koreans, popularly and within the party leadership, begin to question the viability of the Kim dynasty, perestroika may eventually find Pyongyang. Reform would most likely be carried out by a collective leadership and reflect consensus within the party. To maintain order, this new cadre would try to preserve a one-party system but carry out liberalizing economic reforms along the path taken by neighboring China or Vietnam.

Such a regime might be more accommodating of reconciliation with the South and of U.S. demands for nuclear transparency. It would have less difficulty abandoning the Kims' rationale of confrontation and isolation that serve as the organizing principles of the

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world's last surviving Stalinist state. To carry out a successful economic opening, a reformist regime would need access to trade and economic assistance from the United States and its East Asian allies. Freed of ideological baggage, it might be more likely to forfeit the nuclear program as a bargaining chip. Hence, a reformist clique is the most desirable scenario for initiating a new era in North-South relations and for the North's political and economic integration with the rest of the world.

But such a benign evolution is not guaranteed. For a nation so long closed, the path of reform is fraught with uncertainty. The limited skills and resources available to economic planners would make it difficult to satisfy rising consumer demand, especially if broader access to media and information expose the extent of the North's impoverishment. A reformist regime could also fall prey to a cycle of rising popular political expectations. Even for avowed economic reformers, "seeking truth from facts," as Deng has urged in China, carries political dangers, as the frustrated 1989 revolt in Tiananmen Square amply proved. A reformist regime in the North could find itself similarly tested, or even toppled.

Thus a violent collapse, initiated by an internal power struggle or civil strife, could befall either Kim or a reformist regime. As happened in the revolutions that unsettled old orders in Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria, the regime's collapse could produce a period of anarchy. But in the case of the North, it is highly unlikely that either a civil society or political pluralism would quickly spring up. Instead, chaos would likely drive millions of refugees across the Tuman and Yalu rivers and the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. Thousands of others could take to the seas. Such a scenario is among the worst possible outcomes and one that South Korea, China, Japan, and the United States would certainly like to avoid.

It is against this potentially gruesome backdrop that the United States, its allies, and Pyongyang itself must work toward the North's "soft landing" through gradual economic reform. Only when economic necessity prevails over the political imperatives of the Kim dynasty can such an outcome materialize. But given the rigid nature of Kim's regime, a "crash landing" is more likely. Such an event could

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lead either to another attempt to construct a reformist regime or to a sudden and unstable reunion with the South.

PLAYING A WEAK HAND

IN HIS GAME of brinkmanship, Kim Il Sung attempted to use the nuclear card to recast the North's survival and security. He sought to present the world with a fait accompli and to keep the nuclear weapons that his regime has, in all likelihood, already developed. Only in his final days, as Washington contemplated tough U.N. economic sanctions and former President Jimmy Carter made his "private" journey to Pyongyang, did Kim agree to freeze his ongoing nuclear program in return for resuming high-level talks with the United States. To avert further isolation, he attempted to bargain away the limited prospect of future inspections in order to extort political recognition and economic concessions from the United States, Japan, and other Western countries.

The North's future now hinges on his son. But judging from the Geneva accords that Kim Jong Il signed with the United States in August and October 1994, he has not changed his father's policies. Whether he will faithfully implement these pledges remains to be seen.

The deals contained the following: Kim agreed not to reprocess the North's some 8,000 spent fuel rods and to halt construction of two nearly completed reactors, to seal and allow IAEA monitoring of a "radiochemical laboratory," and to remain party to the NPT; in return, Washington promised to provide two 2,000-megawatt light-water reactors (which produce non-weapons-grade fuel), to arrange for an interim energy source as the North's graphite-moderated reactors are dismantled, to refrain from using nuclear weapons against the North, and to establish diplomatic "representation" in each other's capitals.

In other words, Washington gave Pyongyang all that it wanted. Importantly, the Geneva agreements lack a provision for timely special, let alone mutual, inspection of suspected nuclear facilities or waste sites to verify the North's past record. This was the reason South Korea and Japan were so unhappy over the August accord, with South Korea's President Kim Young Sam stating that even "one-half" of a

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nuclear weapon in the North is unacceptable. Since then, Washington had insisted that the North commit to inspections before construction of a light-water reactor could begin; the North had refused. The October accord does not remedy that situation. Washington is in danger of acquiescing in Pyongyang's policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Moreover, Kim's ability to implement what he has already agreed to must be questioned. Although the threat of sanctions would appear compelling, Kim depends first on the support of his military, which is currently led by old-style guerrilla-war partisans who may continue to regard nuclear weapons as their primary guarantee of security. Pyongyang is thus likely to remain determined not to allow any inspection of its past nuclear record. At some point, Kim may seek to use his regime's nuclear card to replace the U.N.-North Korean armistice that halted the Korean War with a peace agreement reducing or gradually removing U.S. forces from the South.

Three near-term decisions by Kim will give some indication as to the North's agenda and Kim's ability to carry out the Geneva accords. First, Kim must decide whether to reprocess the North's spent fuel rods, which contain about 40 kilograms of plutonium (enough for five atomic bombs) and to reload the North's five-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor with fresh rods, which Pyongyang has threatened to do. These decisions must be made soon, as the spent rods continue to deteriorate in the cooling pond where they are stored. The United States wanted the spent rods placed under IAEA control and moved to a third country. The North proposed "dry storage," that is, encasing them in cement within North Korea. Under the NPT, Pyongyang can legally reprocess the rods with IAEA inspectors present, although doing so would violate the North-South denuclearization agreement signed in 1991. Thus, reprocessing may yet proceed.

Kim's second decision regards the future of the nuclear program. Not only is the North's five-megawatt reactor awaiting refueling, but a separate 50-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon could begin operating in early 1995, and a third 200-megawatt reactor in Taechon could be completed in 1996. Once in full operation, the two larger reactors could produce enough spent fuel to reprocess plutonium for at least

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20 to 30 bombs per year. In addition to the three reactors, a plutonium reprocessing plant is also nearly complete, and in March 1994 IAEA inspectors reported evidence that a second reprocessing line was being built in the same plant.



ISAAC, CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

North Korea is thus at the threshold of becoming a major nuclear power. It remains to be seen whether it will indeed abandon these facilities, which have cost it more than $2 billion, in return for the U.S. pledge to supply two light-water reactors that will cost about $4 billion and take seven to ten years to construct. Besides, dismantling the North's existing reactors will itself cost an enormous amount of money. Although the North has agreed to freeze construction of the two larger graphite reactors, whether it will actually carry through on that pledge is far from certain.

Finally, Kim must decide whether to allow international inspection of any undeclared nuclear facilities and weapons that the North has developed. The CIA believes that the North may have already produced one or two nuclear bombs. Vladimir Kryuchkov, former head of the KGB, reported to the Soviet Politburo as early as February 1990 that the North had developed a nuclear device. Most recently, on July 27, 1994, Kang Myung Do, a defector identified as the son-in-law of North Korean Prime Minister Kang Song San, told a news conference in Seoul that the North possesses five nuclear weapons and is trying to develop five more while it stretches out negotiations with the United States.

How Kim decides these issues will only be revealed in the process of implementing the Geneva agreements, which itself is likely to require a long and arduous negotiation. Judging from the North's strategy so far, however, the real danger exists that Pyongyang has already succeeded in keeping any weapons it previously made while buying the time to build more. Washington's decision to freeze the North's nuclear program now while delaying the inspection of Pyongyang's past record and its medium-range ballistic missile and biochemical weapons programs may actually have worsened this danger.

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SEOUL'S NIGHTMARE

SEOUL HAS grown increasingly wary of the manner in which Washington's negotiations with Pyongyang have progressed. It harbors the very real concern that Washington is so preoccupied with freezing further development of the North's nuclear program that, despite the Geneva accords, it may forgo purposeful action on Pyongyang's past record, much as Washington did with Pakistan. From Seoul's viewpoint, Washington had prompted the South to abandon its own reprocessing and enrichment of fissile material for nuclear weapons in 1991, and so it is now incumbent on Washington to make Pyongyang do the same. It worries that Washington may be tempted to pursue a policy that pulls back from the brink at the expense of ensuring a denuclearized peninsula. Seoul also fears that its interests will suffer from Washington's overriding concern with global nuclear nonproliferation—that Washington may be tempted to declare victory in order to bolster a sagging NPT, which is up for renewal in 1995, and thus forsake local deterrence and assurances on a denuclearlized North.

Indeed, Seoul fears that Washington may even strike a separate peace with Pyongyang, delinking its relationship with the North from its alliance with the South. Washington's agreement to set up a liaison office in Pyongyang, even before Seoul has one, has not helped matters. South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo visited Washington in September to emphasize that the North's relationships with the United States and the South should proceed in tandem. Washington acknowledged the need for both dialogues to complement each other but has also made clear that it will negotiate independently with Pyongyang if necessary.

Yet it would be difficult for Washington to fully implement a satisfactory agreement absent Seoul's approval and cooperation. For example, it is the South that has committed to financing 70 percent of the cost of the light-water reactors through an international consortium, the Korea Energy Development Organization, to be launched under Washington's auspices. It is important, therefore, that Washington help the two Koreas normalize their relations. Washington's best tack

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is to work toward the long-term goal of consensual unification even as it seeks a short-term resolution of the nuclear issue.

Throughout their talks, however, the North has sought to maneuver itself between the United States and the South and to negotiate the nuclear issue with Washington alone. Moreover, it has treated its relations with the South as necessary only to the extent that they improve relations with the United States. As long as South Korea remains fearful of being left out of an issue in which it possesses such vital stakes, relations with both the North and the United States are bound to deteriorate. Both Washington and Seoul must make clear to Pyongyang that normal relations with the United States depend first on normal relations with the South.

Seoul has other concerns as well. A nuclear-armed North would certainly upset the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Seoul doubts whether Washington would indeed extend its own nuclear arsenal in case of attack, and even whether Washington would continue to maintain its forward troop deployment in the teeth of a North Korean nuclear threat. While the North's motivation may well be defensive, a nuclear capability nonetheless increases the likelihood of diplomatic blackmail by Pyongyang. It also greatly diminishes the prospect of consensual reunification through a gradual process of confidence-building.

In short, Kim Jong Il with a nuclear arsenal is the South's strategic nightmare. As such, Seoul can be expected to stand firm against permanent ambiguity for the North's nuclear status. Moreover, should the United States appear to acquiesce in letting the North keep nuclear weapons, the credibility of the U.S. security commitment as well as U.S.-South Korean relations could only suffer.

BY DESIGN OR DEFAULT

At such a time of uncertainty, the United States and South Korea must reaffirm their alliance commitments and the goals of nuclear transparency and gradual reunification. This message should be clearly communicated to Pyongyang. Preventing a nuclear North will require Washington to exercise timely and decisive leadership

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with clearly defined goals, a consistent policy, and credible action. Seoul should consult with Washington and coordinate its own policies toward that same end.

Above all, the United States and the South must remain united in their goal of ensuring a denuclearized peninsula. This means getting a full accounting of Pyongyang's past record through timely IAEA and mutual North-South inspections. At the same time, Washington must stem further growth in Pyongyang's nuclear program by compelling Kim to live up to the commitments that he signed in Geneva. The Clinton administration should make clear that it will withhold diplomatic recognition and economic cooperation, including a light-water reactor, unless Kim makes good on the accords. Such a policy would receive the support of the U.S. Senate, which has unanimously passed a bill stating that no funds be made available to North Korea "until the President certifies and reports to Congress that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, has halted its nuclear weapons program, and has not exported weapons-grade plutonium."

Kim Jong Il with a nuclear arsenal is the South's strategic nightmare.

Washington must also make clear that Pyongyang must first normalize relations with Seoul before it can negotiate any peace with the United States. Any other policy would substantially undermine Seoul's attempts to improve its own relations with Pyongyang. Nor should Washington allow Pyongyang to chip away at the U.S.-South Korean mutual defense treaty, which has kept the peace on the peninsula for more than 40 years. In these areas, Washington and Seoul must speak with one voice. Otherwise, Washington will be playing into Pyongyang's hands by inadvertently strengthening the pillars on which Kim's failing regime now rests.

For those reasons, Washington must take care not to transform talks over implementing the Geneva accords into a long political negotiation. The more the North can prolong direct negotiations with the United States, the more it will try to relegate relations with the South to an ancillary status. Such a course would not only damage Washington's relations with Seoul but also diminish the

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chances for a political reconciliation between the two Koreas, on which an ultimate solution to the peninsula's crisis depends.

But it remains doubtful that Kim will live up to the Geneva accords at all, especially given Pyongyang's track record of reneging at the last minute even as others meet its demands. The best way to ensure compliance is for Washington and its allies to remain strong in the face of a progressively weakening, if unpredictable, Kim regime. Kim will only give up the perceived gains of his nuclear program if faced with a certain countervailing disincentive.

As U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry has suggested, "a very firm stand and very strong actions" are the best way to deter any possible military provocation by the North. This means enhancing joint deterrence capabilities with the South. Coordinated, quiet, and firm action on the part of the allies should keep pace with any escalation in Kim's bluster. The Geneva accords, continued negotiation, and the threat of sanctions will not produce desired results from Pyongyang unless they are backed up by a clear demonstration of determination and strength.

A nuclear-armed North would upset East Asia's entire military balance, causing South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan to consider developing equivalent deterrents. It is in the interests of all the region's powers, then, that the North be denied nuclear weapons. Washington should thus stem any tendency for others to "free ride" as it bears the burden and risks of diplomacy. China, especially, has opposed sanctions in favor of diplomacy, but without facilitating dialogue with the North. As it enjoys the best relations with Pyongyang, Beijing should be pressed to persuade Kim to abandon his nuclear ambitions. This issue is important enough that the United States and Japan should make progress in their bilateral relations with Beijing contingent on a truly constructive Chinese role.

Russia has said that it will support U.N. sanctions, provided that an eight-party conference be held first, an idea that the United States has reluctantly supported. Japan, meanwhile, has made clear that it can only support sanctions if they come through the United Nations. Yet Japan shares a strong interest in preventing a nuclear-armed North. If China succeeds in blocking U.N. sanctions, the United

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States should at least enlist Japan and South Korea in imposing their own sanctions, and only when the North shows serious signs of scuttling the nuclear option should they provide generous economic and political assistance. In the meantime, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan should also strive to provide a stable security environment in Northeast Asia through a two-plus-four dialogue that includes both Koreas, as an important supplement to the region's discrete bilateral relationships.

What is at stake on the Korean peninsula after the death of Kim Il Sung is the very credibility of American foreign policy, which Washington's confused signals thus far have significantly eroded. Only by restoring a steady hand can Washington regain the trust and respect that will ensure peace on the Korean peninsula and its success in future efforts at global nuclear nonproliferation.

But ultimately, the Korean question must be resolved by Koreans themselves, through normalized relations and eventual unification. The death of Kim Il Sung has raised the hope that those goals might someday soon be attained. South Korea will continue to view unification as a slow process of confidence-building and reconciliation, even as the North pursues its chimera of a confederal state. But it would serve Pyongyang well to recognize that Korean unification can come by design, or it may just as surely come by default.

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Giving Taipei a Place at the Table

Ross H. Munro

LET TWO CHINAS BLOOM

WHAT IN the world is Taiwan up to? More than two decades ago, the Republic of China on Taiwan was forced out of the United Nations when a majority of U.N. members voted to seat the People's Republic of China. At that time Taiwan adamantly refused to endorse any formula that might have allowed it to retain its U.N. membership alongside the P.R.C., which was being given the Security Council seat. Now Taiwan is pressing for a role in the United Nations under almost any conditions. Launched in mid-1993, Taiwan's all-out campaign to return to the United Nations is being widely dismissed even by some of its friends as quixotic at best. Nevertheless, it merits serious attention in Washington, and even more so in Beijing, because it is emblematic of the rapid democratization of Taiwan's politics that is transforming its foreign policy, particularly toward the P.R.C.

The rationale for Taiwan's U.N. stance is that, while the Republic of China (R.O.C.) remains committed to the idea of one China and thus theoretically to the eventual reunification with the mainland, a separate government has ruled the island and its now 21 million residents continuously since 1949. And it has ruled well: Taiwan boasts a modern economy that provides a good living standard for the vast

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majority of its citizens and a political system that has virtually completed the transition to democracy. Today Taiwan outstrips most U.N. members in GNP (with the world's twentieth-largest economy), trade volume (the world's thirteenth-largest), and population (larger than that of two-thirds of the U.N. membership). Following the precedent set by Germany and Korea of dual representation for divided nations, the Republic of China on Taiwan clearly deserves a place in the U.N. system.

CHINA'S HOLLOW VICTORY

DESPITE THE strong case made by Taiwan for U.N. membership on historical, legal, economic, and ethical grounds, its first attempt to put the issue before the United Nations in the fall of 1993 was an embarrassing failure. Only a few countries—most of them small, poor Caribbean Basin nations that receive economic assistance from Taiwan—spoke out on its behalf. The explanation for Taipei's failure was simple: Beijing fervently opposes any role in the United Nations for what it still portrays as a renegade province with an illegitimate government. With China's burgeoning economic and military power making it second in importance only to the United States in many nations' eyes, Beijing had little trouble ensuring that few would speak on Taiwan's behalf. In pragmatic terms, even U.N. members enjoying good ties with Taiwan faced an easy, expedient choice: to incur Beijing's wrath by openly supporting Taiwan's apparently hopeless quest, or to remain silent while the issue was buried in committee.

And buried in committee the issue might remain. As long as the Beijing government presides over a strong and reasonably united People's Republic, it can easily wield enough power to frustrate Taiwan's effort to reenter the United Nations. But in doing so, Beijing is hurting its own interests and retarding the cause of Chinese reunification.

Because Taiwan's U.N. prospects seem so bleak, even many of Taiwan's friends abroad have been unsettled by its U.N. campaign. Some observers have dismissed it as a product of domestic Taiwan politics. But that is precisely why Taiwan's U.N. campaign is so significant. The people of Taiwan are speaking out and, now that democracy has

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arrived, the government is listening carefully. At the center of Taiwan's democratic politics today is the emotional issue of Taiwan's international identity—whether to seek an independent Taiwan or some form of reunification with China, and since neither seems immediately attainable, how best to manage the ambiguity of Taiwan's current status. Although this debate is far from resolved and often conducted in veiled language, the people of newly democratic Taiwan are determined to be heard on the issue of their island's future. Indeed, the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) government launched its U.N. campaign, with great reluctance, only after concluding that the Taiwanese people, whatever their political allegiance, had overwhelmingly supported the main opposition party's call for U.N. membership.

So Beijing should not rest on its easy victory against Taipei at the United Nations; easy victories often prove hollow. Beijing instead could serve its own interests by trying to understand the factors, chief among them the democratic process, that drove Taiwan's government to seek U.N. membership despite the overwhelming odds against it. So far it seems that the leaders of the People's Republic of China fear but do not understand the new politics of Taiwan.

THE NEW TAIWAN

In January 1988, Lee Teng-hui became president of the R.O.C. on Taiwan and immediately made flexibility and pragmatism the official hallmarks of his foreign policy. Underlying this approach was a radical new principle that became official Taiwan policy in 1991: one China, two political entities. It asserts that in China today there are two governments, the R.O.C. and the P.R.C., each legitimately ruling the area it controls. The logical extension of this argument is that both governments deserve to be represented abroad, which might strike some as obvious. But it represents a sharp break from the previous position of the R.O.C. on Taiwan: that there is only one China, and it can have only one legitimate government. This is still the position taken by the P.R.C., which has been unrelentingly attacking the R.O.C. for shifting its stance.

Under President Lee's new policies, Taiwan began pressing vig-

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orously for admission to international organizations. It returned in 1988 to Asian Development Bank meetings, accepting the designation it had spurned two years before. In 1990, Taiwan applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the "Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu." Taiwan's GATT nomenclature paid implicit tribute to the idea of one China while reflecting the reality that Taiwan was governed separately, but Beijing refused to recognize the conciliatory gesture. In 1991, Taiwan was admitted to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum's meetings.

The leaders of the P.R.C. fear but do not understand the new politics of Taiwan.

Even more impressive was Taipei's drive to develop intergovernmental relations with countries that had diplomatic relations with Beijing. By mid-1994 the R.O.C. government had set up "administrative" or "representative" offices, performing many functions of a typical embassy, in about 60 countries. In another 30 countries where Taiwan was forced to adopt a lower profile, it maintained some sort of agency, such as a business office or travel bureau, as a point of contact.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Taiwan's unofficial relations with the United States continued to improve. In September 1992 President George Bush approved a $6 billion sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan, partly to restore a military balance of power that had been disturbed by the P.R.C.'s purchase of Su-27 bomber aircraft from Russia. Within days U.S. authorities also announced the sale of 12 SH-2F helicopters to Taiwan for $161 million. This year Congress passed legislation that effectively overturned the Reagan administration's agreement to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, declaring that the commitment of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to ensure that Taiwan has sufficient self-defense capability takes precedence. In September the Clinton administration announced that it was modestly expanding its official ties with Taiwan and allowing its offices in Washington and other cities to be renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States. A senior State Department officer, however, said visits by Taiwan's top officials would still be barred.

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Taiwan has also developed extensive unofficial ties with communist and formerly communist countries. Taiwan succeeded in setting up de facto government offices throughout Central Europe, where its presence was once negligible. In Asia, Taiwan's greatest success was establishing ties with Vietnam in 1988; by 1994 Taiwan was Vietnam's leading foreign investor.

Taipei even enjoyed some minor victories in its long-standing competition with Beijing over formal diplomatic ties. Between 1989 and 1992 Taiwan convinced seven Caribbean and African nations that had diplomatic relations with Beijing to establish formal ties with Taipei. Taipei was clearly hoping that Beijing would not automatically break off relations with the countries concerned, but in every case it did, even when ties stopped short of full diplomatic relations. After Latvia decided in January 1992 to upgrade relations with Taiwan to the consulate-general level, Beijing continued to protest the arrangement until Latvia retreated this year.

CHINA OUTBIDS TAIWAN

THE 1988-92 period may well have been the heyday of Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy. Taiwan undoubtedly benefited from the temporary decline in Beijing's international standing after the Chinese leadership ordered tanks into Tiananmen Square in June 1989 to suppress anti-regime demonstrators. When China's economic growth then temporarily slowed, Taiwan clearly drew advantage from its burgeoning economy and huge foreign exchange reserves, then the largest in the world. Taiwan's economic strength, relative to the mainland's, probably reached its zenith during this period.

But by mid-1992 China's market-oriented economic reformers were back in control, with Deng Xiaoping at the vanguard, and the mainland economy had resumed its hyper-rapid growth. Eager to profit from what promised to be the biggest economic takeoff in history, the world's business leaders were beating a path to Beijing's door, and the political leaders of many industrial nations were not far behind.

With its economic, military, and political power growing rapidly, China had the resources to outbid the R.O.C. in the international

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arena. In August 1992 China's burgeoning economy and international trade helped lead South Korea to forsake its old and deep friendship with Taiwan and establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. France agreed to end arms sales to Taiwan after the P.R.C. made it clear that French companies would be punished if such sales continued and rewarded if they stopped. Although in 1994 the Republic of China on Taiwan still maintained formal diplomatic relations with 29 countries, only one of them, South Africa, could be classified by size, wealth, or population as large.

China now enjoys enormous power in the world community. It can prevent many things from happening or make efforts difficult for other major powers, including the United States. The P.R.C.'s veto in the Security Council is the most obvious manifestation of this fact; its ability to make or break an embargo of North Korea is another.

Taiwan's leading policymakers, who are acutely sensitive to every shift in their environment, understood that, no matter how prosperous and modern Taiwan's economy might be, it cannot directly match the international leverage inherent in a Chinese economy of enormous size growing at more than ten percent a year. Taiwan's authorities had to conclude that the rapid increase since the mid-1980s in the number and substance of its quasi-diplomatic ties with foreign countries was not necessarily going to continue indefinitely.

THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY

EVEN MORE troubling to Taiwan's political leaders was the extent to which Taiwanese businesses were being drawn to the mainland. Taiwan's businessmen, eager to escape the high land and labor costs that were crimping the profits of their labor-intensive, export-oriented industries such as toys and footwear, had begun shifting production to the mainland in the mid-1980s.

Ironically, the shift sharply accelerated soon after the Tiananmen incident and has continued to increase every year. Taiwanese businessmen shrewdly recognized that Beijing was desperate for investors when most countries hesitated to sink additional capital into the P.R.C. By 1992, according to the R.O.C. Central Bank, the mainland

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was absorbing 45 percent of Taiwan's capital outflow. By mid-1993 Taiwanese companies had made investment commitments on the mainland of $14.2 billion, of which more than $10 billion had already been expended. Unofficial estimates of current Taiwanese investment on the mainland run as high as $30 billion. Eyeing these trends, the leaders in Taipei realized that most of Taiwan's overseas investment capital would be sunk into mainland enterprises within a few years. This means that the P.R.C. would enjoy overwhelming leverage over Taiwan's business community and thus considerable influence over the R.O.C. government.

Taiwan's fears were anything but fanciful. After the December 1992 elections, which saw an upsurge in the strength of the pro-independence opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Beijing apparently realized that it was blocked politically in its drive for assimilation of Taiwan. It began emphasizing economic and trade relations over political issues, with the intent of diffusing Taiwan's independence movement through economic integration. Taiwan's leaders saw the same picture, prompting them to seek countervailing international connections to offset the risk of being absorbed economically and politically by the mainland.

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This set the stage for the launching of Taiwan's U.N. campaign the following spring. The Taiwanese government also urged business leaders to slow the pace of investment on the mainland and look at investment opportunities elsewhere. Officials announced a "southern strategy" aimed at strengthening Taiwan's ties with Southeast Asia by encouraging Taiwan's businesses to invest more in that region. Until about 1990, Taiwan's investment in Southeast Asia had increased rapidly. But by then China was beckoning, and annual new investment by Taiwanese companies in Southeast Asia plummeted. By 1994 it was less than one-fifth, and possibly just one-tenth, of 1990 levels. While Taiwan's total investment in Southeast Asia is currently about $16.7 billion, that figure will soon be overtaken by investment on the Chinese mainland, if it has not been already.

Taiwan's leaders realize that they and their Southeast Asian counterparts have a strong mutual interest in steering Taiwanese investment to that region. Particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, concern about China's economic power and military intentions is high. Their leaders are anxious about potential investors, both domestic and foreign (that is, Taiwan), being lured away by the China boom. Taiwanese authorities have been working with several Southeast Asian governments to offer incentives to Taiwanese investors, and in the Philippines and Vietnam they have helped sponsor industrial development zones aimed at attracting Taiwanese capital.

A LITTLE RESPECT

THE PEOPLE of Taiwan are proud of what their island nation has accomplished economically, socially, and politically. That pride is mixed with increasing resentment over their nation's international outcast status, which they consider unfair, unjust, and insulting. These feelings connect with a growing consciousness of a Taiwanese identity and a growing wariness of the mainland. These sentiments are shared by those who hope that Taiwan can one day be a separate and independent country and those still committed, however abstractly, to the ultimate goal of one China. They transcend party lines and the increasingly fuzzy division between mainlander and Taiwanese fami-

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lies. One aspect of this is the desire for respect, "face," or standing—call it what you will—for Taiwan in the international community.

The DPP tapped into such sentiments years ago. When the opposition DPP was founded in the fall of 1986, the party called for U.N. membership for Taiwan. It proved to be a political masterstroke and a no-lose issue for the DPP. The demand struck a sympathetic chord throughout the population. Of course, the pro-independence DPP expected the P.R.C. to fiercely oppose its U.N. plank, but this served the DPP's interest in portraying the P.R.C. as hostile to Taiwan. And as long as the DPP harped on the need for U.N. membership, it helped divert public attention from the substantial foreign policy achievements of President Lee and the KMT government.

Taiwan understands that the road to the U.N. ultimately goes through Beijing.

The DPP's U.N. plank hurt the KMT not just because it won widespread popular support but also because it threatened to change the terms of political debate in Taiwan. The DPP's position made it clear that a DPP government would apply for U.N. membership as "Taiwan," a new state. In other words, the DPP's popular call for U.N. membership amounted to a backdoor endorsement of Taiwan independence. So the KMT, whose historic identity stems in part from its commitment, however abstract, to the eventual reunification of China, felt compelled to take the U.N. issue away from the DPP and redefine it as a legitimate demand that both parts of a divided nation be represented in the United Nations. The alternative for the KMT was to remain on the political defensive and risk relinquishing its dominance of the central political debate over Taiwan's identity and future.

When Taiwanese officials launched their U.N. campaign in mid-1993, their initial goal was merely to "participate" in the United Nations; they carefully avoided making their demands more explicit. They also signaled their willingness to participate initially only in peripheral U.N. organizations. Given the flexibility Taiwan's authorities have displayed over the form and legal basis of their participation in the United Nations, the P.R.C. seems once again to have missed an opportunity to advance its interests as well

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as the cause of reunification. If the Foreign Ministry in Beijing had been sufficiently shrewd and creative to offer Taiwan some sort of subordinate participatory role in the United Nations, it might have created a painful dilemma for Taipei. If it accepted, it could be construed as acknowledging Beijing's power to determine its international status. If it refused, its U.N. campaign would be fatally undermined, and it would appear rigid while Beijing appeared accommodating.

Unfortunately, all of this remains speculation. Beijing responded to Taiwan's U.N. initiative on September 1, 1993, with a white paper that made clear Beijing's renewed determination to block the participation of the R.O.C. in the international community, including the United Nations. Once again the P.R.C. refused to acknowledge that a legitimate, democratic government exists on the island. According to the white paper, "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people" is in Beijing.

While it is doubtful that any diplomat was won over by the white paper's arguments per se, it served its purpose. It reminded the world's envoys and foreign policy makers that the P.R.C. would treat as a hostile act even the mildest manifestation of support or sympathy for Taiwan's plea to participate in the United Nations. Little more needed to be said. The P.R.C. had demonstrated its willingness to punish countries economically if they maintained ties with Taiwan. The P.R.C.'s version of dollar diplomacy aside, it also enjoyed the advantages of the defender. It was not asking other countries to do anything except to ensure that the Taiwan participation issue be quietly buried by inaction—a request that undoubtedly appeals to cautious diplomats.

Certainly one could infer that Taiwan had many timid, silent sympathizers when the question of its participation in the United Nations was raised at a meeting of the U.N. General Committee on September 24, 1993. The question was simply whether to put the issue on the committee agenda. Of those committee members in attendance, three countries with whom the R.O.C. maintains diplomatic relations spoke in favor of Taiwan. Eleven countries spoke against. The majority—24—said nothing. No formal vote was taken and, as far as

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that year at the United Nations was concerned, the issue was moot.

Since that setback, Taiwan has not ceased promoting its case. The KMT government still seems completely committed to the U.N. campaign, even though some of the pressures that precipitated the decision to launch the campaign have eased. The slowdown in new Taiwanese investment in the mainland that began in 1993 is continuing, and since the December 1992 election, the DPP has not fared quite as well. Even so, by early this summer, Taipei's worldwide campaign for the 1994-95 U.N. season was in high gear.

THROUGH THE BACK DOOR

SOME FRIENDS of Taiwan have been promoting the idea of entering the United Nations through the back door, that is, by participating in the work of the specialized U.N. agencies. Taiwan has repeatedly offered substantial financial contributions to U.N. organizations that allow it to participate. That way Taiwan would gain legal or de facto membership in the specialized agencies and could gradually enlist a two-thirds majority of U.N. members to support its application for membership.

Such suggestions seem to imply that China is economically weak or diplomatically inept. It is neither. The reality is that the P.R.C.'s diplomats are already quite aware of this proposed gradualist strategy, and are primed to react to any evidence that Taiwan is adopting it. In addition, the foundation of this strategy—using Taiwan's economic clout to make offers to U.N. agencies too generous to be refused—is flawed. Taiwan's relative economic strength vis-à-vis the P.R.C. has probably peaked; Taiwan's strong and expanding economy is no match for the sheer volume of growth generated by China's economic takeoff. This means that the P.R.C. has sufficient economic resources to prevail, directly or indirectly, in any bidding war at the United Nations. In short, the P.R.C. today has the economic clout and the diplomatic savvy to stymie a Taiwanese effort to enter the United Nations through the back door—or, for that matter, the front door.

Although they cannot publicly acknowledge it, Taiwan's top officials undoubtedly understand that the road to the United Nations ultimately goes through Beijing. Taiwan has been sending

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a subtle message to the P.R.C. that is part threat and part promise. The threat is that if Beijing continues to isolate and humiliate Taiwan internationally, especially by blocking its participation in the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, then it will foster pro-independence sentiments in Taiwan that the KMT will be unable to counter. Alternatively, Taipei officials seem to be saying, they are ready to enter serious talks aimed at eventual reunification once Beijing gives Taiwan "face" and endorses its participation in the United Nations. Taiwanese officials must measure their words carefully here because of the great wariness of the mainland that prevails in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, several Taiwanese officials have said in recent months that Beijing could promote the goal of reunification by endorsing Taiwan's U.N. bid. Given that Taipei has repeatedly made clear that the terms of its participation in the United Nations are negotiable, Beijing should recognize the opening that is being presented.

A SYMBOLIC UNION

THE P.R.C. must first come to grips with the reality of a democratic Taiwan. Beijing has long acted as if its goal was to browbeat or inveigle a ruling clique on Taiwan into agreeing to peaceful reunification. That window, if it was ever open, has now closed forever. When Beijing treats the elected government of Taiwan as an illegitimate entity ruling a renegade province, it insults the people of Taiwan, including those who did not vote for the ruling party. Such tactics only promote pro-independence sentiment.

Beijing must also rid itself of the comforting delusion that Taiwan's campaign to participate in the United Nations is a concoction of Taiwan's political elite and unnamed villains in the United States, something the P.R.C. media regularly suggests. Instead, Beijing must see the U.N. campaign as a product of Taiwan's democratic process.

The P.R.C. has only one realistic option if it wants to achieve even a symbolic reunification with Taiwan, and that is to woo the people and leaders of Taiwan. Beijing has never made clear how its formula for reunification—one country, two systems—would work in Taiwan.

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While Hong Kong will begin operating under that formula in 1997, the transition from British rule so far has not provided a reassuring precedent for Taiwan residents. Even the director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies in Beijing acknowledges pervasive "misgivings" about one country, two systems, and the existence of public opinion polls showing that few Taiwanese support it.

Serious wooing by Beijing would mean making a creative and conciliatory proposal to Taiwan that, without surrendering the principle of one China, would respect and acknowledge Taiwan's legitimacy as a separate political entity. Any realistic arrangement would acknowledge Taiwan's right to play a role in the international community, including the United Nations. In return, Taiwan would have to join with the P.R.C. in reinvigorating the idea of one China, giving it some institutional reality, however symbolic. There are many ideas about how to accomplish that, but they will remain so much smoke until Beijing makes a genuine and generous overture to Taiwan.

Such an overture will have to wait until a younger and more flexible leadership consolidates control in the post-Deng era. A reading of the communist media in Beijing and Hong Kong suggests that Deng's rigid position on Taiwan issues is still the key factor in the P.R.C.'s Taiwan policies. Nevertheless, it is not too early for Beijing's younger leaders to contemplate the political trends in Taiwan that indicate time is not on their side.

ALL FOR ONE

WHAT ROLE should the United States play in all this? The short answer is, a wary but sympathetic one. While the State Department's current position is that it does not support U.N. membership for Taiwan, it should at least declare that it favors any agreement between Taiwan and the P.R.C. that would allow Taiwan to participate in the United Nations. A senior State Department official committed the United States in September to increased efforts to support Taiwan's attempts to gain admission to international organizations like GATT that do not require members to be nation-states. Beyond that, the United States must exercise caution, because Washington has a strong

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interest in upholding the principle of one China. The U.S. government has repeatedly acknowledged this principle ever since President Richard Nixon's joint communiqué with Premier Zhou Enlai in 1972. If the United States were to endorse a U.N. role for Taiwan in the face of P.R.C. opposition, Beijing could then attack Washington for violating the one-China principle.

The one-China principle has gained renewed importance in light of the possibility that the DPP could gain power in Taiwan sometime in the future. The DPP's promotion of Taiwan's independence ultimately rests on an irresponsible gamble—that it could get away with provoking Beijing by declaring de facto independence because the United States would come to Taiwan's defense.

It is true that the Taiwan Relations Act declares U.S. opposition to any attempt by the P.R.C. to use force against Taiwan. Although it stops short of an explicit commitment, the act morally obliges the United States to come to Taiwan's aid if the P.R.C. attacks it. But that obligation was made in the context of the U.S. commitment to one China. The U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan would no longer be clear once a pro-independence government took power in Taiwan and repudiated the principle of one China.

Chinese military action against Taiwan would prompt a bitter debate in the United States, with some arguing that America's commitment to a democratic Taiwan was undiluted and others that the United States should not risk all-out war with China because of a rash act by Taiwan. Thus Washington has a strong interest in continuing to support the principle of one China.

The best thing Washington can do is to remind Beijing of the mutual interest of the United States and the P.R.C. in avoiding the crisis that would become inevitable if Taiwan declared independence. But responsibility for avoiding such a development is not mutual. It is up to Beijing to propose a new formula that will preserve the idea of one China while accepting Taiwan's right to a respected place in the world.

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Profile

Faces of Fundamentalism

Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah

Judith Miller

AROUND THE 1980s an eruption of militant Islamic passion sent tremors through the Middle East: the 1979 installation in Shiite Muslim Iran of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; the occupation that same year of Mecca's holiest shrine; the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat after the Camp David accords; Hezbollah's car-bomb assault on the U.S. embassy in Beirut; the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan by the Saudi- and American-armed *mujahedeen;* the growth of the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, in Israeli-occupied territories; the election victories in Algeria of the Islamic Salvation Front; and the military coup in Khartoum that brought Hassan al-Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood to power and made Sudan the region's first militant Sunni Arab state.

But that was the 1980s. The present decade has seen mostly setbacks for the militants. Sudan, always poor, is now bankrupt and still trapped in a savage, costly civil war after five years of Islamic rule. Economically isolated, Khartoum became a political pariah in 1993, when Washington added it to the short list of countries sponsoring or assisting international terrorism. In Iran, Islamic militants vie among themselves for power

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WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE/THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY

Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi

in the political vacuum left by Khomeini's death. Afghanistan is locked in vicious civil strife among competing Islamic warlords. And Saddam Hussein's invasion forced the once-wealthy militant Islamic movements to choose between their traditional patrons—Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—and their mostly pro-Saddam constituents.

Moreover, America's spectacular display of military power in the Persian Gulf War signaled Washington's determination to protect its access to oil and other vital interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S. victory in the gulf led to American-sponsored peace talks in Madrid in 1991, which culminated two years later in Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signing a peace accord in Washington. Now Jordan has agreed to a formal peace, and Syria is not far behind. Islam's defeats of the 1990s have been so widespread, so relentless, that French scholar Olivier Roy has written of "the failure of Islam," and Fouad Ajami, an eminent American analyst of Lebanese origin who pronounced the death of Arab nationalism in this journal four years ago, has concluded that "the pan-Islamic millennium has run its course; the Islamic decade is over."

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Despite such predictions, it may be premature to proclaim the end of the militant Islamic moment. Given the enormous attraction Islam holds for young Muslims, and the lack of any convincing, homegrown alternative, the militants' failure may be only temporary. In Algeria, Islamic extremists may take partial or total control of the government. In Egypt, the government is undergoing economic and political strain. The country is debt-ridden, politically stagnant, and plagued with rising unemployment. Although the United States was able to twice mobilize an international force to confront Saddam Hussein—a secular dictator whose last-minute conversion to Islam fooled few people—it is not clear that America would have sufficient military power, moral authority, and national will to quell a popular Islamic uprising in, say, Cairo, or—still more daunting—an anti-Western coup by Islamic extremists in Saudi Arabia.



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah

A COUNSELOR AND A CLERIC

TWO MEN are attempting to adapt to these challenges, each in a way that reveals much about the power and appeal of Islamic movements in the Arab states. Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi of Sudan and Sheikh

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Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon are the two most important leaders of Islamic literalist movements. Each leads a movement dedicated to the destruction of the social and political order in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries with pro-Western regimes. For American and European officials charged with protecting Western interests abroad, their names evoke images of car bombs, murder, and young, bearded holy warriors bent on historic revenge. In Arab capitals, they represent the militant Islamic revival feared by conservative rulers and prayed for by the millions of unhappily ruled, the futureless young, the poor, the dispossessed—those the Muslims call "the disinherited."

Their names evoke images of car bombs, murder, and holy warriors bent on revenge.

In the past decade, these men and their movements—committed to establishing Islamic regimes that combine development and Islamic justice—have become vastly more influential, and hence, far more threatening than Western analysts ever imagined possible. Arab intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s were inspired by the works of George Antonious—a Lebanese Christian whose book *The Arab Awakening* became the bible of Arab nationalism—and were hypnotized by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's aggressive promotion of secular pan-Arabism. Today's Muslim generation is enthralled by Turabi, Fadlallah, and less prominent imitators.

Turabi, now 62, is a smooth, Western-trained ideologist of Sudan's Islamic counterreformation. As leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, he is the power behind the Islamic regime, which has ruled Sudan since 1989, when a military coup destroyed Sudan's inept democracy. In the past 30 years, Turabi has transformed the Muslim Brotherhood from a marginal group into a powerful political force, one that Sudan's traditional parties were forced to include in their ruling coalition. When the Brotherhood's agenda was blocked democratically, its followers used their posts in the government, army, and security services—which Turabi had encouraged them to join—to seize power.

Lebanon's Sheikh Fadlallah, a 59-year-old descendant of the Prophet Muhammed, is a prolific poet, scholar, and influential Shi-

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ite cleric. While his group—Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Party of God—stands little chance of ruling Lebanon in the short term, it is now a broad-based political and social movement that Lebanon's government must take seriously. Hezbollah's kidnappings, hijackings, and car-bomb attacks in the early 1980s helped drive America from Lebanon, and the Party of God remains the major opponent of Israel's self-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon. Under Fadlallah's guidance, Hezbollah has not only captured the largest bloc of seats in Lebanon's fractious parliament, it has developed a large and passionate following among young Shiite Muslims, now the largest religious group in what was once a predominantly Christian country.

On the surface, Fadlallah and Turabi would seem to have little in common. Fadlallah, a Shiite from once-wealthy Lebanon, received a classical Islamic education in the seminaries of Najaf, Iraq, the center of Arab Shiism, and speaks only Arabic. Turabi, a Sunni from impoverished Sudan, attended a secular university and studied law in London and Paris, and speaks idiomatic English and French. Turabi is tall, thin, and dark-skinned. Fadlallah is short, round, and wan. But both are cosmopolitan, well-traveled men of the world. Each has affected Middle Eastern politics far beyond his country's own borders, and together they have influenced the ideas millions of young Arabs have about the West, their own troubled countries, and the peace that is now being arranged between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Though they have never met, each told me he respects the other. They have also begun to correspond, though neither will say about what.

Interviewed in appropriately Spartan offices this past spring and summer, both men expressed absolute certainty that only Islam can fill the vacuum left by the failures of Western-inspired Arab nationalism and other imported ideologies; as Turabi often declares, in the spirit of Karl Marx, "Objectively, the future is ours." Both are charismatic orators who use the mesmerizing rhythms and power of Arabic to great effect—Turabi at political rallies and lectures, Fadlallah in his famous Friday sermons at his Beirut mosque. Both are what Israeli scholar Martin Kramer calls "modern" Islamic leaders in that they defend and promote Islam in

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terms beyond the Koran and are fond of incorporating Western techniques and arguments in their criticisms of the West.[1]

Both have, in Kramer's phrase, "amazing discipline of discourse." Although Turabi and Fadlallah can occasionally be provoked—and they were at times during these interviews—they usually stick close to a mental script, pursuing their goals without digressing. They resist being drawn into philosophical debates that might expose weaknesses in their Islamic framework or put them on uncertain intellectual ground. When convenient, both engage in sophisticated dissimulation. When they do not wish to answer a sensitive question, no amount of cajoling, humoring, incitement, or repetition can draw them out. Both relish the attention of journalists and appreciate our usefulness in spreading their ideology, especially to media-savvy young Arabs accustomed to satellite dishes and VCRs. In Khartoum, for example, Turabi told me that he always talked to journalists who visited Sudan, "even journalists who say awful things about me. When they meet me here, it looks like I haven't read what they've written. But I have," he said, smiling. "I just don't react. And not because I want to win him over. I simply feel that one must continue to communicate with others."

To some extent, both men think of themselves, as did Khomeini, in grandiose ways—as a symbol of his country's revolution, or, as Turabi says, "a symbol of Islam." Fadlallah, when asked how he prefers to be addressed, replied that, given his age and scholarly achievement, he could appropriately be called "ayatollah." Asked whether the even higher Shiite designation of "marjah" was appropriate, Fadlallah smiled and noted, "Some people have talked about this and consider me as a reference and guide on Islamic issues, but I have not yet announced myself as a marjah." The people, he added modestly, would have to decide whom they would trust with such exalted standing.

The place of each leader in his respective movement eludes pre-

[1] Martin Kramer recently completed a study of Sheikh Fadlallah, which will appear in R. Scott Appleby, ed., *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders in the Middle East*, University of Chicago Press, 1995. The volume also contains my profile of Turabi.

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cise definition. Both men have repeatedly denied having any formal title or post. Yet it is unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood or Hezbollah would have evolved as they did without such inspiring, pragmatic leadership.

ENEMIES AND FRIENDS

TURABI AND Fadlallah share several mutual hatreds. Communism is one of them. Turabi's most tenacious foe throughout his life has been Sudan's Communist Party, once the largest communist party in Africa. Similarly, after Iraq became ostensibly independent in 1932 and then again after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, believers such as Fadlallah were forced to confront Baathist communists and other secularists who threatened both the clerics' standing and Islam's grip on Shiite Muslims throughout the region. Fadlallah's belief in the need to update Islam emerged in part from those early battles with atheist groups.

Turabi and Fadlallah also detest Saudi Arabia, a less obvious competitor and an early patron of their charitable and political works. While they dismissed Saddam Hussein as a fraud, an Islamic pretender, during the buildup to the Persian Gulf War, both were even more hostile to the American-led forces that drove Iraq's troops from Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, understandably, viewed their opinions as betrayals. Turabi describes the Gulf War and what he regards as Saudi Arabia's temporary salvation through American military might as a "blessing in disguise" that "turned the Islamic phenomenon into a mass movement." In Cairo and Riyadh, he told me, soon after the Gulf War, that "the traditional religious and political establishments are trembling." King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was "in quite a mess," he gloated. The Saudi rulers were neither Muslim fundamentalists, nor Muslims. "The Saudis, with their monarchy and secular laws and secular elites, had propagated a very conservative Islam throughout the Middle East for years. But the Gulf War has shattered the dynasty's legitimacy. Now, even the Saudis face a full-fledged Islamic movement that will no longer be bought off."

Turabi is undoubtedly angry that the Saudis have cut off financial

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aid to Sudan and, more recently, expelled Osama bin Laden, a fanatical young member of a wealthy Saudi family known for his support of the Afghan rebels and Islamic militants. Bin Laden now lives in Khartoum and carries a Sudanese passport.

Fadlallah, too, has little affection for the Saudi regime, despite the fact that it bans alcohol, strictly segregates the sexes, and has made *sharia*, or Islamic law, the law of the land—all ostensible goals of most radical Islamic movements, including Hezbollah. But as Fadlallah argued, the implementation of Islamic law does not automatically guarantee the creation of an Islamic society. "They claim to derive their rules from Islamic teachings," Fadlallah said, his disdain for the Saudis evident on his face. "But their implementation is different from what they claim." He dismisses as cosmetic Riyadh's recent well-publicized rapprochement with its substantial Shiite population. The agreement, he complained, "solved only one one-thousandth of the problem. The Shiite minority of Saudi Arabia are citizens of the tenth degree."

Turabi describes the Persian Gulf War as a "blessing in disguise."

At the same time, however, both Turabi and Fadlallah have distanced themselves in recent years from another beloved patron and champion of absolutist Islam—the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Turabi credits Iran with having "Islamized revolution," he also argues that Iran's misfortune was that Islam came to power through revolution, a violent process that invariably leaves a deep stain. Khomeini, he said, was not really a politician. He was "too abstract" and "sometimes wrong." "The revolution needed a symbol, something to hate—the shah. Suddenly the shah was gone, but they didn't know what to do. So they charged against the [U.S.] embassy . . . just to bring something down." In other words, the Iranian militants' main problem, according to Turabi, was that, unlike his Muslim Brotherhood, they lacked a clear agenda for political and social change.

Turabi, who has long denied Western charges that Iranian Revolutionary Guards operate training camps in his country, also denies that Sudan harbors members of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Islamic "liberation" groups, though I interviewed such people during my stay

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in Khartoum. According to Turabi, Washington added Sudan to its terrorist list in 1993 because the United States is "anti-Islamic." Western diplomats, citing what they call overwhelming evidence of Sudan's aid to terrorists, scoff at his denials.

Some analysts believe that the recent cooling of relations between Khartoum and Tehran has less to do with philosophical disagreements than with Iran's paltry support for Sudan's regime. Sudanese officials deride what they now call the "challenge highway," a road to Port Sudan that Iran had promised to construct but that was still unfinished last summer. Moreover, Sudan is obviously displeased that Iran has forced the bankrupt regime to buy its oil at world market prices.

Fadlallah's coolness toward Iran also reflects policy differences, rivalries, and Tehran's disdain for the sheikh's tiresome independence. Fadlallah argues that Khomeini came to power under "harsh circumstances," particularly the "imposed" war with Iraq, which forced the young revolution to focus on survival rather than its Islamic program. "The failure to implement some Islamic thought does not reflect the failure of Islamic thought," Fadlallah told me. "Islamic systems do not exist in a vacuum." Echoing Turabi, he agreed that it would have been better if Islam had not come to Iran through revolution.

Fadlallah, like Turabi, is quick to criticize Iran. He did not, for example, deny assertions by fellow militants that Khomeini refused to meet with him for three years after he rejected Iran's demands that Hezbollah call for an Islamic state in Lebanon. Fadlallah adroitly portrayed the boycott as his decision, and then downplayed the ayatollah's refusal to meet with him, blaming logistics and not a "negative attitude" toward Khomeini or the Islamic republic. "I have my own Islamic personality," Fadlallah told me. "I had it before and after the Iranian Revolution." Other Islamists were not expected to adopt "all ideas and notions used in the Islamic republic or promoted by them."

Nor did Turabi and Fadlallah specifically endorse Khomeini's 1989 *fatwa* against the Indian-born British writer Salman Rushdie. The ayatollah's decision argued that Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*, had insulted the prophet and hence made Rushdie an apostate whose life was forfeit. While Fadlallah defended the *fatwa*, he did not call for Rushdie's death. What mattered to him was that many stores had

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been persuaded not to carry the book and that non-Muslims had been reminded of the danger in offending the world's one billion Muslims. Muslims, he argued, had to prevent the West from using the Rushdie affair "to infiltrate its ideas of human rights into the Islamic world."

Five years later, Fadlallah had not changed his mind. Refusing to say the death warrant should now be canceled, Fadlallah argued only that the Rushdie affair should not be interpreted as proof that Islamists do not believe in "freedom of expression." "We have no problem criticizing Islam in a constructive and scientific way," Fadlallah insisted. But Rushdie was mocking the prophet with "insulting expressions." "This was about politics, not freedom of thought," he said. "If Rushdie had written a similar book about Jews, would Bill Clinton still have welcomed him at the White House? Clinton does not respect the feelings of Muslims as he does Christians and Jews. The official West is not neutral in this matter."

Turabi, a student of law by training, used procedural arguments to avoid criticizing the substance of the *fatwa*. First, he asserted that Rushdie would not be subject to the death penalty for apostasy in Islamic Sudan because he had not violated Sudanese law, which requires that a Muslim take "active steps" to undermine an Islamic state's constitutional order to be convicted of apostasy. Second, Rushdie did not commit a crime on Sudanese soil, and Islam "accepts territory as the basis of jurisdiction." Although Turabi, like Fadlallah, was obviously aware of the damage the death warrant had inflicted on the Islamic cause, he resisted being questioned about it in any detail. The Rushdie affair was not worthy of scrutiny, he declared, dismissing further inquiries about the *fatwa* as "silly questions."

Fadlallah makes a point of distancing his movement from Tehran on other issues. If anything, he told me, the Iranians have adopted many of his ideas, not the other way around. Tehran, for instance, eventually accepted his argument that "political issues must be confronted in a nonemotional way," that "overly broad and hollow" rhetoric was counterproductive to the Islamic cause, and that one had to distinguish between Western systems and Western people. "Our Islamic speech should reflect reality," he said. "We want to be enemies of the official West, not its people."

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Turabi also endorses this Islamic Talmudism. Underlying the distinction both men make between Western governments and their people is an implicit assertion that Western governments are not truly democratic; they do not represent the hopes and beliefs of the people who freely elect them.

ISLAM VS. AMERICA

TURABI'S AND Fadlallah's belief in Islam's ultimate triumph is accompanied by their certainty of America's decline. Fadlallah's view might spring in part from having witnessed the flight of American, French, and Israeli soldiers from Lebanon following his people's "rebellion against fear" in 1983. Turabi shares this conviction because, as he told me, "I know America well," referring to a summer he passed in the United States as part of an American government-sponsored tour for student leaders in 1961. America, he concluded "sadly," is "racist." By Islamic standards, Sudan's human rights record—assailed by the United Nations, Western governments, and virtually all independent human rights organizations—was better than America's, he declared. His society was less violent and far safer. "There are millions of people in America—45 million people at least," he said, apparently alluding to the nation's black population, "who don't believe that your system represents them." The Clinton administration, Turabi said, is "young and energetic, but aimless," and its secretary of state, Warren Christopher, "hasn't got a clue."

At the same time, Turabi and Fadlallah have been careful to express respect and affection for the American people. Though Americans are, in Turabi's words, "very ignorant of the world," they are also very "open" to it. Their quarrel, they stress, is with the government and its wrong-headed policies, not with the people. This reassuring message reflects Fadlallah's conclusion that "if the Islamic movement showed a friendly face, this would bolster those in the West who favor the appeasement of its political demands."[2] This strategy, given the number of Western analysts who yearn for recon-

[2] Kramer, *Spokesmen for the Despised.*

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ciliation with Iran and a dialogue with radical Islamic groups, has not been without success.

Both Turabi and Fadlallah, however, have placed firm limits on their rhetorical confrontation with "official" America. While Fadlallah once defended the suicide bombings against the American embassy and military targets, as well as the young "martyrs" who carried them out, he began to distance himself from airplane hijackings, hostage-taking, and other terrorist acts as early as 1985.

Both men, for example, have condemned the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and related plots to blow up New York bridges, tunnels, and public buildings. "There is no justification for such actions in a country where Muslims have freedom to practice their faith," Fadlallah told me last spring. Muslims living in such lands had an obligation to "respect the rules and laws of the state" and "not to act against the national security of such countries. . . . The people in the World Trade Center had no link to politics; we had no right to hurt them. We condemn all similar murders of innocent people in public places."

Nevertheless, Fadlallah added, while he had never met Sheikh Abdel Rahman, the Egyptian cleric accused of sanctioning the bombings, he doubted that Rahman would have done such a thing, since he had come to the United States seeking political refuge.

Turabi also maintained that neither he nor his government condoned or had any role in the plots. Distancing Sudan from terrorism was more difficult for Turabi, however, since Sheikh Rahman was given his visa to the United States in Khartoum and, according to American investigators, had spent several weeks in Sudan as Turabi's guest, hospitality that Turabi denies. Moreover, five of the 15 men indicted in connection with the bombing conspiracy are Sudanese nationals, some of whom, according to American officials, had extensive contact with two Sudanese diplomats at the United Nations before the bombings. Turabi accused an "Egyptian agent" working for the U.S. Justice Department of trying to frame the five suspects, none of whom he said he knew personally. Sudan was placed on the State Department's terrorist list several months after the Sudanese nationals were formally charged, though the

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World Trade Center episode was not mentioned in the agency's official explanation.

Their hostility to America and the West has undoubtedly been reinforced by their conviction that the United States, often with Western and Arab help, has tried to kill them. Fadlallah said he has been the target of five such plots—"the most serious being the American attempt," he said with a tight smile, referring to a 1985 car bomb that exploded in front of his house moments before his scheduled arrival. Eighty civilians were killed in the blast and more than 250 were wounded. Subsequent press reports attributed the attack to Saudi and American intelligence agents. Although the United States formally denied involvement, Bob Woodward wrote in *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA* that CIA Director William Casey and the Saudi ambassador had authorized the assassination attempt. A year after the blast, Fadlallah announced that Hezbollah had secretly arrested, tried, convicted, and executed 11 Lebanese who he said had participated in the raid.

Their belief in Islam's ultimate triumph is accompanied by their certainty of America's decline.

Turabi, too, blames the CIA for a Sudanese karate champion that nearly killed him in May 1992 at Ottawa Airport. "The CIA misbehaved," Turabi said, citing information from several "knowledgeable" Western friends. But the Sudanese dissident who pummeled Turabi at the airport, temporarily paralyzing him, said that he had acted alone and out of conviction that Turabi was responsible for his country's misery. Nevertheless, Turabi insists that the United States and its allies remain intent on destroying both him and Sudan's Islamic regime, not an unreasonable assumption given previous American conduct.

There is little doubt that such botched attacks have enhanced Turabi's and Fadlallah's standing among their believers. Their followers, and even the men themselves, attribute their survival to *baraka*, an inherited luck and grace that makes one both righteous and invincible.

Perhaps it is not surprising, in the wake of America's military display in the Gulf War, that Fadlallah and Turabi—while continuing in speeches and sermons to insist on the inevitability of America's fall

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and Islam's ultimate triumph—should choose to conciliate Washington and try to charm the American people. Both men are shrewd and seasoned enough to appreciate the risk of openly challenging the United States, a nation slow to anger, but dangerous once aroused.

VOX POPULI, VOX ALLAH

BOTH TURABI and Fadlallah have long insisted that Islamic regimes can best come to power through democratic means rather than revolution. So both men differ from militant Islamic predecessors such as the late Sayyd Qutb, an influential Egyptian militant who urged Islamists in the 1960s to break with *jahaliya*, or pre-Islamic regimes masquerading as Muslim governments.

Fadlallah boasts that it was he who persuaded Tehran that the Islamic cause would best be served by encouraging Hezbollah to run for parliament in 1992. The Party of God's campaign then exceeded even Fadlallah's expectations. "Ten years ago, I argued in a book that change does not happen only through revolution," he said, "that it could be achieved by penetrating democratic institutions to promote Islamic ideas. Recently, Iran agreed."

Nevertheless, Fadlallah refuses to condemn Islamic regimes that come to power through undemocratic means. "If some reached power, as in the case of Sudan, through a coup d'état," he recently told one interviewer, "remember most regimes in the Third World come to power through the same means, and then were transformed into civil ones." The Egyptian regime, he added, had come to power that way.[3]

Turabi, too, infuriated hard-liners within his own Muslim Brotherhood by consistently seeking coalitions with Islamic groups that some militants viewed as insufficiently pure or tough-minded, and by joining any government, civilian or military, that advanced his Islamic agenda. Thus, Turabi blasted an anti-Islamic military regime in 1965 as undemocratic, but enthusiastically joined Jafar Muhammed Numayri's equally undemocratic military regime as attorney general in the early 1980s,

[3] *Middle East Insight*, "An Interview with Ayatollah Sayyed Fadlallah," September/October 1994, p. 19.

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after Numayri espoused his commitment to an Islamic state. In 1985—the year of Sudan's last free elections—Turabi's group won less than 20 percent of the vote, not enough to rule, but enough to force his group's inclusion in the governing coalition. But when then–Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi expelled Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood because it opposed his decision to abrogate the Islamic legal code, which was preventing an end to the war with the south, fundamentalist military officers seized power to block the move. Advancing the Islamic cause, not democracy, seems always to have been Turabi's priority.

No parliamentary majority can nullify God's laws as codified in Islamic law.

Turabi insists that his country is democratic, but his notion of democracy bears little resemblance to democracy as commonly understood in the West. Turabi told me that democracy does not require multiple parties, the right of any individual to stand for office or spend money campaigning for it, or the right to advocate a view that contradicts the Koran. For both Turabi and Fadlallah, the Western notion of democracy is alien: to Islam, rule is a prerogative not of the people, but of God, who appointed the prophet, who, in turn, prescribed the general precepts of governance in God's own words, the Koran. For both men, no parliamentary majority, however large, can nullify God's law as codified in Islamic law.

Fadlallah's view that Hezbollah should participate in Lebanon's secular, multi-sectarian government reflects the significant presence of Christians and other minority groups in Lebanon; demanding that Lebanon become an Islamic state now would be counterproductive. Lebanon's "diversity of sects," its traditional political system—a reference to confessional government, in which each minority is assigned a share of power—and its borders with both Israel and Syria, which has more or less occupied Lebanon, were political constraints that made the goal of an Islamic state "unrealistic," Fadlallah told me. Perhaps in the future, he said, without mentioning Shiite Muslims' growing population, the Lebanese themselves "might choose to be Arabic and Middle Eastern." Lebanon's traditional system was "not holy," he said, pleased with his pun. "The heavens won't fall if the

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Lebanese choose to change it." But for the moment, believers should concentrate on "using Lebanon's freedoms of speech and political action" to promote Islam, for "Islam can best be conveyed to the West and to the region through Lebanon," he asserted.

Turabi has reacted differently to the large and troublesome non-Muslim minority in his country. Ever since 1955, when civil war erupted between the mostly Arab Muslim north and the largely Christian and pagan south, Sudanese governments have struggled to reconcile the north's insistence on an Islamic framework of government with the south's demands that citizens of all religions be equal under law. Peter Kok, a Christian from the south and a former law professor at the University of Khartoum, argues that Turabi's attitude toward southerners, among other stances, is opportunistic. When the south was winning the war, Turabi's Brotherhood supported efforts to weaken the south or separate it from the rest of Sudan; when the north was strong and able to pursue its goal of Islamizing southerners, Turabi favored unity. Today Turabi argues that the Islamic regime is offering southern rebels a generous deal—exemption from the north's Islamic legal code (which would not, however, apply to the one to two million non-Muslim southerners living in the north), regional autonomy, and federation. But southerners do not trust Turabi or his government. According to Kok, when Turabi served in Nimeiri's government, he applauded the imposition of an Islamic legal code that denied them equal legal standing and helped reignite the civil war. So the conflict rages on, embarrassing Turabi and bankrupting his regime.

Fadlallah and Turabi also hold very different views on *wilayat-i-faqih*, the notion endorsed by Khomeini that the most learned and senior of clerics should be an Islamic nation's supreme political and spiritual ruler. Fadlallah, schooled in Islam's classical Shiite tradition, called this, self-servingly, "a true theory." Turabi, a lawyer and a Sunni Muslim with no religious avocation or credentials, disdained the concept. Shiite Islam's emphasis on structure stems from the fact that Shiite Muslims, like the early Christians, were a minority who had developed a hierarchy to protect them from persecution. "When you are a minority," he said, "your leadership and private organizations

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become the most important thing." But Turabi opposed such "barriers" between an individual and God, reflecting his Sunni tradition. In the future, he hoped that "all the titles of the Shiite church—the ayatollahs, or marjahs, or hajatollahs, or whatever—will disappear from their society." Fadlallah would undoubtedly find this view obnoxious and heretical. So while Fadlallah and Turabi attempt to belittle the differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, they are clearly unable to eliminate the vast gap in outlook, intellectual tradition, and dogma that springs from their religious origins. This is yet another indication that in the house of Islamic militancy, there are many mansions, and undoubtedly many potential conflicts.

A FUTURE WITH ISRAEL?

TURABI TOLD me there is nothing inherently anti-Islamic in peace between a Jewish state and Muslims. "The first Islamic state itself had a constitutional document between the prophet and the Jews of Medina," Turabi noted. "He made a constitutional document with them to establish the state. They were constituent members of the state, with their own federal independence. So there is nothing [against it] in principle." But two months later he told a French journalist that no Arab could accept Israel: "I do not question the existence of Jews—but of Israel, yes."[4]

Fadlallah agrees with what Turabi told the French journalist. Israel, he has argued, is inherently illegitimate because it is "a conglomeration of people who came from all parts of the world to live in Palestine on the ruins of another people."[5] Because Israel rested on "dispossession and usurpation," nothing—neither the United Nations nor the PLO—could confer legitimacy on the state. Moreover, Israel was not only inherently expansionist, it was also a tool of American imperialism. Yet both Turabi and Fadlallah have adopted coldly pragmatic responses to what now seems virtually inevitable—peace between Israel and most Arab states.

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[4] Olivier Rolin, "Al-Turabi on Carlos, F.I.S., Israel and Islam," *Le Nouvel Observateur,* Aug. 31, 1994. Translated by the Middle East Intelligence Report.

[5] Kramer, *Spokesmen for the Despised.*

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Turabi, whose role is clearly more peripheral to the peace process than that of Fadlallah, has tried to advise PLO chairman Yasir Arafat on ways to improve his deal with Israel, to lobby fellow Arab leaders to back the Palestinian claim on Jerusalem, and to broker a truce between Arafat—whom he has known since the PLO chief was an Islamic student leader—and the young Hamas militants, who refuse to accept Israel's existence. After his efforts to mediate a truce between Palestinian factions failed, Turabi astonished and infuriated many Islamic militants at a meeting in late 1993 by blocking a resolution that would have condemned Arafat and the PLO for their peace with Israel. "Such splits have only damaged the Islamic cause," Turabi explained. His opposition to the Oslo accords, he stressed, was not one of principle. "Americans, after all, displaced the red Indians," he told me. "People go from one place to another and take things over. History changes." But Arafat had gotten a "bad deal" for the Palestinians, a deal Turabi would have rejected. And there could be no compromise on Jerusalem, Turabi stressed. "Not a single Muslim all over the world would say: well, let us be pragmatic on that." In any event, true peace between Israelis and Arabs was remote, he added, because it would require American dominance in the region. Israel could not count on that forever.

Fadlallah has also staked out a shrewd new stance, one aimed at enabling him to remain popular with Lebanon's Shiite Muslims while making real peace less likely, or at least more costly for Israel and less so for him and his movement. Though Islamists could probably not prevent Arab states from making peace with Israel, Fadlallah said, "states are one thing; people are something else." *Fatwas* had already been issued that barred good Muslims from having "any trade or contact with the Jews of Palestine." He himself had issued such a *fatwa* in 1983. "If more are needed, they will be issued," he told me.

Kramer calls Fadlallah's recent shift of emphasis "astute." For even if Hezbollah is disarmed by Syria, the Party of God can make normalization between Israel and Lebanon extremely difficult. And given Hezbollah's presence in parliament, it will be even harder for democratic proponents of peace in Lebanon to silence them.

At the same time, Fadlallah, who has ministered to the Shiite vic-

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tims of Israeli attacks on villages in the south, knows that Lebanon has no response to Israel's air force, that it would be counterproductive for him to provoke Israel to the point that southern Lebanon remains a battleground. Dependent on money and support from the Shia's ever-growing bourgeoisie who favor peace with Israel and renewed prosperity, and eager to rebuild Lebanon as a Shiite alternative to Iran, Fadlallah is unlikely to foul his nest. A deeply political man who speaks to the issues of his day, Fadlallah is likely to do whatever is necessary to assure his political survival and that of his movement.

IS THE FUTURE THEIRS?

TURABI AND Fadlallah, like most other Islamic absolutists, are clearly surprised and disheartened by the recent setbacks they have faced. And while their movements have already succeeded, in Turabi's brave words, "more than I ever dreamed possible," both men are now struggling to adapt to a far less auspicious political environment. Turabi faces growing international criticism for defending Sudan's autocratic regime and its continuing human rights abuses. He is also trying to escape his country's geographic and economic marginality by attempting to mediate among the Islamic world's fractious players—the quarreling Afghan groups, Algeria's more and less militant factions, and Hamas and Fatah. Meanwhile, Fadlallah knows that his movement will be disarmed by Syria if Damascus makes peace with the Jewish state and that his group's popularity may wane if peace restores Lebanon's prosperity.

Many analysts see Hezbollah's entry into Lebanon's parliament, Turabi's reluctance to condemn those who make peace with Israel, and their respective efforts to soothe and reassure Western audiences as signs of moderation. But such actions can best be understood as evidence of the tenacity, pragmatism, and shrewdness of these two intelligent, determined men. Turabi and Fadlallah have proven amazingly adept at having things all ways—ever certain of their ultimate aim, if not of a straight path to deliverance.

The influence of Turabi, Fadlallah, and their generation of Islamic literalists may have peaked temporarily, but their words and

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ideology have profoundly impressed a new generation of politically despairing Arabs. Far from being ended, the Islamic era they advocate may just be dawning. Neither the West nor many of the Arabs who rule can offer ever-growing numbers of young people the hope that Nasser offered their grandfathers, the prosperity that Sadat promised their fathers but failed to deliver, or the self-reliance and dignity for which all people yearn. With expectations outpacing the creation of jobs, social services, and housing in most of the Middle East, only militant Islamists seem to offer the self-esteem these restless young people crave.

The human rights abuses, economic mismanagement, and rampant corruption of Iran have not lessened radical Islam's appeal to young Arabs. Iran is not an Arab country, they say; a militantly Islamic Sunni Arab state would do better. Nor has Turabi's repressive Sudan served as a warning. The United Nations and Western human rights groups that have criticized Khartoum so harshly are merely "anti-Islamic," apologists maintain, echoing Turabi, who, unlike Fadlallah, denies the existence of abuses that many have seen firsthand. Those who no longer deny the truth rationalize the failure: Sudan was always poor and isolated anyway, they say. Also ignored is the Afghan experience, which suggests that once in power, militant Islamic groups tend to split and feud among themselves.

No, the failures of radical Islam have not deterred young Arabs who seek political salvation through God. They see only "successes"—the vast network of clinics, schools, and banks that help those the Egyptian government has effectively abandoned; Hamas' role in offering services and organizing the intifada against Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank; the election victory denied the Islamic coalition of Algeria by a decrepit regime that will not relinquish power.

All other modern "isms"—nationalism, socialism, communism, capitalism—have failed. All that has not been tried in modern times is Islamic absolutism and the politicians who promote it. The West should not take much comfort in Fadlallah's and Turabi's current problems. Even if they fail, there will be others.

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Reviews



THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, 1953–1961

Is the world a safer place today because of Dulles, his agency, and the world he helped make?

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Review Essay

The Wise Man of Intelligence

Uncovering the Life of Allen Dulles

Robin Winks

Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. BY PETER GROSE. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994, 606 pp. $30.00.

There are very few reliable histories of intelligence, and with good cause. The sources lie, are lost, are nonexistent, are withheld. Journalists (often) lack the patience, scholars (often) lack the clout to gain access, to stay the course, to outlast those who would with both good and malign intent seek to influence the writer's conclusions. The public craves romance, exploits of *jamesbonderie*; the academic too often settles for models, flow charts, and a warm sense of insiderism. The chosen prose style—breathless, confidential, promising more than most sources can honestly deliver—is at war with any serious attempt to assess the value of intelligence to the formulation of foreign policy, to victory or defeat in battle, even to the methodology of research or analysis. Of hundreds of books on intelligence there are, perhaps, a dozen that pass the historian's test: that is, they are significant, they are interesting, and they are, insofar as one can judge of so elusive a subject, true.

Peter Grose's biography of Allen Dulles is one of these books. It is the best book on American intelligence since Thomas Powers' engaging romp through the corridors at Langley, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (1979). Professionals in intelligence found some errors in Powers' book, and no doubt there are a few in Grose's account—though I believe I found only two, neither of any significance—but both books have the flavor, the smell, the texture of the truth. That both are biographies suggests that we may best penetrate the mysteries of an intelligence agency on the coattails of its highest officials, perhaps because compartmentalization, the need-to-know principle, and the sheer diversity of modern intelligence work prevents anyone

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except the most highly placed from having even a moderately coherent picture of the world of intelligence.

THE GREAT GAME

Through detail, nuance, and a persistent intelligence, Grose shows what the life of a professional in the Great Game was like. Between November 1916, when Allen Welsh Dulles, then 23 and a new third secretary to the American Embassy in Vienna, and November 1961, when Dulles stepped down as Director of Central Intelligence, we follow an urbane member of the American Establishment as he encounters the affairs of the world. A romantic at heart, Kipling's *Kim* on his bedside table on the night he went into the hospital to die, Dulles was, to use the words of one of his contemporaries, present at the creation—of the Cold War, of the CIA, of our world.

Grose writes very well, with a wry sense for the humorous situation (of which there were many in Dulles' life), a frank eye on "the gentleman spy" as philanderer, with sympathy for the wife much-philandered against, and with a consistent graciousness. He belies the reports that, as a result of the Bay of Pigs, there was personal animosity between Dulles and the young new president, John F. Kennedy. He provides a balanced assessment of the operations to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Mohammad Mossadeq in Iran, not failing to remark on how short-term successes were followed by long-term disasters. He is very good with the anecdotal aside, with the intriguing footnote that stands out textually precisely because it is a footnote. He appears almost always to be in command of the larger international contexts and, as befits a former executive editor of *Foreign Affairs*, can provide the reader with necessary background in a few broad yet clearly defined brush strokes. He seldom repeats himself. Despite the length of this biography, it seems almost spare, without the padding—precise addresses, the color of the walls in an interrogation room, the exact time when a contact is made—that is standard to most books about espionage.

To be sure, there are signs of haste in the final chapters; for example, at least twice Grose turns to a semi-digested catalog of events to force the pace. It is a wonder that there are not more such signs, for in his "Notes on Sources" Grose remarks that the Central Intelligence Agency did not release its record on Dulles' tenure at the agency ("in delayed response to my request of March 1989 under the Freedom of Information Act") until May 1994. The last restrictions on the Dulles papers at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton were lifted only four months earlier. There is a footnote reference to the Aldrich Ames case. To incorporate so much that is timely and fresh so quickly after new materials became available is a remarkable act of applied intelligence by a writer who, one presumes, was never in "the game" himself. Further, Grose shows every sign of having enjoyed the chase.

The "Acknowledgments" are a study in themselves. Grose had the ready cooperation of Allen and Clover Dulles' three children. He was given the interviews and correspondence prepared by Richard Harris Smith, author of an early book on the

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Office of Strategic Services, from 20 years ago. He has worked in all the relevant presidential libraries, has pursued manuscript collections across the nation and into Moscow, has interviewed directly or by correspondence nearly two hundred principal players in the Dulles story. In intelligence history one can always think of a person who has been missed, of an article not cited—not proof, of course, that it was missed, for perhaps it was simply judged of little worth—of a forthcoming manuscript apparently not seen. Richard Bissell's autobiography exists in manuscript; William Hood, though in the text, is not in the acknowledgments; perhaps the main scholarly journal in the field, *Intelligence and National Security*, truly has not, in its ten years, published anything relevant. Another reader may disagree on an assessment here and there: is Tom Mangold's *Cold Warrior* the best biography of James J. Angleton? Is Madeline G. Kalb's excellent *Congo Cables* the best path into the Lumumba/Congo/Katanga morass? Though the notes are full and clear, one wishes for more.

There is quite a lot here that is new, as well as much that is put together in a fresh way. We see just how bad American intelligence on Iraq was in 1958 and must conclude how little has changed. We move from Operation Success in Guatemala to Operation Hike in Indonesia and discover again how operatives who understand one culture can be completely at sea in another. We discover how poorly Dulles performed within a bureaucracy that had grown too large for him and how well he could perform if he could reduce that bureaucracy to smaller components. We learn of the relationship between Victor Hedgman, Lawrence Devlin, and Bronson Tweedy, and while this may not be a revelation to all, to this reviewer, who once served with Tweedy in quite a different world, it most certainly is.

Most books on intelligence provide little that truly is new, relying on the reader not to have kept abreast of the field's minutiae. Still, it is in apparent minutiae that intelligence sometimes achieves its greatest triumphs, and Grose uses detail, even gossip, to great effect. There will be something truly new here for every reader, even though it is also quite possible that every fact and speculation in Grose's book has appeared in print somewhere else. It is the pattern, the broad picture, that will most capture the informed reader, even as the anecdotes, the sense of style, and the frequent surprises will hold the person less versed in the subject.

Unhappily, one cannot always be certain what is new, for at times the citations, set out with care at the end of the book, and the lack of a bibliography leave one unclear on just what has been taken into consideration and what has not. Many books in which Allen Dulles plays a role do not appear here. A 13-line note on the Eisenhower Presidential Library leaves the reader confused about just what has been consulted, though the warning that the Walter Bedell Smith papers "remain to be triangulated with evidence from other quarters" suggests somewhat obliquely that perhaps they have not been used after all.

When more is told, by Peter Grose and others, we will surely come to a better understanding of the Cold War by such balanced, clear-headed examinations

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of the men (and sometimes the women) who helped to define the American vision of a Manichaean world poised on the brink of spiritual and physical destruction. Just as authors of spy fiction, that genre Allen Dulles so loved (his favorite authors were Ian Fleming and Helen MacInnes, and his own most influential books were his two anthologies, *Great True Spy Stories* and *Great Spy Stories from Fiction*), have had to find new enemies, so will historians reexamine the old enemies, perhaps to confirm, more likely to modify rather than utterly reject, the vital lies of the last five decades. Then Dulles' own books, including *The Craft of Intelligence*, and his old certitudes about the nation's enemies, may seem dated.

BAND OF BROTHERS

But Grose has given us more than a history of the Cold War, more than a life and times of a key player. He also shows us a world, of Republican and Democrat alike, of privilege and high personal expectation. Dulles was the grandson of a former secretary of state, John Watson Foster, who served President Benjamin Harrison. His uncle Robert Lansing was secretary of state to Woodrow Wilson. His brother John Foster Dulles was President Dwight Eisenhower's toweringly powerful secretary of state. Allen Dulles knew everyone, would meet everyone, would go everywhere. He was Phi Beta Kappa, Princeton. His closest friend was Hamilton Fish Armstrong. His affairs of the heart (to use the decorous phrase of the time) included Wally Toscanini Castelbarco, possibly Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce (or so Grose strongly suggests), and he was once found locked in a dressing room with Queen Frederika of Greece. Yet he was no snob: he never "bickered" at Princeton to enter one of the upper-class eating clubs, and in 1964 he was sent by President Lyndon B. Johnson to Mississippi to meet with the governor over the burning of a black community church and the disappearance of three civil rights workers. Allen Dulles expected to be secretary of state himself one day, and to the last held out the hope that he might succeed his brother, or so Grose suggests.

Allen Dulles understood that his world had changed. Perhaps the key year was 1959, when he found himself, as Grose sensitively shows, truly alone, despite his wife, his sister, his many friends. His brother died of cancer on May 24. (George C. Marshall, ill in the same hospital, died in October. William J. Donovan, the man who had recruited Allen Dulles, died in February. Late in 1958 his trusted deputy Frank Wisner suffered a nervous breakdown. In April 1959 Fidel Castro made his first and only "friendship visit" to the United States.) Grose shows us this world as it heaved and pushed around Allen Dulles and, to the credit of author and subject, shows Dulles telling a young visitor to his Georgetown home in the spring of 1967 that perhaps the United States had "intervened too much in the affairs of other peoples." Here is social and intellectual history to mix covertly with the overt subject matter of *Gentleman Spy*.

Allen Dulles was a powerful and ever-supportive figure at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a Cold Warrior who never deviated in his conviction that Soviet communism was evil and a threat to the nation's security. He was adept at side-

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stepping Senator Joseph McCarthy and in supporting his men against witch-hunts. He believed in the civil rights movement. He was, in fact, though a self-styled conservative, an old-fashioned liberal and internationalist. Some found contradiction in him. It is Peter Grose's accomplishment to lead us to see that Dulles was neither contradictory within his times nor are those positions contradictory now. He was, his much put-upon wife Clover said, fun to be with. Grose shows us why.

DOES INTELLIGENCE MATTER?

But beyond the intrigue and suspense of the game, just what is the purpose of intelligence? Helping a nation's political leadership obtain some grasp of another's capacities and intentions with respect to oneself, in world affairs broadly, and with respect to potential domestic changes. More narrowly and traditionally, producing the enemy's order of battle. All too often, engaging in destabilizing covert paramilitary activity. Making us, as President Richard M. Nixon said in a statement he issued from the White House the day after Allen Dulles died, on January 29, 1969, feel that "the world is a safer place today."

Those most acute of typologists, librarians, classify intelligence history with military history rather than diplomatic history, and perhaps it is a comment on both intelligence since World War II and on the Cold War that this seems less and less appropriate. Grose writes hardly at all about military matters, notwithstanding a fine chapter on the Bay of Pigs, and Allen Dulles appears to have thought relatively little about military outcomes, despite his role in Operation Sunrise and his post-retirement memoir, *The Secret Surrender* (1966). It may be counted among the successes of intelligence that so little of it pertains to wars that were fought and, one might think, so much to wars that were forestalled, but it is also true that we are not likely to know whether this is true for many years to come, for it is of the nature of intelligence professionals to deny researchers, historians, presidents, and the public access to the truth.

If one finds a book such as this entertaining, informative, and apparently quite accurate, does this mean that a life of Allen Dulles is important? We cannot know, for the central question remains, does intelligence truly matter? Has it demonstrably contributed a determining difference to victory in any battle, success in any policy? We are to believe that there are substantial achievements of which we cannot be told, and precisely because we do not know of them, that they are successes. But there are many commentators who assert that intelligence agencies do more harm than good. I am not one of these—indeed, I believe a democracy particularly needs an effective intelligence agency, since information on its policies and broad capacities is available for the asking at any good university library, while closed societies, or societies without modern informational systems, or societies in perpetual chaos do not yield up their most precious data simply upon the presentation of a reader's card. Still the question remains: does intelligence matter? Until we have some answer to this question, we cannot decide what a biography of a longtime and legendary director of the Central Intelligence Agency really signifies.

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In this respect, I must admit to disappointment. Grose does not tell us what he thinks of intelligence as an enterprise. By tone, occasional aside, and infrequent though pungent observation, he evaluates favorably or unfavorably this or that operation. But he does not argue whether or why the nation needs men like Allen Dulles, then or now. He does not say, as I wish he had done, that any intelligence agency is fatally compromised if the person who leads it is so close a personal friend of the country's president (or prime minister) as to fail the test of political objectivity. He does not tell us, as I wish he had done, that paramilitary exercises, if ever legitimate, are the domain of departments of war, defense, or whatever euphemism a government may choose, but that they are destructive to intelligence. He does not suggest whether human, or signals, or any other particular form of intelligence deserves more or less support, produces sound or unsound results. Perhaps to say that Grose should have done so is to fall into the reviewer's trap of asking for a book the author did not intend to write. Should a biography of Abraham Lincoln or Napoleon never reveal how the author views power and the people who pursue it? Given the flavor of this excellent book, which is about the times as well as the life of Allen Dulles, it does not seem unreasonable to want to know whether the author judges the enterprise in which his subject was engaged ultimately to the benefit of the nation or not. Does he, with Nixon, conclude that the world is a safer place today because of Dulles, his agency, and the world he helped make? If so, would he—would someone, please—give us the evidence?

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Review Essay

The Emperor Has No Clothes

Mao's Doctor Reveals the Naked Truth

John E. Wills, Jr.

The Private Life of Chairman Mao. BY DR. LI ZHISUI, WITH THE EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE OF ANNE F. THURSTON. New York: Random House, 1994, 663 pp. $30.00.

Dr. Li Zhisui met Mao Zedong for the first time on April 25, 1955, late in the afternoon. The doctor had finished a busy day in his clinic, but Mao was just starting his day's work. On a wooden bed beside his indoor swimming pool, the chairman lounged "naked beneath an open terry-cloth robe . . . his lower body loosely covered by a towel." Dr. Li was impressed by Mao's healthy appearance: broad shoulders, a big belly, thick black hair, "skin like butter, delicate, and hairless." Dr. Li, summoned by the awesome and remote Great Leader, was nervous, but Mao soon put him at ease, while at the same time impressing him with his wisdom. Mao made it clear that Dr. Li's education in missionary schools would be no bar to his holding a position of the greatest trust under the chairman. He reminded the doctor that the great second emperor of the Tang Dynasty, Li Shimin, had made a general with a questionable background one of his closest and most trusted aides.

Li became Mao's personal physician, and there were only a few periods between that first interview and Mao's death on September 9, 1976, when he was not immediately responsible for his medical care. There were many times when Dr. Li wanted out, but escape would have labeled him a counterrevolutionary, dooming him and his family. Dr. Li has turned his 21 years of thralldom and anxiety into a book that will absorb anyone interested in China or in the total corruption of total power.

JOHN E. WILLS, JR., a Professor of History at the University of Southern California, has written widely on the history of Chinese foreign relations. His most recent book is *Mountain of Fame: Portraits in Chinese History.*

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Comrades in arms

Some of the characteristics of Mao's inner circle, which Dr. Li recounts in great detail, were foreshadowed in that first interview. Mao was frequently charming when meeting someone for the first time; his willfulness and urge for total control became apparent only after the individual was irretrievably enmeshed in the inner circle. He had no use for the proprieties of dress, work hours, and leisure time observed by others. People came to Mao when he was ready to talk or work, at any hour of the day or night. These peculiarities, Mao's reference to Li Shimin, and his indoor swimming pool—an amazing luxury in 1950s China—were Dr. Li's first indications that he was dealing with someone who cast himself as a revolutionary leader but whose conduct and attitudes reminded one of China's emperors.

Dr. Li would later learn more about Mao's "imperial" attitudes and witness firsthand Mao's voracious appetite for a never-ending stream of eager young women. Dr. Li's brief testimony on this subject in a 1993 television documentary, much milder than the details in the book, produced furious condemnations from Chinese government spokesmen and such harsh pressure on Hong Kong that the program was not broadcast there. The current Chinese leadership, after all, is a product of the same basic political order that produced and sustained Mao. Its senior leaders were part of his high

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command and saw a great deal of him. If the Chinese people could become any more cynical about their leadership, Dr. Li's revelations might provide a push in that direction. His book is sure to arouse a good deal of controversy, with the powers that be in the People's Republic doing everything they can to impugn its authenticity and accuracy.

To be sure, this work reaches us in a way that leaves something to be desired. Dr. Li says he recorded his experiences regularly, but then destroyed his notes during the Cultural Revolution, fearing dire consequences if they were discovered. In 1977 he rewrote his notes from memory. He says his memories of Mao's words and deeds are extraordinarily vivid because his life depended on them at the time. No doubt having kept a contemporary record strengthened the memories he would later rely on. But the tendency to rewrite history grows stronger over time. There is no mention of the location or accessibility to scholars of Dr. Li's notes or his original manuscript. Still, there is no obvious reason to doubt that Dr. Li is genuine and that his book represents a reasonable effort to record his experiences. Highly reputable scholars of China, Andrew J. Nathan and Anne F. Thurston, helped edit the book; other eminent scholars have had a chance to review the English text before publication. Dr. Li is least surprising, and his information is most likely to be derivative or unreliable, on larger political events and famous struggles within the high command. For details on these, and for much about Mao's character and private life, he probably will remain our only or best source.

THE LAST EMPEROR

It is not surprising that Dr. Li thought Mao's conduct imperial: he lived in isolation, shared his bed with many young women, and traveled around the nation to luxury villas in a great cocoon of guards and private trains. Dr. Li is in general not judgmental about the endless parade of young women in Mao's bed, citing the Daoist practice of using sex for longevity. But he was shocked by Mao's lack of concern about transmitting a vaginal infection from one woman to another. Far more insight into the pathologies of the inner circle is provided by his many accounts of the flattery and servility that surrounded the chairman; his description of these traits in the widely respected Zhou Enlai will upset many in China, if they ever have a chance to read it. Especially horrifying is his picture of the vast Potemkin village of perfectly planted fields full of peasant women dressed in red and green, with village blast furnaces smoking everywhere, as the chairman's train traveled south in the first autumn of the Great Leap Forward. Dr. Li describes a leader who has lost touch with reality and confesses that he himself was caught up in the enthusiasm. As millions died in the famines brought on by the Great Leap policies, Mao acknowledged it by occasionally abstaining from eating meat.

Also of considerable interest in explaining the perverse twists of the Cultural Revolution are Dr. Li's descriptions of Mao's growing paranoia, especially his fear of being poisoned, and of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, a neurotic hypochondriac who was impossible to deal with, but who strikingly improved in health

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and attitude as she began to take a leading role in the Cultural Revolution.

Mao can be seen playing cat-and-mouse with his opponents, letting them put out documents he had not approved so that he could attack them later. Dr. Li testifies that Mao, citing the tradition of using distant foreigners against those close at hand, had begun to talk about improving relations with the United States as early as 1969, at the height of the tensions with the Soviet Union.

HISTORY BUFF OR BLUFF?

Mao's reference to Li Shimin in his first interview with Dr. Li was far from accidental. The chairman was obsessed with Chinese history. In 1936 Mao told American journalist Edgar Snow that when he was a boy he loved to hear tales of the heroes of the Three Kingdoms period from the old men of his village. Certainly Mao's penchant for bold action and heroic rhetoric could have been inspired by those great heroes. But many Chinese heroes, including Li Shimin, were admired for their ability to listen to their ministers. In their imperial lives lies another strand of the Chinese heritage: the moral glamour of the selfless, earnest minister, hoping to be given power to do what he knew was right, always ready to remonstrate fearlessly when the emperor was straying from the path of Confucian righteousness.

Mao's tolerance for independent advice, however, was limited. On one occasion the chairman became fascinated with the history of a vigorous reformer, a mid-Ming Dynasty official named Hai Rui, who was dismissed after repeatedly condemning abuses of power at the imperial court. Mao was attracted by Hai Rui's selflessness and the ideal of the honest official, but he himself was unwilling to hear any criticism. Too many people saw a parallel between the Ming emperor's dismissal of Hai Rui and Mao's dismissal of the frankly critical Marshal Peng Dehuai in 1959. So powerful was the parallel that a leading scholar in Ming history, Wu Han, became one of the first targets of the Cultural Revolution because he had written a play about Hai Rui.

The Chinese political tradition is full of warnings that Mao did not want to hear: against ruthless centralization of power, against pushing ahead with a policy when the best advisers oppose it. Since these ideals ran counter to his aim of transforming China by revolution, he ignored them. Although Mao's fascination with China's past predated his revolutionary zeal, it was subordinate to or at least distorted by it. Dr. Li offers fascinating new evidence on this point, recounting Mao's praise for Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty, Empress Wu of the Tang Dynasty (the only woman ever to sit on the Dragon Throne in her own name), the notorious first emperor of Qin, and Zhou, the last king of the Shang Dynasty. Despite the traditional negative judgments of all four, modern students would have some sympathy with Mao's views of at least three of them as important and partly effective builders and wielders of central power, but it is hard to see more in the praise of Zhou than willful reversal of a traditional verdict. The first emperor of Qin, in particular, is credited by many modern nationalists with a key contribution to

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what they regard as China's natural or essential condition of political unity.

One should, however, beware the tendency to explain Mao's conduct and attitudes by pointing to continuities with the emperors of the old order. Leninism has produced grotesque leader cults in societies with political heritages as diverse as those of Russia, Cuba, Cambodia, Romania, and China. Iraq, Syria, Uganda, and others have had their own share of dictators without much help from Leninism. The cultural sources of glorification and abuse of authority in the modern world are diverse indeed, and some of them are endemic and recurring pathologies of the nation-building process.

DO MEN MAKE HISTORY?

Dr. Li's vivid portrait of the corruption and hypocrisies of Mao's inner circle is an important document for every student of Chinese politics. One should be careful, however, not to rely too heavily on this highly personal portrait to explain the immense and wrenching political changes of contemporary China. Western writing on China between the 1940s and 1976 focused on "Mao's China." Few took into account the political realities not under Mao's control. In the book's introduction, Nathan writes that "no other leader in history . . . inflicted such a catastrophe on his nation." This is probably true if one counts victims, but it is not likely that the proportion of victims to the whole population was as high as that of Pol Pot or the nameless machete-wielders of Rwanda. "Politics in a dictatorship," Nathan continues, "begins in the personality of the dictator." While China was certainly shaped by Mao's personality, an approach that emphasizes the personal over the political seems to trivialize the patriotism, idealism, savagery, careerism, longing for discipline and meaning, and hope for a more comfortable life that shaped the politics of the People's Republic.

Dr. Li was an eyewitness to Mao's famous swims in China's rivers. Despite pleas from the doctor, who worried about the dangerous currents, sewage, and parasites, Mao insisted on them. In doing so, he demonstrated that he was in charge and that there was nothing to fear if one just plunged in. Once in the water his fat helped keep him afloat, while his entourage of guards and worried courtiers simply floated along with the current.

Water is an important symbol in Chinese culture. It associates human wisdom with making use of the tendency of water to flow downhill, cutting channels so that a flood can drain instead of trying to dam it up, diving into the whirlpool below a waterfall and going with the flow to come up safe. Mao's conduct as a swimmer was in this great tradition, but he too often forgot its lessons in his politics, breasting the currents of political resistance and human inclination, acting like the Lord of the River in the Daoist masterpiece *Zhuang Zi*, who thought himself the master of all splendor and power until the river carried him into the unfathomable vastness of the North Sea.

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Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

New French Thought: Political Philosophy. EDITED BY MARK LILLA. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 231 pp. $45.00 (paper, $14.95).

Despite the traditional insularity of Anglo-American political and philosophical thought, American intellectual life has been profoundly affected in recent years by new developments from France like structuralism and deconstructionism. Many postmodernists have become entrenched in the American academy in recent years. They will be surprised to learn that their perspective has become a spent intellectual force in its country of origin. For the past decade, at least, the latest fashion from Paris has been a serious discussion of liberalism, human rights, and democratic political institutions. This excellent volume brings together the writings of the younger generation of French writers and intellectuals who have broken with the two earlier waves in French thought, derived from Marx and Nietzsche, and who for virtually the first time have accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a political order. Of particular interest are the critique of Michel Foucault by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Pierre Manent's essay on the role of rational discourse in the rise of the modern state, the reconsideration of Tocqueville by Marcel Gauchet, and Mark Lilla's helpful overview.

The Handbook of Economic Sociology. EDITED BY NEIL J. SMELSER AND RICHARD SWEDBERG. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 804 pp. $95.00.

Contemporary neoclassical economics has risen as an imposing structure amid the rubble of the other social sciences, with its practitioners sallying forth to conquer new

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provinces from family life (Gary Becker) to politics (James Buchanan and the rational choice school). A spirited counterattack has been mounted in recent years by sociologists and occasional economists who, in the tradition of Max Weber, have noted that economic exchange is embedded in larger social structures—the family, culture, religion, ethnic community, networks, and the like—and cannot be explained apart from them. While this critique of neoclassical economics has not been as visible as that of, say, the Japan revisionists, it is more serious and sustained. This excellent volume is a compilation of some of the best writing in this field over the past decade, including basic works like Oliver Williamson's transaction cost theory of the firm, and a helpful comparison of economic sociology to mainstream economics by the book's editors. Major sections cover the sociology of economic institutions, from markets and firms through the informal economy and business networks, with individual chapters on topics like economics and gender, environment, religion, and ethnicity.

Social Revolutions in the Modern World. BY THEDA SKOCPOL. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 344 pp. $49.95 (paper, $16.95).

In this collection of previously published essays, one of America's leading comparative sociologists refines and expands the arguments she made in her 1979 book, *States and Social Revolutions,* to account for the numerous Third World revolutions since then. Skocpol is known for her emphasis on both the role of the state in revolutions and "structural" causes such as agrarian class relations, at the expense of "voluntaristic" explanations that look to the role of individuals and ideologies. Her efforts to assimilate new cases like Iran and Nicaragua into a framework developed for France, Russia, and China are consistently sophisticated and informative. Of interest as well is her methodological defense of "macrosociology," or social theory on a grand scale, and her critiques of fellow grand theorists Barrington Moore and Immanuel Wallerstein.

The Vogue of Revolutions in Poor Countries. BY FORREST D. COLBURN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 129 pp. $19.95 (paper, $14.95).

This book is a strong counterpoint to the Skocpol volume above. Written by an author with personal experience of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and of Ethiopia under the military rule of the Dergue junta, Colburn makes a strong case for the primacy of politics in Third World revolutions. He rejects earlier theories that link revolution exclusively to long-term structural conditions like relative deprivation or the fragility of existing institutions, since these conditions exist in many developing countries without producing cataclysmic upheaval. The particular character of postwar revolutions is due, rather, to the intellectual vogue of socialist redistribution theories and Leninist attitudes toward power, which created their own destructive internal logic independent of the culture, history, and traditions of the particular countries involved. With the withering away of the socialist idea, the nature of revolutions themselves will change.

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Civil Wars: From LA to Bosnia. BY HANS MAGNUS ENZENBERGER. New York: New Press, 1994, 144 pp. $18.00.

The author of these glum pieces, a German writer and essayist, argues that since the end of the Cold War the nature of war has changed from purposive, ideologically driven enterprises undertaken by highly organized industrial powers to "molecular civil war," a kind of purposeless, anomic, self-immolating violence that has suddenly appeared everywhere from Afghanistan to Germany to the inner cities of the United States. Reflecting the deep gloom that has settled over most European writers and intellectuals, the book actually bears unintended good news in that molecular civil war is likely to remain much less destructive than organized violence of the old kind. Among the essays, "Europe in Ruins" and one on the current German debate on asylum and immigration are insightful and interesting.

Collective Security beyond the Cold War. EDITED BY GEORGE E. DOWNS. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994, 275 pp. $39.50.

This collection of essays investigates the prospects for collective security after the Cold War from a rather abstract point of view, beginning with early chapters on game theory. Despite the clear preference of some of the authors for collective security, many of the essays are quite modest in predicting what the approach can achieve. The two historical chapters on the classic balance of power system by Charles Lipson and Michael Doyle, for example, suggest that the Concert of Europe might provide a better model for the present than a broad Wilsonian international legal mechanism. The book does not reach any startling conclusions with regard to present-day problems: Charles Glaser argues that NATO continues to be the best framework for European security, while for Steve Walt collective security toward the former U.S.S.R. amounts to little other than a mutual agreement between outside powers to stay out (though he somewhat inconsistently argues that there ought to be intervention not for security but for human rights purposes). One gap in the book is its failure to address more forthrightly the acute predicament of the only universal collective security mechanism out there, the United Nations, as revealed by the recent debacles in Somalia and Bosnia.

Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War. BY RICHARD L. KUGLER. Santa Monica: RAND, 1994, 610 pp. $30.00 (paper).

This book is a serious and detailed history of NATO from its founding in 1949 to the present. The author, who worked as a NATO planner in the Pentagon, takes us through all the major political battles of the alliance, both in Europe and in Washington. In addition, he presents a wealth of quantitative data on evolving military balances and defense budgets that will be useful to students of this period. The author is very much a NATO traditionalist and argues that a deteriorating situation in Europe necessitates an expansion of the alliance, in terms of both membership and missions. What-

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ever the correctness of this judgment, the book remains a useful historical resource.

Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements. Vol. IV of The Fundamentalism Project. EDITED BY MARTIN E. MARTY AND R. SCOTT APPLEBY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, 852 pp. $47.50.

Volume IV of the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences picks up where the previous one left off, giving a rich social, cultural, and historical account of the rise of fundamentalisms in the contemporary world, with separate sections on Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and the religions of South Asia. Like the other volumes, this massive work brings together a broad range of leading scholars who lack a uniform perspective. It is difficult for secular social scientists to discuss so emotion-laden a subject with total neutrality, and while this volume maintains a reasonably nonjudgmental tone, disapproval sometimes colors the evaluations. The portrayal of the impact of Protestant conversions in Latin America, for example, would have been more balanced had David Stoll's chapter on the evangelicals in Guatemala been complemented by the perspective of a sociologist like David Martin. Nonetheless, this book will be basic reading for anyone interested in this extremely important field.

The Costs of Living: How Market Freedom Erodes the Best Things in Life. BY BARRY SCHWARTZ. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994, 393 pp. $25.00.

This book, written by an academic psychologist, can be categorized as "left-wing communitarian." Schwartz argues that the expansion of market relationships and the profit motive into all aspects of American social life during the Reagan-Bush "decade of greed" has destroyed the communal solidarities of family, neighborhood, and workplace that characterized earlier American social history. This account is correct in pointing to the potentially atomizing consequences of capitalism, but gives far too much weight to specific developments of the 1980s. The overall argument would be much more convincing if the author showed any awareness of the ways in which the liberal expansion of rights by the courts and federal government had an equal if not more pervasively destructive impact on America's organic communities. His solutions—such as renewed vigor for religious communities—indicate the contradictions of a position that wants to reconcile strong moral community with universal tolerance.

A World Fit for People. EDITED BY ÜNER KIRDAR AND LEONARD SILK. New York: New York University Press, 1994, 478 pp. $40.00.

As one would expect from a collection of 50 essays from a recent U.N. Development Program conference in Romania, this volume is extraordinarily heterogeneous in outlook, quality, and theme. Contributors range from academic economists to journalists, heads of nongovernmental organizations, and serving foreign ministers and presidents. While some of the individual papers, like that of Kishore Mahbubani, are serious and provocative, others are far more predictable. Discomfort with the neoliberal policies of the 1980s is a common theme.

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A History of the World in the Twentieth Century. BY J. A. S. GRENVILLE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, 973 pp. $39.95.

This massive tome follows a relatively new trend among historians to abandon their sometimes narrow parochialism in favor of "world history." The content of the latter continues to be debated: to what extent is it more than an aggregation of particularistic histories of individual regions and countries, and more a history of broad social trends or transnational interactions? The present volume deals with more thematic issues like industrialization, the empowerment of women, the rise of environmental concerns and multinational corporations, but this book's approach remains fairly traditional, with sequential coverage of the world's regions and nations. The author admits to not breaking new historical ground, and the book will probably be of greatest use in introductory college courses on twentieth-century history.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. BY ERIC HELLEINER. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, 244 pp. $29.95.

This book, written by a young Canadian political scientist, reviews changes in both attitudes and public policy toward international movements of capital since World War II. Its central thesis is that government policy as well as the oft-cited advances in communications technology played a critical role in the remarkable globalization of financial markets since the late 1950s.

The book recounts the gradual shift from controls on international movement of private capital—which had proved so disruptive in the early 1920s and again in the 1930s—to the 1990s, when the prevailing attitude is acceptance of a fully liberal flow of capital between the rich countries (and increasingly to and between developing countries as well, a trend that gets too little treatment). The book provides useful historical background for the many participants in this activity who may be interested in knowing how we got where we are today.

The book is not without its weaknesses. While the political side of the story is well told, the technological and competitive sides are underplayed. The Carter administration rejected capital controls in 1979, not so much because of the growing importance of neoliberal ideas, as the author suggests, but because of the practical infeasibility of using them without a full panoply of exchange controls, which have been politically unacceptable (as well as undesirable for trade) except in wartime.

Policymakers also recognized that technology makes the locus of financial transactions geographically footloose: Switzerland, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Bermuda thrive by offering alternatives to the financial regulations of other

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countries. The demands on international cooperation to carry out a system of capital controls would be formidable; the issue would have to be elevated to a top priority in U.S. foreign policy, and even then might not succeed.

The author explains and interprets what he sees as the divergence between international capital movements (virtually free) and foreign trade (still restricted). But this view is myopic. It is true that foreign trade is not free of restrictions, for reasons that are well explained. But the book ignores the tremendous liberalization of trade that has occurred over the past 40 years, and is likely to continue with the European single market, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round. In truth, there has been much more parallelism than divergence.

Western Hemisphere Economic Integration. BY GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER AND JEFFREY J. SCHOTT. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994, 279 pp. $25.00 (paper).

With the completion of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, trade strategists are beginning to think about the next major steps in the evolution of the international trading system. Of course, NAFTA has a 15-year transition phase, and the forthcoming World Trade Organization has much business left over from the Uruguay Round. But the prolific Hufbauer-Schott team is thinking ahead, and this fact-filled volume addresses the question of a "Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area" called WHFTA.

The authors estimate the economic impact of a WHFTA on the United States (small), third countries (small), and Latin America (substantial, stimulating economic growth by a not-quite-believable 1.5 percent a year). The authors also calculate a "readiness index" and conclude that many are moving in the right direction but that most countries in the hemisphere are not yet ready for WHFTA. The notable exceptions are Chile and Trinidad, which are judged to be more ready than Mexico was in 1990.

This book is not for readers who do not like numbers. It is full of quantitative facts and ingenious calculated estimates, although it does not venture into the domain of higher mathematics. The main problem with the book is its title: it discusses intelligently a future strategy for U.S. trade policy, but there is no reason to confine it to the Western Hemisphere, some of which is very far away. Mexico is special not because it is Latin American but because it has a long border with the United States.

Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons. EDITED BY LISA M. LYNCH. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994, 319 pp. $47.00.

We have had much lamentation about the poor quality of American schools, and especially about the low quality of those new entrants into the labor force who have no education beyond high school. This volume usefully examines the experience of several other countries in training those out of school to be productive and well-rewarded workers. It is written by economists for economists who have some training in econo-

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metrics, but the chapter summaries and especially the lucid introduction by editor Lynch are accessible to a much wider audience.

What comes through is that there is no magic formula. Vocational training is potentially useful, but its payoff in higher productivity and higher wages depends heavily on the form and content of the training, and on the institutional setting in which it is given. In particular, training seems to have the highest payoff if it is directed by firms (who have the clearest grasp of what business needs), provided it includes general education as well as training in firm-specific skills.

But why should firms provide general education to workers who may leave? Japan's answer is strong mutual loyalty between worker and firm, resulting in long-term employment. Germany's is that young workers in training receive exceptionally low wages; in effect, they pay tuition to the firm providing the training. In both countries, post-school training builds on formal school education well-suited for feeding young people into the labor force, with heavy emphasis on literacy and numerical skills.

The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform, and Transformation. BY BEN SLAY. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 229 pp. $35.00.

One of the most dramatic economic experiments in recent years was the "big bang" economic reform of Poland. In January 1990, Poland undertook macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization, currency convertibility, and abandonment of controls on foreign trade, all at the same time.

The good news is that Poland's economy survived and is once again growing, thanks to free markets and integration into the world economy. Contrary to frequent assertions, a currency can become convertible overnight, and exports can respond rapidly to new profitable opportunities.

The bad news is that privatization of Poland's large state enterprises has stalled, and former communists and their allies won a majority in Poland's second free parliamentary elections in more than 60 years, two years after the first one in October 1991.

Ben Slay, of Middlebury College, has usefully provided an overview of economic policy, economic events, and the tangle of Poland's politics during the period from 1989 to the September 1993 elections. He helpfully discusses the complicated political traditions of Poland and the extensive transformation of the Polish economy that occurred under communist rule during the 1980s. He reports on, but does not attempt to explain, the ambivalence of former Solidarity leader and now President Lech Wałęsa toward economic reform and his complicating behavior toward reform-minded politicians.

The book's most recent data are for 1992, and those are preliminary or incomplete. The book is best viewed as an interim report. The saga no doubt will provide material for many more.

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Military, Scientific, and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. BY WILLIAM H. HALLAHAN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994, 578 pp. $30.00.

The exposé genre of military technology studies took a beating in the aftermath of the Gulf War—all that gold-plated hardware seemed not only to work, but to work amazingly well. No matter. In this book Hallahan revives some well-worn tropes. His thesis—highlighted with words like "scandalous" for the benefit of his more obtuse readers—is that the U.S. Army's ordnance department has always favored weapons designed for slow, accurate fire, and that this approach to small arms has brought tragedy in more than one war and will do so again. This book is well-written but shows almost no evidence of primary research, as opposed to mining of secondary sources that confirm the author's thesis. In the tangled story of the M-16 rifle, for example, Hallahan barely mentions Thomas McNaugher's sober and authoritative review of the evidence, in which the ordnance experts appear no great villains. In areas on the margins of his work (for example, German military inventions in the latter part of World War II) the author is wildly inaccurate. Unfortunately, this kind of sensationalist and superficial history will probably do well. We take an odd comfort in the belief that governments make mistakes only because public servants (soldiers, above all) are implacably and dangerously stupid.

Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. BY ROY LICKLIDER. New York: New York University Press, 1993, 372 pages. $50.00.

A book that can be read either for the seven well-executed case studies or the more theoretical chapters in the preceding and concluding parts of the book, or both. The cases are consistently better than the theoretical chapters, which include such observations as: "The effects of warfare are different in civil wars where possible compromise solutions exist than in conflicts where they do not." Presumably, readers who have seen *Gone With the Wind* understood that point without the aid of social science. Nonetheless, this book helps in the understanding of the dominant form of armed conflict in the world today.

Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings. EDITED BY DANIEL J. HUGHES. San Francisco: Presidio, 1993, 275 pp. $35.00.

Helmuth von Moltke, the Prussian chief of staff who, together with Bismarck, masterminded the wars of German unification, was a prolific writer. In this important book we have a wide-ranging collection of his essays and orders, ranging from philosophical reflections on the nature of war to instructions for handling wagon trains. The 1869 "Instructions for Large Unit Commanders" is alone worth the price of the volume: a careful reading of that document helps explain the approach to war and command that helped make the Germans so formidable in the field for almost a century. Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For

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that reason as well, this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor's careful explanation of terms that are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing.

A Naval History of World War I. BY PAUL G. HALPERN. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994, 591 pp. $55.00.

Not for the faint-hearted, this large and solid volume is a welcome if daunting survey of the naval war of 1914-18. Ably summarizing recent scholarship, Halpern describes the naval war, including many aspects (naval hit-and-run operations in the English Channel, mine barrages to stop submarines in the Adriatic Sea, Russo-German engagements in the Baltic Sea, the role of naval intelligence) with which the general reader may not be familiar. Mercifully, he does not give us yet another blow-by-blow account of Jutland but seeks, rather, to describe the many aspects of a naval conflict no less complex and important than that of the Second World War, which is much better known. A better arrangement of maps and charts was possible, but overall this is a very valuable work.

Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Comprehensive Reference to the International Power Struggle that Dominated World Politics for Almost 50 Years. BY THOMAS S. ARMS. New York: Facts on File, 1994, 628 pp. $70.00.

This one-volume compendium is a sign that the Cold War is indeed finished. Generally accurate and concise, it has its share of anomalies—why, one wonders, does Kurt Waldheim deserve a full page, when Maurice Thorez is unmentioned? The brief biography of Thomas Gates, Eisenhower's last secretary of defense, fails to mention his pivotal role in chairing a commission under Richard Nixon that put an end to the draft. Still, this work may help those in search of capsule biographies or brief accounts of well-known episodes. No surprises here, of course, but the book is adequate for its purposes. Those now entering high school may wish to browse through it, wondering at a riven world that their parents once took for granted and assumed would last indefinitely.

The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power. BY BRUCE W. FARCAU. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994, 222 pp. $55.00.

The author, a foreign service officer who appears to have seen a coup or two close-up, offers a well-written account of the mechanics of coups, primarily in Latin America. After reviewing (and in most cases, disposing of) the relevant academic literature, he explores the practicalities of coup-making, including such mundane affairs as logistics. The odd anecdote (the indisposition of officers in one country to support an otherwise suitable coup leader because he was a cuckold, for example) enlivens his account. Farcau stumbles here and there, using such hackneyed bureaucratese as "viable option," giving the noted military sociologist Morris

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Janowitz a new first name (Irving), and resorting to a not very useful tabular assessment of the "coup value" of different Bolivian army units. One wonders how applicable the Latin American cases are to the more heavily armed autocracies of the Arab world, let alone the more complicated circumstances in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Still, this book makes a useful contribution to the study of a way of attaining political power that was particularly important in the past, and may be again in the future. Unfortunately, the price ensures that only prosperous libraries will acquire it.

Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars. BY EMILY O. GOLDMAN. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, 352 pp. $45.00 (paper, $16.95).

An interesting work by a political scientist curious to discover the applicability of early Cold War arms control theory to the interwar naval agreements. She finds the theory wanting, not least because it isolated arms control from broader political relationships, which prove in practice to be determinative. Historians of the period may bridle at her self-conscious attempt to extract lessons from the interwar period and may criticize the relative paucity of explicit discussion of financial considerations behind the Washington and London treaties. Such weaknesses as there are, however, are counterbalanced by a clear and cogent narrative and by the insightfulness of the concluding chapter, which suggests interesting parallels with our own time. A clearly written and thought-provoking work.

The Fifth Star: High Command in an Era of Global War. BY GEORGE M. HALL. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994, 227 pp. $39.95.

A well-intentioned attempt to compare the military leadership of America's senior commanders during World War II. Relying on a limited set of secondary sources, the author whips through ten capsule biographies in under 120 pages, then embarks on 50 pages of analysis, replete with diagrams labeled "Scale of Leadership Requirements" and such. One is tempted to make an invidious comparison with Eric Larrabee's wonderful *Commander in Chief*, which did much the same work but with far greater verve and insight.

The President's Scientists: Reminiscences of a White House Science Advisor. BY D. ALLAN BROMLEY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, 273 pp. $30.00.

Bromley served as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and as Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy during the Bush administration. As such he follows in a long line of physicists who have served as advisors to presidents since the early days of the Cold War. Now, as Bromley makes clear, their task is very different from what it once was (one of his predecessors told him, for example, that he had to explain repeatedly why satellites do not simply fall to earth). The book's range—from health care to foreign policy, environmental matters to conflicts of jurisdiction with the Office of Management and Budget—indicates the greatly increased scope of science in contemporary presidential decision-making. As Bromley also points out, however, Washington now boasts a far wider array of agencies and

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organizations that bring science to bear on current policy questions than when the office of presidential advisor for science was first founded. The book originated in a series of lectures at Yale and, although necessarily superficial in parts, is a useful introduction to its subject.

The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford. BY STUART W. LESLIE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 332 pp. $16.50 (paper).

Leslie makes a powerful case for his central thesis—that defense spending affected the development of postwar American academic science—by examining the cases of MIT and Stanford. What does not follow is his conclusion (and his entering assumption) that this was a reprehensible thing. Indeed, at the very end he creditably concedes that "no one can assert with any confidence exactly where a science and engineering driven by other assumptions and priorities would have taken us." Cross-national comparisons with other countries might help answer this question, but that is beyond the purview of this book. Leslie thoroughly documents the ways in which the Cold War shaped this crucial segment of American life; one suspects that this monograph will prove an important building block for a larger synthesis of the subject.

National Security Law and the Power of the Purse. BY WILLIAM C. BANKS AND PETER RAVEN-HANSEN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 260 pp. $39.95.

A lawyerly work, nearly a third of which consists of footnotes, and marred by ponderous and glutinous prose (as common as it is unnecessary at the bar). The authors have a wonderful subject—the ability of Congress to control executive branch action in matters of national security through the power of the purse. They reach back to the early period of American history, but for the most part concentrate on more recent developments, particularly in the 1980s. If one has the patience to wade through it, this is a useful introduction to one of those elements that makes the foreign policy powers of the U.S. Constitution "an invitation to struggle."

Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal. BY FRED THOMPSON AND L. R. JONES. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994, 298 pp. $29.95.

A brisk and cheery argument that the Pentagon can be fixed—mainly by doing sensible things like reducing the amount of effort that goes into regulations designed to prevent contractors from defrauding the government. Perhaps, but one wonders if the authors can be quite as confident as they sound. This book discusses the politics of congressional oversight (which is why a lot of those laws come about), but argues that Congress can be persuaded to stop much of what the Pentagon usually views as meddling. There are some lacunae: the authors have surprisingly little to say about a personnel system that makes it impossible for aspiring businessmen (as

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opposed to lawyers and academics) to spend some time in government service without undertaking a vow of poverty immediately thereafter. Cynics will doubt that "the new public management," sensible though it may be, will have much of a chance in Washington, but they should read this book, if only to learn what the arguments on the other side are.

With this issue, David C. Hendrickson, professor of political science at Colorado College, succeeds Stephen Ambrose as reviewer of books for the United States section. We thank Professor Ambrose for his splendid reviews.

THE EDITORS

The United States

DAVID C. HENDRICKSON

America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. BY TONY SMITH. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 442 pp. $24.95 (paper, $19.95).

This work, formidable in scope and scholarship, is a rousing defense of liberal Wilsonian internationalism. Smith, a professor at Tufts, gives Woodrow Wilson's utterances a canonical character, against which he measures the words and deeds of nearly all subsequent presidents. The importance of these ideas in providing the lens through which American self-interest was understood and pursued for much of this century—often making interests and ideals nearly identical twins—is lucidly presented.

Smith argues that implanting democracy requires a thorough reform and uprooting of not only the political system but also its social and economic underpinnings. Where this was done, as in Germany and Japan after World War II, democratic institutions took hold; where it was not done, which was just about everywhere else it was attempted, democracy for a long time lost its way. (The argument is convincing; does it not, however, suggest that the current hope of extending democracy through peaceful coercion—at a moment when the "third wave" of democratization has clearly crested—will be continually frustrated?) This historical account is accompanied by a sophisticated analysis of the perspectives on democratization of Marxists, comparativists, and realists, who hold respectively, says the author, that the United States will not, cannot, and should not promote democracy abroad. It is normally a sign of a good book when the author considers all extant interpretations of his subject to be fundamentally mistaken.

Smith is least successful in charting the span of presidents since Carter. His big tent of liberal Wilsonian internationalists includes not only Carter but also Reagan, Bush, and Clinton—an interpretation of Wilsonianism, in other words, compatible with a wide range of policies. Yet it matters greatly whether democracy is promoted through example or resort to progressively more coercive instruments, up to and including war. Smith cites Wilson, Carter, and Reagan to the effect that America's example is to be the real agent of change in the world,

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making exemplars and crusaders all part of the Wilsonian camp. Reagan's arming of the contras and constructive engagement with South Africa is deemed "essentially Wilsonian," but so too, it would appear, was the opposition to those policies. It is no wonder that we are all "selective Wilsonian internationalists"; we should all want to join a church where such sinning is allowed.

The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives. EDITED BY DAVID REYNOLDS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, 271 pp. $27.50.

This compendium is a welcome addition to the still-burgeoning literature on the origins of the Cold War. Its merit is to provide detailed assessments of the scholarly literature produced in the United States, Russia, and Western Europe on the first decade after 1945, much of which is unavailable in English. The opening essay on the voluminous American literature by Anders Stephanson is an excellent historiographical review; that on the Soviet Union, by Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, understandably takes a different course. The authors, handicapped by the general worthlessness of pre-1990 Soviet literature and the still sharply limited access to Russian archives, concentrate on an able and dispassionate examination of Stalin's personality, motives, and outlook (a crucial question given his total dominance, and one on which, the authors note, further archival access may not shed much light). They doubt that there were any "missed opportunities to make a post-war peace with Stalin." The subsequent essays on Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, and Scandinavia richly develop the interplay between domestic and external pressures in shaping the European response to the emerging stalemate, revealing the first decade of the Cold War to be the scene of multifarious debates within the West hardly conforming to the normal caricatured description—bipolarity.

The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993. BY GADDIS SMITH. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994, 280 pp. $25.00.

This elegant work, by a distinguished diplomatic historian at Yale, chronicles the use and abuse (the latter, mostly) of U.S. power in the western hemisphere since 1945. Smith nicely describes the recurring tension between America's insistence on a sphere of influence and its denial of the legitimacy of such spheres when claimed by other great powers. His dominant theme, however, is how the zealous determination to prevent communist penetration of the Americas, in the name of the Monroe Doctrine, led to repeated U.S. interventions in the internal affairs of hemispheric states, the support of repressive governments, and ultimately the discrediting of the doctrine itself.

The Monroe Doctrine would appear to be dead not only in the sense that Smith intends: with the end of the Cold War and the absence of an external threat to the hemisphere, a doctrine intended to ward off external threats can have no relevance. It is dead also in that the princi-

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ple of nonintervention that once lay at the heart of the doctrine has now been displaced by a Wilsonian principle of democratic legitimacy. The Monroe Doctrine is dead! Long live hemispheric intervention!

Intervention: The Use of Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. BY RICHARD N. HAASS. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, 255 pp. $24.95.

A member of Bush's national security team offers a compact and discriminating survey of whether and how the United States should conduct military interventions. Haass takes as his point of departure the various criteria that public figures (such as Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell, and Les Aspin) have offered on the subject over the past decade, guidelines Haass himself formulated as the drafter of Bush's valedictory speech on national security affairs. (The most prominent statements in this genre, none of which the author finds fully satisfactory, are usefully appended to the volume.) He decries gradualism, thinking it best to "use force massively at the outset." The just war requirement of "last resort" he finds ill-advised, mainly because its observance may mean the "loss of surprise and the loss of initiative." When force is used, "it is better to err on the side of using more rather than less." Haass is skeptical of uses of force that smack of "nation-building," though he appears to favor precisely that in the Haitian case. Though Haass defends Bush's handling of the interventions in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia, there is remarkably little special pleading in the book; the tone is quite even-handed. Readers who wish to discover how the United States can be the world's policeman without getting bogged down in quagmires—the golden grail of contemporary foreign policy—will find much useful advice in this carefully hedged manual.

LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. BY GEORGE C. HERRING. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994, 228 pp. $29.95.

Herring, the author of two previous books on Vietnam, looks at L.B.J.'s war leadership and finds it (not surprisingly) seriously wanting. In a crisply written and well-informed study, the author chronicles the growing distrust between civilian and military officials, amounting to a veritable crisis in civil-military relations, as the "all out limited war" heated up from 1965 to 1968; he shows that "pacification" was pursued half-heartedly and with maximum bureaucratic confusion; he notes the odd coincidence of a poverty of strategic thinking by civilian leaders alongside incessant micromanagement.

Herring, however, dodges some critical questions he ought to have taken up; in this respect the study apes the very failures it chronicles. Though the baleful influence of "limited war theories" is a leitmotif of the book, the author never takes up the question of whether or how the United States might have won the war. He argues that such counterfactual speculations are of dubious value, citing the judgment of another historian that the great interpretive problems "rage over questions about which the historian is least able to determine the truth." That is

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true; it is true also that these tend to be the most important questions, which obliges the historian to take them up. In order to make sense of his criticism of "limited war," we need to know, for example, whether L.B.J.'s fear that escalation would bring in China or Russia was solidly based or a fantasy. What precisely were the limits of this "limited war"? Herring doesn't say. As a result, it is unclear whether the bitter debates he chronicles were among blind men arguing about the proper disposition of the chairs on the Titanic or serious disputes whose proper resolution by the commander in chief would have made the difference between victory, however conceived, and ignominy.

Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement. BY ETHAN NADELMANN. University Park: Penn State Press, 1993, 524 pp. $55.00 (paper, $16.95).

This pioneering and prodigiously researched work examines how U.S. law enforcement agencies cope with transnational crime in jurisdictions where their legal powers are nonexistent. The answer is largely seen in terms of the transnational esprit de corps of foreign police agencies, whose willingness to cooperate often surmounts the formal jurisdictional hurdles. Nadelmann has a fascinating historical survey of U.S. law enforcement activities abroad (particularly instructive to students of U.S.-Mexico relations), but the main emphasis of the work is on the great expansion of such efforts in the last two decades, largely in response to the war on drugs. He shows that U.S. law enforcement techniques have had a profound effect on criminal justice systems around the world, so much so that he speaks of their "Americanization." European legal systems, for example, that once looked with suspicion on the agent provocateur and other sorts of undercover operations have now generally yielded to American techniques. The work contains little in the way of normative judgments or policy prescriptions. Given Nadelmann's known objections to the war on drugs, this gives the book an odd character, quite as if the Rev. Pat Robertson were to attempt a detached scientific analysis of the production values in *Last Tango in Paris*. This oddity apart, however, the work superbly charts a hitherto neglected terrain lying at the intersection of U.S. foreign policy and law enforcement.

The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. BY H. R. HALDEMAN. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1994, 698 pp. $27.50.

This fascinating document sheds light on virtually every aspect of the Nixon presidency. Many of the entries are priceless. We listen in as John Connally tells Nixon that he "must be totally ruthless inside the Oval Office, but firm and human outside" (advice that, on the evidence of these diaries, Nixon seemed often to invert). We see Nixon placing the disagreeable call to then-Secretary of State William Rogers (who had been cut out of Kissinger's "back channel" negotiations with Soviet diplomat Anatoliy

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Dobrynin): "Right after he hung up the P heaved a deep sigh, looked out the window, and said it would be goddamn easy to run this office if you didn't have to deal with people." The touching preface by Haldeman's widow, who recounts how her husband recorded his impressions of the day's work every night before bed, is made even more poignant by the fact that such diaries cannot be prudently kept today by public servants. This situation, dramatically confirmed by the Whitewater hearings, is not only a gross invasion of the privacy of public figures, who are no longer allowed the asylum of a confidential journal; it will also be a terrible loss to future historians.

Western Europe

FRITZ STERN

Monty, The Lonely Leader, 1944-1945: A Biography of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. BY ALISTAIR HORNE AND DAVID MONTGOMERY. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994, 381 pp. $25.00.

A well-known, prolific English historian has written a superb study of Montgomery in the last year of World War II, with the help of the general's son. The result is an admiring but critical appraisal of a great soldier: a man who was an insensitive and egotistical leader, beloved by his men and disliked by the "higher-ups." The author traveled to all the places where Montgomery established his fabled, austere headquarters, from Normandy to Lüneburg, near Hamburg. Horne supplements earlier accounts with some new—mostly filial—material and adds his own assessments. Like many great men, Montgomery was his own worst enemy, vain, vulnerable, and petty. A brilliant tactician, sparing of his soldiers, he was always close to the front and surrounded by a group of devoted young aides who were his eyes and ears. The great rows with Eisenhower are recorded, and his duels with Rommel (in North Africa and again in Normandy) make Horne draw analogies to the Siege of Troy: Montgomery as Achilles and Rommel as Hector. But Horne makes some powerful judgments about inferior British equipment—especially tanks—and describes the terrible losses that reminded Montgomery of what he experienced at the Somme in the slaughter of the First World War. Horne sees the German military, the *Wehrmacht*, remaining a superb, seasoned fighting machine to the very end, with morale allegedly strengthened by the Allied insistence on "unconditional surrender" and by news of the Morgenthau Plan. These are unpersuasive and largely undocumented assertions in an otherwise brilliant and authoritative study.

Between East and West: Across the Borderlands of Europe. BY ANNE APPLEBAUM. New York: Pantheon/Shocken, 1994, 320 pp. $24.00.

A London-based American journalist travels to remote places, beginning in Kaliningrad and ending in Odessa, talking to people who have seen borders move, conquerors come and go, torments endure. On her journey to countries, regions, cities—in areas no longer Polish,

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no longer belonging to the Soviet Union—she evokes the distant pasts of worlds that most Westerners know little about. We learn of Germans who once moved east and after centuries were thrown back, of Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Jews. Observations and conversations are intermingled, the latter evoking historically embattled places and times. Travelogue and glimpses of a still-present past are cleverly combined.

Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918-1963. BY A. J. NICHOLLS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 422 pp. $45.00.

Nicholls, an experienced English historian of Germany, examines here the critical influence of Ludwig Erhard, who as federal minister of economic affairs presided over Germany's postwar rebound. This fine study recounts the intellectual origins of Erhard's social market principles and the manner in which this stubborn man translated ideas into practice against a great deal of German and Allied skepticism and opposition. The author shows how Erhard, appalled by Hitler's coercive economy and the strict controls imposed by the Allies, sought not only a currency reform but the liberalization of trade. He opposed both command economies and pure laissez-faire, or complete disregard for social justice. Nicholls argues that Germany's spectacular recovery in the 1950s was the fruit of Erhard's policies. Erhard gradually persuaded opponents, including the Social Democrats, to consider his approach and ultimately won a far-reaching consensus in favor of the policies of the market but including codetermination and great social benefits. Nicholls started his work as a study in the construction of a new political culture in postwar Germany—only to find that the study has acquired a new topicality in the years after the collapse of communism and the search for alternatives. This work is simultaneously a study in economic thought and practice, a major contribution to the early history of the Federal Republic, and an excellent synthesis of the vast literature surrounding all these subjects. It is churlish to wish for more, but even a brief comparison with the experience of *dirigiste* France in the 1950s would have been especially valuable.

Beyond Borders: West European Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century. BY SARAH COLLINSON. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, 116 pp.

A brief, analytical assessment of the questions that greater migration pose for individual states with their different traditions, policies, and experiences at a time when porous borders circumscribe their independence. The author, a research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, takes a moderate view of a situation that has produced anticipatory panic and pervasive resentment. She argues that immigration problems and policies need to be made clear to the citizenry and not, as often happens, disguised. Migration is

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an old European phenomenon, but it changed in character with the mass movements after 1945 and again with the end of the Cold War. In 1991, Western Europe received 1.5 million foreigners; in 1992, Germany received over 500,000 asylum applications and the United Kingdom 20,000. The political, cultural, and socioeconomic implications of these movements are dealt with succinctly.

Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. BY HANS-GEORG BETZ. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 222 pp. $45.00 (paper, $18.95).

A survey of the varying fortunes of radical right-wing parties in all the West European countries, Austria emphatically included. The author, a young scholar, documents the chauvinistic, often racist characteristics of these parties, which exploit pervasive disillusionment with existing parties—strikingly in the case of Italy. Betz relies heavily on quantitative evidence and shows that these parties seem to attract more men than women, more young than old. These parties are a serious challenge to the older conservative parties, and Betz says too little about how some of the latter have moved to the right in order to absorb some of this populist vote. These developments, so clearly inimical to liberal democracy, require deeper studies. Future studies could begin at home by including our own brand of right-wing radicalism.

Political Traditions in Modern France. BY SUDHIR HAZAREESINGH. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 355 pp. $53.00 (paper, $19.95).

An introduction to the great ideological traditions in French politics, tracing the impact of past thought and events on current politics. An unconventional, informative, and suggestive work, by an Oxford tutor and specialist on French political culture.

Between Mussolini and Hitler: The Jews and the Italian Authorities in France and Tunisia. BY DANIEL CARPI. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1994, 341 pp. $49.95.

An Israeli historian, combing Italian and French archives, reconstructs the way Fascist officials in Italian-occupied areas during the war tried to protect Jews who were Italian citizens from Nazi terror and deportation. A good study, with much new material, that does not mention the major preceding work, Jonathan Steinberg's *All or Nothing*, which was so much richer in nuance. Still, a heartening book—for the specialist.

OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikanische Militärregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949. BY HERAUSGEGEBEN VON CHRISTOPH WEISZ. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag München, 1994, 847 pp.

A much-delayed product of an American-German project to collect the vast documentation of the Office of Military Government for Germany. German archivists and a few historians have prepared this compilation of the organization and personnel of OMGUS, on a regional and zonal level. A useful reference work—long on structures and lists of officeholders, short on historical reconstruction and analysis.

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Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America. BY CLAUDIO VELIZ. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, 254 pp. $35.00.

Claudio Veliz is a distinguished Chilean sociologist and historian who has spent much of his career in English-speaking countries (England, Australia, and now the United States) explaining Latin America to English-speaking audiences. Here he applies the insight first proposed in the seventh century B.C. by the Greek poet Archilochus that "the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing" to help unravel the old enigma that has troubled historians and observers for decades: how to account for the divergent historical paths taken by the two major former colonized regions of the Western Hemisphere. Why did the North develop while the South stagnated?

The metaphor was of course reinvigorated by the Oxford philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin during the early 1950s in his justly famous discussion of Tolstoy's philosophy of history. However, Veliz seeks to adapt Berlin's thesis in an extended essay that is at times luminous and at other times irritatingly precious to explain the contrasting essences of English and Spanish American cultures and economies. The British in the New World and their descendants became the foxes, according to Veliz, bringing an independent, pluralistic, and adaptable cultural tradition. The Spaniards were the hedgehogs, bringing a tradition that was single-minded, systematic, and rationalistic. These central cultural constructions are exemplified by the Industrial Revolution in the North and the Baroque Counter-Reformation in the South, each of which strongly influenced the subsequent and contrasting development within the Americas.

A wide-ranging book like this inevitably raises more questions than it answers, which is of course an invitation to a provocative read. Its great merit is to bring questions of religious, traditional, and cultural construction back to center stage. However, the book's categories are excessively broad and chronologically slippery, and the almost total absence of any discussion of the indigenous population, slavery, race, or economic resources is startling. While Veliz ruminates over 500 years of history, the cultural questions he raises have contemporary significance. Samuel P. Huntington in these pages recently placed Latin America and the United States on opposite sides of a cultural divide. Yet the assumptions underlying NAFTA and the Clinton administration's neo-Wilsonianism in the hemisphere, to take but two examples, follow an opposite tack. They at least are banking on the increasing "foxification" of the South.

Are Economic Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? BY CARMELO MESA-LAGO. Miami: University of Miami, 1994, 84 pp. $11.95 (paper).

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This book provides an essential background briefing by one of the leading academic experts on Cuba, and goes a long way toward explaining the dilemmas facing the Cuban government as it struggles to contain the devastating economic impact caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bankruptcy of Castro's socialist model. Based on a careful assessment of the available statistical data, technical reports by Cuban and foreign experts, many interviews with Cubans on all sides of the political spectrum, and Mesa-Lago's own formidable research over the years, this short book will be greatly appreciated for the richness, comprehensiveness, and confidence of its economic analysis.

As to the key question posed in the title, Mesa-Lago is less certain. "The reform process appears irreversible," Mesa-Lago concludes, but he also clearly lays out the self-defeating contradictions and halfheartedness that permeate many of the Cuban government's measures to confront the economic crisis. It remains far from clear whether Castro's cautious embrace of the capitalist market will be sufficient to extract Cuba from the cul-de-sac in which it finds itself after three and a half decades of communist rule.

Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro. BY SUSAN EVA ECKSTEIN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 286 pp. $29.95.

This important book by Susan Eckstein, a professor of sociology at Boston University, is an ambitious attempt to provide a broad overview of Cuba under the Castro regime. The author looks systematically at the role of the state, economic policy, social and demographic changes, health and welfare, Cuba's overseas commitments, and the current crisis.

Among Eckstein's more interesting conclusions is her observation that the regime's social successes have produced a demographic profile (mainly due to fertility decline) more closely resembling that of a highly industrialized country than of a Third World nation, contributing to the burden of health and retirement costs that now overwhelm Cuba's productive capacity. She also confirms that the impact of hard currency remittances from family members overseas has contributed to growing social tensions in Cuba by, in effect, rewarding enemies of the regime and punishing its supporters.

Thus, ironically, two of the principal medium-term threats to the Castro government—the mass emigration of young men, which could be enormously damaging to the Cuban economy, and the de facto dollarization of the economy—were precisely the two elements the Clinton administration chose to mitigate by its new policies on Cuban immigration and its prohibition of remittances.

Eckstein, however, never fully resolves her own ambivalent attitude toward the Castro regime, nor does she shake herself free from ritualistic bows to social science "theory" or the demands of academic political correctness, where criticism of Castro remains cautious at best. This is a great pity, given the strengths of her research, and because she clearly has the ability to write a book that appeals to a broader public than the denizens of sociology seminars. Her descriptions of the committees for the defense of the revolution, for example, make these intrusive arms of a dictatorial state sound like community self-help orga-

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



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

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nizations, providing meals-on-wheels to senior citizens in small-town Massachusetts. And this despite the fact that her comparative statistical analysis of the Castro regime's achievements and failures is devastating.

Her review of Castro's various attempts at partial market reforms is also pessimistic. She hopes the future will preserve what she holds to be the regime's achievements, "Cuba's health welfare, its reduction of rural/urban and class inequities, and the gains of women and dark-skinned islanders." Yet many of these gains were surely bought at the cost of Soviet subsidies, as the current lack of supplies, nutritional deficiencies, and rampant inflation demonstrate; they cannot all be blamed on the U.S. embargo. In the end this book, despite itself, is not optimistic about the prospects for an inevitable transition to a postcommunist Cuba. It makes for very sober reading that specialists and policymakers should take note of.

Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean. EDITED BY CARL KAYSEN, ROBERT A. PASTOR, AND LAURA W. REED. Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994, 177 pp. $10.00.

A valuable collection of essays from a project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences that examined "emerging norms of justified intervention" in the western hemisphere, originally presented at a conference held at the Carter Center in Atlanta on September 20-21, 1993. Conference participants included Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and Pastor, all of whom played roles in the dramatic denouement to the Haitian crisis almost exactly one year later. A common thread connecting the essays in the volume, as Carl Kaysen and Robert Pastor point out in their introduction, is the "growing legitimacy of international involvement in politically related activities within states in the region." Latin Americans, however, remain deeply ambivalent about this phenomenon, which confronts sensitive and divisive issues concerning sovereignty, democracy, past experience, and great power credibility. The outcome of the Haitian "justified intervention" over the coming months will clearly have a major influence on how this contentious debate evolves in the future. But this excellent collection is as good a place to begin as any, and because of recent developments in the Caribbean, it is of more than passing historical interest.

Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America. BY MARTHA L. COTTAM. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994, 220 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

A very timely, clear-headed, and jargon-free analysis of the factors that contribute to U. S. intervention in Latin America and that help explain the methods chosen (if "chosen" is the correct word here, given the pattern of blundering and inadvertent entrapment that historically seems to characterize U.S. military involvement in the western hemisphere). Cottam, who is a professor of political science at Washington

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State University, looks at a number of case studies of intervention and decision-making patterns, from overt military involvement to covert operations to economic pressure. Her major contribution is to focus attention on the importance of the images policymakers hold of cultures and peoples, and how this influences their policy decisions and choice of policy instruments.

Although the author begins by asserting that Latin America is once again on the bottom of the heap in U. S. foreign policy (somewhere, no doubt, the White House wishes Latin America would remain, given the current Cuban and Haitian imbroglios), her conclusions were prescient, especially as far as Haiti is concerned. "The simplification of domestic political elements has always been part of U. S. perceptions of dependent countries. In the post-Cold War era, the danger in this simplification is much greater. This combined with the Cold War pattern of selecting coercive instruments and lack of an overriding strategy (containment) has the potential to lead the United States into a quagmire in Latin America." How right Cottam was. A valuable and indispensable book for our times.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Lenin: Life and Legacy. BY DMITRI VOLKOGONOV. New York: The Free Press, 1994, 509 pp. $29.95.

For those wondering what a serious Russian historian would say about Lenin when given a chance to write freely, here is the answer. Volkogonov, a career military officer, adviser to Boris Yeltsin, and biographer of Stalin, has reread the man whom his generation revered beyond mortality, tracked him through the archives, and viewed him through the eyes of defeated or disgraced contemporaries. The new Lenin he meets, while intelligent and far more galvanizing than his peers, is a man of potent but noxious qualities—an iron will in the service of an intense, narrow, dogmatic mind; enormous energy without a moral compass; and a vast self-confidence unleavened by compassion for anyone other than one or two of those close to him. More important, this driven figure believed that his society could—indeed, must—reach justice and democracy through violence, terror, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, where proletariat stands for party.

In Russia, Volkoganov's biography will feed a sentiment already well-rooted, albeit in a scholarly and measured way. From the films of Stanislav Govorukhin and the bitter essays of Russian nationalists, many have come to see 1917, the revolution, and Lenin's dream (or, more accurately, his obsession) as a monstrous tragedy of which the Russian people are the sad, sad victims.

For Western readers, the impact is likely to be less clear. In principle, much excitement should attend the appearance of a work whose author had full access to party, police, and, particularly, the Politburo archives from these early years. In fact, however, it is a bit disappointing to discover how little these materials add to the picture we already have of Lenin, his

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life, and his leadership. They do shed new light on Lenin's last months, after the incapacitating stroke of March 1923: on the progress of his disease, the role played by Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, and the way all this was handled by Stalin and other members of the leadership. The sections dealing with the evolution and deliberations of the party's leading organs during these first years in power are also useful and fascinating.

The archives hold massive numbers of documents, and doubtless Volkogonov could make his way through only portions of them. What he found, however, embellishes rather than alters the image of Lenin constructed in previous Western biographies, particularly the most critical of them. The book's real value for a Western audience is not so much the interpretation he provides but the additional weight he gives to interpretations that see Lenin as the forerunner of Stalinism, not as the author of a revolution betrayed by Stalin.

The Dream that Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union. BY WALTER LAQUEUR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 225 pp. $25.00.

Much to Laqueur's credit, this book is about large questions: What is the essence and meaning of the Bolshevik Revolution? Why did the Soviet Union collapse when it did? And why did all the expertise in the world not prepare us for the event? After all, if we cannot answer questions like these, what questions of any weight can we answer?

Rather than address these questions, however, the author wields them as a knout, flogging members of what he calls the revisionist school of Western Sovietology—revisionist because they rejected the earlier dominant concept of totalitarianism and substituted an interest in the social sources of support for the regime, the limits to the regime's power, and the discontinuities between the Stalin era and its sequel. But a knout is only an argument of sorts, and not convincing in the pages of a book. For all the clarity and punch of Laqueur's writing, the case itself is obscure. One cannot tell whether his scorn for the revisionists is really because they assumed the regime was more durable than it turned out to be—a transgression of which they alone were hardly guilty—or because their writing did not, as Laqueur reads them, show moral repugnance of the Soviet system. Nor can one tell whether he means to attack only those who clearly fall within this school of thought or virtually everyone studying the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, except those on the right. "Sovietology: An Epitaph," the title of two chapters, suggests the latter, but he takes so little notice of whole bodies of work done during this period and returns so often to the writings of a half dozen people that one has trouble deciding.

In a final, dual irony, the author notes that after all these years, the collapse of the Roman Empire has not been explained. The many books and theories only account for the weaknesses of Rome, he says. He then proceeds to explain the weaknesses of the Soviet Union, without being able to do more.

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Moreover, in assessing these weaknesses, he ends up discounting most of them, until he himself has made clear why assuming the stability of the Soviet system was not so unreasonable.

Imperium. BY RYSZARD KAPUŚCIŃSKI. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994, 331 pp. $24.00.

Kapuściński is a poet masquerading as a journalist. Thus, these sketches from three encounters with the Soviet Union—one as a boy living through the Soviet occupation of his Polish hometown in the first year of World War II, the second a quarter of a century later as a traveling journalist, and the third during the country's last two years as a witness who could not resist being there—are pure art. Not a set of essays, and even less a detailed assessment of the reality he encounters, they convey an essence through brilliantly simple word pictures. A child in Siberia explains with polite superiority what "great cold" is, something obviously beyond his experience: "One can recognize [it] by the bright, shining mist that hangs in the air. When a person walks, a corridor forms in this mist. The corridor has the shape of that person's silhouette."

Because in 1967 and then again in 1990-91 he visited much more than the Russian heartland, traveling throughout the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the depths of Siberia, by the end of the book the reader has accumulated rich, indelible impressions. The prose is magnificent, splendidly translated by Klara Glowczewska. So good is the writing, so universal the minor philosophical reflections, and so frequent the laugh-out-loud humor that this book is worth reading even for someone who could care less about the subject.

The Making of Eastern Europe. BY PHILIP LONGWORTH. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 320 pp. $17.95 (paper).

Longworth employs an interesting device to recount the history of Eastern Europe: He tells the story backwards. Beginning with the post-Stalin period, he considers the growth, then the decline, then the fall of the system, concluding with a set of questions: How much of contemporary Eastern Europe, particularly its troubles, comes from the Soviet legacy? Did Stalin intend from the beginning to make the region over in his image? How much of what happened after 1944 depended on the war? This leads to an exploration of the 1944-53 period and more questions. Without the war, he argues, the Soviet Union could not have subjugated Eastern Europe, "and there may well have been no war had the situation in Eastern Europe in the 1930s not invited Nazi aggression." But why was this so? Why had the region become a "strategic vacuum?" Why had the promise of 1918 dissolved? Why had democracy failed? Why had nationalism gone bad? After the chapter dealing with 1918 to 1944 comes the next barrel of the reverse telescope, the nineteenth century and the "roots of the [interwar] failure." For it was, he argues, during the period after 1848 when the peoples of Eastern Europe developed their passionate and divisive sense of nationality, the burden of rural overpopulation grew, and the region "failed to meet the challenge of the new, industrial age." And so on, back to the fourth century.

As the reader can tell from the theses

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implicit in Longworth's questions, more than the book's architecture is original and open to contention. He knows that and does not shrink from going further, insisting the history of these states can be told as the history of a region, a history long distinguishing East from West, a history making it far from certain that, but for the Soviet yoke, Eastern Europe would have long ago emerged into the daylight of democracy. He even invites the counterargument, which, if made with the same grand sweep and attention to basic historical questions as his book will serve the reader well.

The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. BY ROBERT J. KAISER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 471 pp. $65.00.

Kaiser is a political geographer, and he has written this thick academic book, he says, to "bring geography back into the study of nations and nationalism." Specifically, he devotes his book to two questions: What is a nation? What role does place—or the notion of a homeland—play in the definition of nation and the emergence of nationalism? The case study, to which Kaiser has devoted a career, is the Soviet Union, although here he also deals with the imperial Russian prelude.

While the general reader is not likely to make the investment this book requires, the specialist who does will be rewarded. To the modernized concept of nationalism, which makes it a social and political invention rather than a metaphysical or primordial given, Kaiser adds a number of important refinements. In particular, he treats place (as in "land where my fathers died"), not simply as a nondescript vessel containing the lively phenomena producing or reducing nation and nationalism, but as a cause itself. In the process, he slides a large brick into the solid foundation of recent studies on nationalism and ethnicity in the Soviet Union and the successor states.

Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

The Failure of Political Islam. BY OLIVIER ROY. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, 229 pp. $22.95.

If you read only one book on political Islam, this should be it. Olivier Roy, an authority on the complex politics of Afghanistan, has turned his attention to the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism, with remarkable results. On practically every page one finds an interpretation or observation that is provocative and insightful.

He maintains that contemporary Islamic radicalism has little to do with the traditional views of Islamic religious scholars, the *ulama*. Indeed, "political Islamists" were anticlerical intellectuals intent on finding ways to deal with the modern world.

Political Islam has come closest to succeeding with the Iranian revolution, which in many ways was profoundly anticlerical. Now that Khomeini is dead, no grand ayatollah, for example, exercises political

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power, and the state determines the role of the clerics, not the other way around.

In a brilliant chapter on the sociology of political Islam, Roy shows that the recruitment of large numbers of alienated young men without much hope in the future has transformed political Islam into what he calls "neo-fundamentalism." Unlike the Islamists, many of whom were serious intellectuals who tried to adapt to aspects of modernity, the neo-fundamentalists do little more than channel the discontents of urban youth into political opposition. Neo-fundamentalists worry about morals, mixed education, veiling, and the corrupting influence of the West, but they have no real political or economic program. If they come to power they will resemble the repressive, one-party regimes that they are likely to replace, and will in turn face the opposition of these same disaffected classes.

Some Muslims will disagree with the bleak prognosis that Roy delivers. Some secularists will reject the notion that it makes little difference whether Algeria is ruled by the FLN or the FIS. The evidence to date, however, from Iran and Sudan supports his view that Islamists in power are far from finding solutions to the social and economic problems of their peoples. Roy sees contemporary Islamic movements not as serious efforts to return to the classical paradigms of Islamic governance (which are only partially rooted in the Koran in any case), but rather as a result of a failed modernization. But the appeal of the modern world is still at the root of much of the anger felt by Islamists, and they blame their rulers for keeping them from enjoying the fruits of modernity. Therein lies the dilemma for both incumbent regimes and opposition forces in the Middle East today. Roy has helped to illuminate the problem, but offers little to those looking for solutions.

Beyond Alliance: Israel and U.S. Foreign Policy. BY CAMILLE MANSOUR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 324 pp. $37.50.

What accounts for the remarkable level of American support for Israel over the years? This question has given rise to an extensive literature, much of it partisan. Essentially the arguments can be boiled down to variations on the following: The United States has supported Israel as part of a grand design for extending its influence into the Middle East (Israel as strategic asset); and the United States has supported Israel because of domestic political factors (the Israeli lobby, Jewish vote, pro-Israeli PACs, shared values). Camille Mansour carefully surveys the record of the past 45 years and concludes that American support for Israel is more rooted in values (culture, ideology) than in anything else. This is not such a surprising conclusion, except that many of Mansour's fellow Arab intellectuals have vociferously defended the alternative explanations of grand conspiracy or powerful lobby. The author could have done without the occasional charts and graphs that are meant to provide a scientific cast to his explanations. They don't. Still, the overall level of analysis is impressive, the sources (mostly secondary) are wide-ranging, and the conclusions seem solid. One implication is that the end of the Cold War and the weakening of the "strategic asset" argument will not necessarily imperil U.S.-Israeli ties.

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The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed. BY CAMERON R. HUME. Bloomington: Indiana University Press/Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1994, 269 pp. $29.95.

The United Nations, long maligned for its inability to live up to the expectations of its founders, finally came into its own in the late 1980s. In 1987, to the surprise of many, the U.N. Security Council called for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq after seven years of warfare. Within a year such a cease-fire was in place. Two years later, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council once again functioned as it was intended and served as the forum for organizing the force that expelled Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait.

How the United Nations came to perform its intended task so well is the story of this well-informed book. The author was an insider and he is therefore able to provide a feel for the nature of the debates and arguments that went on behind closed doors. There are few big surprises, and there is little in the way of broad generalization. Some who were involved in the negotiations have noted that the author has slighted the Saudi role in helping persuade the Iraqis to accept the cease-fire resolution, and there will doubtless be other quibbles over points of emphasis. But this is certainly an ably written diplomatic history that will be referred to for years to come by those who want to understand how the United Nations is meant to operate.

On Both Banks of the Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi Al-Tall. BY ASHER SUSSER. Portland: Frank Cass, 1994, 208 pp. $35.00.

Few Middle East statesmen have been the subject of good political biographies. Wasfi al-Tall certainly merits a book-length study of his remarkable political career. He served as King Hussein's prime minister and senior political adviser during crucial periods in the late 1960s, and was in part responsible for the showdown between Jordanian forces and the PLO in late 1970 and early 1971. His life was cut short by an assassin's bullet later that year.

Asher Susser is one of Israel's leading Arabists. He first published a Hebrew version of this book over a decade ago. The availability of this revised English edition is welcome, for it advances our understanding of the solidity of the Jordanian political system. The king, unlike most Arab rulers, has consciously recruited and trained a cadre of capable men to assist in the governing of the country. At times, they have carried much of the burden of managing the many problems that beset the Hashemite Kingdom. Wasfi al-Tall stood out as a particularly shrewd, loyal, and charismatic Jordanian. That an Israeli scholar who never met the man and has been unable to interview many of those who knew him best can present a fair and convincing portrait is a testament to good scholarship. What is missing, not surprisingly, is an in-depth feel for the personality and anecdotes that might have come from the type of contact that is just now becoming possible between Israelis and Jordanians. Still, this will stand as a valu-

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able account of Jordan and one of its most impressive statesmen at a particularly difficult moment in recent history.

A Voice of Reason: Hanan Ashrawi and Peace in the Middle East. BY BARBARA VICTOR. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1994, 258 pp.$24.95.

Hyperbole abounds in this well-intentioned but seriously flawed portrait of an articulate Palestinian figure. The dust jacket sets the tone. "And why have the leaders of one of the most sexist societies in the world put their fate and the fate of their people in the hands of this Christian woman?" The answer, of course, is that they have not. Hyperbole aside, this biography is filled with irritating mistakes, some minor and others indicative of a lack of serious knowledge about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Names are so often mangled that one stops paying attention. But what about substance? Here the author has a few tidbits to offer. She correctly notes that Ashrawi played an important role in setting in motion the first contacts between the Israelis and PLO officials who went on to negotiate the Oslo accords. One also learns that Ashrawi has a thoughtful and supportive husband, lots of friends who say nice things about her, a few detractors, and a pretty impressive career. The author clearly admires her and detests Yasir Arafat, but never quite captures the nature of the relationship between these two individuals. As a result, both are essentially treated as stereotypes. Many of the reported anecdotes and conversations are grist for a good magazine article, but without an organizing theme, without more historical context, they hardly warrant a book—at least not a book of this modest quality.

Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, & Civil Society. BY KIRK J. BEATTIE. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 260 pp. $60.00.

The Nasser era is far enough in the past that one can have some historical perspective on it, but it is still close enough that the inquisitive researcher can talk to those who knew Nasser and the inner workings of his regime. Beattie has exploited this opportunity skillfully, interviewing many of the key figures of the Nasser era, reading the memoirs of others, and stitching together a readable and convincing account of the evolution of Nasser's political thinking. From an early flirtation with the Muslim Brethren to a later embrace of left-leaning socialism, Nasser remained essentially a nationalist, a pragmatist, and a dictator. But he was a dictator in a military regime in which the military was loyal to his rival, Abdel-Hakim Amer. The Nasser-Amer rivalry, now understood but at the time carefully hidden, helps explain much about Nasser's behavior in the 1960s, including some of his maneuvers on the eve of the fateful 1967 war. Nasser was able to cling to power after the war, but he never succeeded in creating a "hegemonic bloc," in Beattie's words, which means that Egyptian politics continues to reflect liberal, leftist, and Islamist currents. Some see this lack of ideological unity in the country as an impediment to development, but it might also be viewed as a promising base from which to construct a more pluralistic and tolerant polity than anything Nasser could imagine. One may quibble with Beattie's theoretical frame-

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work, but his research is solid, which makes the book of enduring value.

Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East. BY DAVID W. LESCH. Boulder: Westview, 1992, 242 pp. $49.50.

Revisionism concerning Eisenhower's presidency has been based largely on the evidence that the president was much more in charge of policy than many had thought at the time and that he showed remarkably good judgment in not entangling the United States in costly overseas adventures. As a result, the 1950s were years of peace and prosperity for many Americans. But the record looks a bit different, as Lesch shows, through the lens of American Middle East policy during this period. The episode selected for analysis in this "re-revisionist" history is the Syrian crisis of 1957. Until recently, the American role in this affair was treated as a deep secret. Now it is clear that the United States was drawn into a plan to destabilize the Syrian government, in league with Britain, Iraq, and Turkey, during 1955-56. The Syrians managed to disrupt the plan in August 1957, by which time Iraq had pulled back, and the whole affair looked quite amateurish. Lesch believes that the misguided pressure on the leftist, but not communist, Syrian regime in this period had the counterproductive result of driving the Syrians into the arms of the Soviets and later toward unity with Egypt. Eisenhower and Dulles were unable to make much of a distinction between radical nationalists and communists, and by failing to do so they adopted policies whose results were the opposite of those they hoped for. This is a well-done case study, which does not quite succeed in lifting the veil on all the mysteries of what Washington was trying to do to Syria in 1957, but comes closer than any previous account. And it helps to explain why Syrians have long been suspicious of American policy toward their country.

Asia and the Pacific

DONALD ZAGORIA

The End of Japan, Inc.: And How the New Japan Will Look. BY CHRISTOPHER WOOD. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, 227 pp. $22.00.

The Undefeated: The Rise, Fall & Rise of Greater Japan. BY ROBERT HARVEY. London: Macmillan, 1994, 633 pp.

A few years ago, so-called "revisionist" writers on Japan were telling us that Japan, Inc. was immutable, infallible, and relentlessly set on a course of world economic domination. Today these theorists will have to explain Japan's worst postwar slump, the disintegration of its ruling party, the LDP, and the fact that America has toppled Japan's economy from its long-held position as the world's toughest competitor.

Wood, the former Tokyo bureau chief of *The Economist*, describes an ossified economic and political system that mistakenly believes that it can continue to export its way out of recession, aging politicians who continue to act as if relations between America and Japan

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can be conducted as usual, and a political system that has entered a turbulent period as rivals compete to fill the power vacuum left by the demise of the once-dominant LDP.

Harvey, a qualified admirer of the revisionists, argues that the "Japan problem" is not that identified by Karel van Wolferen—i.e., that no one governs Japan—but rather that its government is still, as it was in the days of the shogun, in the hands of elites barely responsible to the people.

Both of these books are provocative, readable, and lively. Wood may be overstating the depth of the Japanese economic crisis, but he does point to serious problems—an automobile industry threatened by the rising yen, excess investment, and a huge loss of competitive advantage; and a new computer-led information economy in which America, not Japan, is leading the way.

Both of these books deserve wide readership. Critics will complain that each oversimplifies. But both identify fundamental questions about the future of Japan and its relations with the United States and offer sensible advice on what needs to be done.

The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. BY SUSAN L. SHIRK. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 399 pp. $48.00 (paper, $15.00).

This superbly researched book will take its place alongside Harry Harding's *China's Second Revolution* as the definitive study of the politics of the economic reform process in China since 1978. In addition to shedding much light on economic reform in China, Shirk provides one of the most detailed and illuminating descriptions and analyses of the Chinese communist political process. She also has a good deal to say about why the reform process succeeded in Deng's China and failed in Gorbachev's Russia.

The cornerstone of Deng's strategy was to build support for economic reform through revenue-sharing contracts between the central government and provincial governments, an approach that gave provincial officials a vested interest in promoting and sustaining the reform drive. This created a pro-reform political counterweight to the central bureaucracy and achieved market reform while preserving China's communist institutions.

In a concluding chapter, the author thoughtfully discusses both the merits and the failures of China's gradualist reform strategy and concludes that China may yet succeed in privatizing the inefficient state factories.

Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations. EDITED BY ROSS GARNAUT AND PETER DRYSDALE. Pymble: HarperEducational/Canberra: The Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1994, 433 pp.

This collection of papers by prominent economists from the United States and East Asia is a gold mine of insights into Asia-Pacific economic regionalism and its likely impact on the global trading system. The papers are concise, punchy, and meaty. Paul Krugman identifies the central issue: should regional trading agreements be welcomed as a step toward global free trade, condemned as institutions that undermine the multilateral sys-

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tem, or grudgingly accepted as the best we are likely to get and preferable to a breakdown of the multilateral system? He comes to a modest conclusion: states' ability to support cooperative solutions at a multilateral level are declining, while such cooperation remains strong at the regional level. Lawrence Summers is more emphatic in arguing that regionalism is desirable and that "plausible" regional arrangements will have trade-creating effects. Summers also advances several arguments for supporting regional economic arrangements, including one that is not sufficiently recognized. Regional arrangements help lock in good domestic policies. If Mexico flourishes under domestic reform and in NAFTA, the rest of Latin America may follow suit. The same argument is valid in East Asia. The success of China's economic reform has been followed in Vietnam.

The two editors of this important book, Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut, are prominent Australian economists who have long been associated with the idea of establishing a trans-Pacific economic grouping. They offer insightful introductions and contributions that stress the differences between East Asia's market-driven "open regionalism" and the government-driven regional arrangements in Europe and North America.

In sum, this is an indispensable volume not only for economists but for all those with an interest in East Asian international relations.

Japan and Russia: A Reevalution in the Post-Soviet Era. BY WILLIAM F. NIMMO. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, 207 pp. $55.00.

The author is an American historian who teaches both Japanese and Russian history and who lived, studied, and taught in Japan for 12 years. He is one of America's few experts on the critical relationship between Japan and Russia, a relationship that is bound to become more important in the post-Cold War era. The volume contains a solid discussion of the Russo-Japanese relationship up to 1945 and during the Stalin, Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras, and it concludes with a section on current and future relations between Yeltsin's Russia and Japan.

By quoting extensively from both Russian and Japanese sources, Nimmo provides important insights into the domestic factors on both sides that inhibit compromise on the territorial issue posed by the Kuril Islands. Opposition in Russia to any return of the disputed islands comes from nationalists, former communists, key regional and military officials, and, not least, the general public.

Meanwhile, in Japan the predominant view seems to be that Russia has not changed much in the post-communist era, that in any case it is politically unstable, and that the G-7 should not rush Japan into providing substantial aid to Russia. Both of these views are extremely shortsighted, as the author points out in a conclusion that urges Russia to return the islands and Japan to show goodwill through full participation in G-7 efforts to aid Russia.

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The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War. BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND KONGDAN OH. Santa Monica: RAND, 1993, 106 pp. $15.00 (paper).

For American readers, perhaps the most useful part of this study by two RAND Corporation analysts is the chapter on the Japanese reassessment of Japan's changing strategic environment now that the Cold War is over. There are brief summaries of alternative Japanese views on national security, the U.S.-Japan alliance and its future, whether Japanese and American societies are converging or diverging, and the potential for Asian regionalism.

The study's main part, on how the United States needs to alter its Japan and Asia strategy, is neither original nor very illuminating. It largely repeats venerable clichés such as: the United States cannot afford to become isolationist, it should make clear that a "remilitarized" Japan is not in Japan's best interest, and the U.S. government must increase its staff of Asian specialists.

Africa

GAIL GERHART

United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change. BY PETER J. SCHRAEDER. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 347 pp. $59.95 (paper, $27.95).

To most Americans, Africa is remote, inconsequential, and confusing. "So many countries," as one diplomat put it, "so many wars." How can American relations with Africa be made intelligible to those who want to understand? This first-rate book is aimed at both an academic audience and African readers trying to make sense of American diplomacy. Schraeder explains the institutions of U.S. policymaking and the types of bureaucratic and political behavior associated with each. Then he posits that there are three recurring patterns of interplay between African events and American policy formulation. Most of the book is then devoted to exemplifying these patterns in three detailed cases that span the post-World War II period: Ethiopia/Somalia ("routine situations and bureaucratic politics"), Zaire ("crisis situations and presidential politics"), and South Africa ("extended crisis situations and domestic politics"). The author draws on dozens of interviews with foreign service personnel and on many documents from the National Security Archives in developing and adding nuance to his cases. Although little new information is brought to light, the accounts are well presented and effectively illustrate the patterns and processes at the core of the analysis. A final section examines the implications of the end of the Cold War for U.S. policies in Africa. An excellent text for college courses.

Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice. BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 206 pp. $54.95.

Burundi's postcolonial history is a tangled tale of tribal, factional, and regional competition punctuated by horrific massacres each time the dominance of the country's Tutsi ethnic minority has been threatened

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by a credible challenge. "Nowhere else in Africa," says Lemarchand, writing before Rwanda's 1994 holocaust, had "so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small a space as in Burundi." This skillful and timely study examines both the historical conflict and the meta-conflict—the different self-serving beliefs and explanations of conflict perpetuated by the competing groups in their public discourse. Completed just before the October 1993 assassination of Burundi's first elected Hutu head of state, Melchior Ndadaye, the book explores the courageous efforts of Pierre Buyoya, Ndadaye's Tutsi predecessor, to initiate perestroika in Burundi despite opposition from hardline Tutsi elements in his army. Without going into detail on the contrasting politics of neighboring Rwanda, Lemarchand takes into account the psychological and demographic impact on Burundi of Rwanda's history of ethnocidal conflict. Predicting Burundi's political future is risky now. But it will certainly be a test of one society's collective capacity to correct itself under the pressure of some of the world's most haunting historical memories.

Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development. BY DAVID HIMBARA. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, 192 pp. $35.00.

This provocative and well-researched analysis of Kenya's economic rise and fall challenges past academic theories regarding the role of indigenous capitalists and their relationship to the Kenyan state. The author, an East African émigré scholar, revisits the history of Kenya's commercial and industrial development, and argues that from independence onward, the potential of the country's proven entrepreneurs—its Indian business class—was neglected. Meanwhile, state resources were redirected toward inexperienced Africans in the belief that success in business and economic growth would follow merely from creating new opportunities for the country's majority to accumulate capital. As a succession of mediocre and corrupt elites, first Kikuyu and then Kalenjin, grasped the reins of state power, the promising momentum of industrial and commercial development dating from Kenya's late colonial period was lost. Today, despite attempts by aid donors and multilateral lenders to foster reform and shore up its faltering state institutions, Kenya finds itself with dwindling revenues, decaying infrastructure, and still no true class of African capitalists dedicated to long-term investment and growth.

The Transition to Independence in Namibia. BY LIONEL CLIFFE AND OTHERS. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, 293 pp. $38.50.

This thorough and informative election study is based on field observations by a team of British and African researchers led by Cliffe, a Leeds University political scientist. After retracing the decade and a half of war and diplomatic maneuvering that preceded Namibian independence in 1990, the book focuses on the pre-independence election of November 1989, and in particular on the performance of the United Nations as a political midwife of

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Namibia's new order. While judging that the conduct and outcome of the election would have been fairer had the United Nations rather than South Africa had ultimate administrative authority over the voting, the study credits the United Nations with generally making the best of a difficult situation. Much useful data is presented on the parties, issues, and voting results, as well as on the deliberations of the constituent assembly put in place by the election. Ironically, the book concludes, South Africa's anti-SWAPO machinations helped to foster favorable conditions for democracy in Namibia by forestalling a more decisive SWAPO victory that could have led to one-party rule.

Invisible Crimes: U.S. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique. BY KATHI AUSTIN. Washington: Africa Policy Information Center, 1994, 50 pp. $5.50.

Although the State Department in the Reagan years officially condemned the brutal insurgent movement in Mozambique known as Renamo, it simultaneously turned a blind eye to the material and propaganda support provided to Renamo by right-wing American groups. Hundreds of thousands of Mozambican civilians died in a war fomented, first by Rhodesian whites and later by Pretoria, solely to thwart movement toward majority rule in southern Africa. This report argues that Americans who helped to fuel Renamo's murderous war machine should be held legally accountable for the movement's gross abuses. Unfortunately, while it amply documents the range of conservative propaganda efforts—misguided and mendacious but constitutionally protected—the report falls short of solidly substantiating its claim that right-wing material support (communications equipment, uniforms, money) boosted Renamo's fortunes to any important extent. Noting that in practice no effective legal mechanism exists to hold private actors accountable in American courts for material intervention in foreign conflicts (the 1794 Neutrality Act having fallen into disuse), the report recommends that Congress and legal scholars address the inadequacies of existing law regarding such interventions.

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A Response to Lee Kuan Yew

Is Culture Destiny?

The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values

Kim Dae Jung

In his interview with *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994), Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, presents interesting ideas about cultural differences between Western and East Asian societies and the political implications of those differences. Although he does not explicitly say so, his statements throughout the interview and his track record make it obvious that his admonition to Americans "not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work" implies that Western-style democracy is not applicable to East Asia. Considering the esteem in which he is held among world leaders and the prestige of this journal, this kind of argument is likely to have considerable impact and therefore deserves a careful reply.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, socialism has been in retreat. Some people conclude that the Soviet demise was the result of the victory of capitalism over socialism. But I believe it represented the triumph of democracy over dictatorship. Without democracy, capitalism in Prussian Germany and Meiji Japan eventually met its tragic end. The many Latin American states that in recent decades embraced capitalism while rejecting democracy failed miserably. On the other hand, countries practicing democratic capitalism or democratic socialism, despite temporary setbacks, have prospered.

In spite of these trends, lingering doubts remain about the applicability of and prospects for democracy in Asia. Such doubts have been raised mainly by Asia's authoritarian leaders, Lee being the most articulate among them. They have long maintained that cultural

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differences make the "Western concept" of democracy and human rights inapplicable to East Asia. Does Asia have the philosophical and historical underpinnings suitable for democracy? Is democracy achievable there?

SELF-SERVING SELF-RELIANCE

Lee stresses cultural factors throughout his interview. I too believe in the importance of culture, but I do not think it alone determines a society's fate, nor is it immutable. Moreover, Lee's view of Asian cultures is not only unsupportable but self-serving. He argues that Eastern societies, unlike Western ones, "believe that the individual exists in the context of his family" and that the family is "the building brick of society." However, as an inevitable consequence of industrialization, the family-centered East Asian societies are also rapidly moving toward self-centered individualism. Nothing in human history is permanent.

Lee asserts that, in the East, "the ruler or the government does not try to provide for a person what the family best provides." He cites this ostensibly self-reliant, family-oriented culture as the main cause of East Asia's economic successes and ridicules Western governments for allegedly trying to solve all of society's problems, even as he worries about the moral breakdown of Western societies due to too much democracy and too many individual rights. Consequently, according to Lee, the Western political system, with its intrusive government, is not suited to family-oriented East Asia. He rejects Westernization while embracing modernization and its attendant changes in lifestyle—again strongly implying that democracy will not work in Asia.

FAMILY VALUES (REQUIRED HERE)

But the facts demonstrate just the opposite. It is not true, as Lee alleges, that Asian governments shy away from intervening in private matters and taking on all of society's problems. Asian governments intrude much more than Western governments into the daily affairs of individuals and families. In Korea, for example, each household is required to attend monthly neighborhood meetings to receive government directives and discuss local affairs. Japan's powerful government constantly intrudes into the business world to protect perceived national interests, to the point of causing disputes with the United States and other trading partners. In Lee's Singapore, the government stringently regulates individuals' actions—such as chewing bubble-gum, spitting, smoking, littering, and so on—to an Orwellian extreme of social engineering. Such facts fly in the face of his assertion that East Asia's governments are minimalist. Lee makes these false claims to justify his rejection of Western-style democracy. He even dislikes the one man, one vote principle, so fundamental to modern democracy, saying that he is not "intellectually convinced" it is best.

Opinions like Lee's hold considerable sway not only in Asia but among some Westerners because of the moral breakdown of many advanced democratic societies. Many Americans thought, for example, that the U.S. citizen Michael Fay deserved the caning he received from Singaporean authorities for his act of

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vandalism. However, moral breakdown is attributable not to inherent shortcomings of Western cultures but to those of industrial societies; a similar phenomenon is now spreading through Asia's newly industrializing societies. The fact that Lee's Singapore, a small city-state, needs a near-totalitarian police state to assert control over its citizens contradicts his assertion that everything would be all right if governments would refrain from interfering in the private affairs of the family. The proper way to cure the ills of industrial societies is not to impose the terror of a police state but to emphasize ethical education, give high regard to spiritual values, and promote high standards in culture and the arts.

LONG BEFORE LOCKE

No one can argue with Lee's objection to "foisting" an alien system "indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work." The question is whether democracy is a system so alien to Asian cultures that it will not work. Moreover, considering Lee's record of absolute intolerance of dissent and the continued crackdown on dissidents in many other Asian countries, one is also compelled to ask whether democracy has been given a chance in places like Singapore.

A thorough analysis makes it clear that Asia has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and traditions. Asia has already made great strides toward democratization and possesses the necessary conditions to develop democracy even beyond the level of the West.

Democratic Ideals. It is widely accepted that English political philosopher John Locke laid the foundation for modern democracy. According to Locke, sovereign rights reside with the people and, based on a contract with the people, leaders are given a mandate to govern, which the people can withdraw. But almost two millennia before Locke, Chinese philosopher Meng-tzu preached similar ideas. According to his "Politics of Royal Ways," the king is the "Son of Heaven," and heaven bestowed on its son a mandate to provide good government, that is, to provide good for the people. If he did not govern righteously, the people had the right to rise up and overthrow his government in the name of heaven. Meng-tzu even justified regicide, saying that once a king loses the mandate of heaven he is no longer worthy of his subjects' loyalty. The people came first, Meng-tzu said, the country second, and the king third. The ancient Chinese philosophy of *Minben Zhengchi*, or "people-based politics," teaches that "the will of the people is the will of heaven" and that one should "respect the people as heaven" itself.

A native religion of Korea, Tonghak, went even further, advocating that "man is heaven" and that one must serve man as one does heaven. These ideas inspired and motivated nearly half a million peasants in 1894 to revolt against exploitation by feudalistic government internally and imperialistic forces externally. There are no ideas more fundamental to democracy than the teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Tonghak. Clearly, Asia has democratic philosophies as profound as those of the West.

Democratic Institutions. Asia also has many democratic traditions. When Western societies were still being ruled

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by a succession of feudal lords, China and Korea had already sustained county prefecture systems for about 2,000 years. The government of the Chin Dynasty, founded by Chin-shih huang-ti (literally, the founder of Chin), practiced the rule of law and saw to it that everyone, regardless of class, was treated fairly. For nearly 1,000 years in China and Korea, even the sons of high-ranking officials were not appointed to important official positions unless they passed civil service examinations. These stringent tests were administered to members of the aristocratic class, who constituted over ten percent of the population, thus guaranteeing equal opportunity and social mobility, which are so central to popular democracy. This practice sharply contrasted with that of European fiefdoms of that time, where pedigree more or less determined one's official position. In China and Korea powerful boards of censors acted as a check against imperial misrule and abuses by government officials. Freedom of speech was highly valued, based on the understanding that the nation's fate depended on it. Confucian scholars were taught that remonstration against an erring monarch was a paramount duty. Many civil servants and promising political elites gave their lives to protect the right to free speech.

The fundamental ideas and traditions necessary for democracy existed in both Europe and Asia. Although Asians developed these ideas long before the Europeans did, Europeans formalized comprehensive and effective electoral democracy first. The invention of the electoral system is Europe's greatest accomplishment. The fact that this system was developed elsewhere does not mean that "it will not work" in Asia. Many Asian countries, including Singapore, have become prosperous after adopting a "Western" free-market economy, which is such an integral part of a democracy. Incidentally, in countries where economic development preceded political advancement—Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain—it was only a matter of time before democracy followed.

The State of Democracy in Asia. The best proof that democracy can work in Asia is the fact that, despite the stubborn resistance of authoritarian rulers like Lee, Asia has made great strides toward democracy. In fact, Asia has achieved the most remarkable record of democratization of any region since 1974. By 1990 a majority of Asian countries were democracies, compared to a 45 percent democratization rate worldwide.[1] This achievement has been overshadowed by Asia's tremendous economic success. I believe democracy will take root throughout Asia around the start of the next century. By the end of its first quarter, Asia will witness an era not only of economic prosperity, but also of flourishing democracy.

I am optimistic for several reasons. The Asian economies are moving from a capital- and labor-intensive industrial phase into an information- and technology-intensive one. Many experts have acknowledged that this new economic world order requires guaranteed free-

[1] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

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dom of information and creativity. These things are possible only in a democratic society. Thus Asia has no practical alternative to democracy; it is a matter of survival in an age of intensifying global economic competition. The world economy's changes have already meant a greater and easier flow of information, which has helped Asia's democratization process.

Democracy has been consistently practiced in Japan and India since the end of World War II. In Korea, Burma, Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and other countries, democracy has been frustrated at times, even suspended. Nevertheless, most of these countries have democratized, and in all of them, a resilient "people power" has been demonstrated through elections and popular movements. Even in Thailand, after ten military governments, a civilian government has finally emerged. The Mongolian government, after a long period of one-party dictatorship, has also voluntarily accepted democracy. The fundamental reason for my optimism is this increasing awareness of the importance of democracy and human rights among Asians themselves and their willingness to make the necessary efforts to realize these goals. Despite many tribulations, the torch of democracy continues to burn in Asia because of the aspirations of its people.

WE ARE THE WORLD

As Asians increasingly embrace democratic values, they have the opportunity and obligation to learn from older democracies. The West has experienced many problems in realizing its democratic systems. It is instructive, for example, to remember that Europeans practiced democracy within the boundaries of their nation-states but not outside. Until recently, the Western democracies coddled the interests of a small propertied class. The democracies that benefited much broader majorities through socioeconomic investments were mostly established after World War II. Today, we must start with a rebirth of democracy that promotes freedom, prosperity, and justice both within each country and among nations, including the less-developed countries: a global democracy.

Instead of making Western culture the scapegoat for the disruptions of rapid economic change, it is more appropriate to look at how the traditional strengths of Asian society can provide for a better democracy. In Asia, democracy can encourage greater self-reliance while respecting cultural values. Such a democracy is the only true expression of a people, but it requires the full participation of all elements of society. Only then will it have legitimacy and reflect a country's vision.

Asian authoritarians misunderstand the relationship between the rules of effective governance and the concept of legitimacy. Policies that try to protect people from the bad elements of economic and social change will never be effective if imposed without consent; the same policies, arrived at through public debate, will have the strength of Asia's proud and self-reliant people.

A global democracy will recognize the connection between how we treat each

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other and how we treat nature, and it will pursue policies that benefit future generations. Today we are threatening the survival of our environment through wholesale destruction and endangerment of all species. Our democracy must become global in the sense that it extends to the skies, the earth, and all things with brotherly affection.

The Confucian maxim *Xiushen qijia zhiguo pingtianxia*, which offers counsel toward the ideal of "great peace under heaven," shows an appreciation for judicious government. The ultimate goal in Confucian political philosophy, as stated in this aphorism, is to bring peace under heaven (*pingtianxia*). To do so, one must first be able to keep one's own household in order (*qijia*), which in turn requires that one cultivate "self" (*xiushen*). This teaching is a political philosophy that emphasizes the role of government and stresses the ruling elite's moral obligation to strive to bring about peace under heaven. Public safety, national security, and water and forest management are deemed critical. This concept of peace under heaven should be interpreted to include peaceful living and existence for all things under heaven. Such an understanding can also be derived from Gautama Buddha's teaching that all creatures and things possess a Buddha-like quality.

Since the fifth century B.C., the world has witnessed a series of revolutions in thought. Chinese, Indian, Greek, and Jewish thinkers have led great revolutions in ideas, and we are still living under the influence of their insights. However, for the past several hundred years, the world has been dominated by Greek and Judeo-Christian ideas and traditions. Now it is time for the world to turn to China, India, and the rest of Asia for another revolution in ideas. We need to strive for a new democracy that guarantees the right of personal development for all human beings and the wholesome existence of all living things.

A natural first step toward realizing such a new democracy would be full adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. This international document reflects basic respect for the dignity of people, and Asian nations should take the lead in implementing it.

The movement for democracy in Asia has been carried forward mainly by Asia's small but effective army of dedicated people in and out of political parties, encouraged by nongovernmental and quasi-governmental organizations for democratic development from around the world. These are hopeful signs for Asia's democratic future. Such groups are gaining in their ability to force governments to listen to the concerns of their people, and they should be supported.

Asia should lose no time in firmly establishing democracy and strengthening human rights. The biggest obstacle is not its cultural heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists. Asia has much to offer the rest of the world; its rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and traditions can make a significant contribution to the evolution of global democracy. Culture is not necessarily our destiny. Democracy is.

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Letters to the Editor

Marshall Goldman on Russia, Wayne Angell on Inflation

To the Editor:

Anders Åslund writes about "Russia's Success Story" (September/October 1994), but, while there have been some positive developments, they hardly warrant his conclusion that "Russia has at last become a relatively predictable country."

Only a year ago, then-Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi tried to violently oust Russian President Boris Yeltsin's government. Yeltsin retaliated with a bloody tank attack. Although Yeltsin managed to keep power, his popularity and effectiveness have since diminished. Since 1990, he has issued over 5,500 decrees, which have been largely ignored not only by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the Duma but by the population at large. Furthermore, Yeltsin seems to have some serious health problems and, embarrassingly, continues to appear drunk in public.

Some new threats to democracy are equally worrisome. Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, the commander of the 14th Army, for example, is more popular with many senior military officers and much of the public than Yeltsin. A frustrated Napoleonic figure, Lebed openly covets the Defense Ministry and even the presidency. "What's wrong with a military dictator?" he once asked.

Admittedly, any transition from a communist system to a market economy is bound to be disruptive. However, during the beginning of the shock therapy process in early 1992, the main focus of then-Finance Minister Yegor Gaidar was liberalizing prices and cutting back on credits and the printing of money. Because of the country's monopolistic industry and agriculture, however, this set off a 24-fold rise in prices, combined with a radical drop in production in the state sector. While some decline in production, especially in the military-industrial complex, was inevitable and even desirable, few anticipated or wanted the widespread deindustrialization that followed. Russian economic statistics are flawed, but there is widespread agreement that production in the former state sector is less than 50 percent of what it was in 1991. The reformers should have done more to anticipate that collapse by stimulating the formation of new, market-responsive farming, service, and manufacturing businesses.

With the disintegration of the old state economic institutions and the demoralizing impact of inflation on government, police, and regulatory agencies, a vacuum developed that was rapidly filled by the Russian mafia.

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According to official reports, they now control 70 to 80 percent of all private businesses and banks. The mafia's domination even reaches into much of the foreign business community, which hires either "consultants" or security forces in Moscow who are often mafia members themselves. On the assumption that magazine production was a profitable business, a Moscow mob even attempted to extort money from the Moscow office of *Newsweek*. The growing mafia presence is far less manageable than Åslund suggests.

Åslund points approvingly to the newly "privatized" industrial sector. But a growing number of Russians call this "grabitization," not privatization. Many of the directors of former state enterprises blatantly seized personal control, and many have deposited both their domestic and export revenues in overseas bank accounts or otherwise stripped their enterprises' assets. According to a senior Russian police official's recent estimate, capital flight of such assets now amounts to nearly $2 billion a month, or a total of $50 billion to $100 billion since 1990.

Åslund also downplays the magnitude of Russia's unemployment and labor unrest. Recent reports indicate that unemployment may total 15 percent or more and that strike activity is increasing. During the first quarter of 1994 alone, there was a tenfold increase in the number of strikes.

Moreover, Åslund does not mention the difficulties in reforming Russia's agriculture sector. Only about five percent of farms are now run as truly private or family farms. Despite their new titles, most are still traditional state and collective farms that, along with the mafia, block many of the new private farms from obtaining supplies and selling their produce. Consequently, a growing number (one report says 70 percent of all farms opened in the first half of 1994) are closing down after only a few months.

True, as Åslund asserts, the official statistics miss much of the unofficial economic activity in both the countryside and the urban areas, even inside the state sector. We know, for example, that the public—out of necessity—is becoming increasingly dependent on their personal gardens and that farmers are increasing the size of their private plots. We also know that much activity in the marketing and service sector is not recorded. This is a consequence of both faulty data collection and efforts to hide data in order to hold down taxes. It may also explain why tax collections are only about 50 percent of what was expected, and why the budget deficit is probably considerably more than the promised 10 percent of GNP.

Russia's turn toward a market system has certainly unleashed private initiatives that had been suppressed for 70 years. But because the reforms were poorly designed and often misapplied, malignancies like the mafia and the "grabitization" of state enterprises stifle rather than help Russia's evolution to a healthy market economy. The first priority should have been to build new economic and legal institutions. This cannot be done overnight.

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CUMMINGS, WINNIPEG, CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

FED UP

To the Editor:

James D. Robinson III confuses the role of monetary policy with that of trade and fiscal policy ("Inflation Overkill," September/October 1994). Contrary to Robinson's arguments, the source of inflation is not capacity constraints, which he argues are much less likely to occur in a global economy. Nor does inflation represent an imbalance between the supply of goods and the demand for goods. Rather, it results from an imbalance between the supply of money and the demand for money.

Monetary policy should always be neutral. The Federal Reserve should use forward-looking market indicators, such as the price of gold, to assess the stance of monetary policy. Such a policy would allow the economy to grow at its natural rate. The Fed should not punish economic growth by setting its interest rate moves by the growth rate of the economy, but it should attempt to use monetary policy to promote growth. It is the expectation of higher inflation that stimulates growth, not higher growth that stimulates future inflation.

The markets are aware of the globalization of the U.S. economy and its impact on inflation, but auction markets still signal that the policy is accommodative and that the inflation outlook continues to deteriorate. The Fed must regain its vigilance. With gold pushing $400 an ounce, there is little risk of inflation overkill.

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To the Editor:

James D. Robinson III's argument is more familiar coming from the liberal wing of congressional Democrats than from a former Wall Street CEO.

True, financial impediments held back the recovery at first, but that drag has been overcome. The financial system can readily fund economic growth for some time to come, even as the cost of credit inexorably rises. Interest rate levels remain far below the threshold of pain where individuals and firms scale back their spending plans.

With a global economic rebound in the offing, and with U.S. capacity utilization nearing its peak, inflationary pressures will inevitably build up. Monetary policy in the United States will respond with progressive moves in the direction of restraint, eventually abandoning the present policy of monetary tolerance. In the process, U.S. short-term interest rates will be lifted by more than a couple hundred basis points before the cyclical expansion expires—challenging both the bond and stock markets. And inflationary concerns are heightened by the bizarre spectacle of a nation close to effective full employment of capital and human resources engaging in aggressive trade disputes with its allies.

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CONTAINING SERBIA

To the Editor:

I found David Gompert's article disappointing ("How to Defeat Serbia," July/August 1994). Gompert justifies Slovene and Croat secessions by contending that the Serbs were usurping power in Belgrade, but offers no evidence. The Serbs had been talking openly—but fruitlessly—about the need for democratic elections as a prerequisite for rectifying the injustices imposed upon them by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. At the time of the 1991 secessions, the Yugoslav federal government was dominated by non-Serbs.

Gompert indicates that a Greater Serbia would contribute to an unstable peace, but believes that a Greater Croatia would not. The Serbs have consistently said that they do not want land that rightfully belongs to others, and they did not demand a rectification of domestic boundaries when Yugoslavia existed. Only after secessionists destroyed the Yugoslav state did the Serbs aspire to have the Serbs who had been part of a common state since 1918 continue living in one state.

Gompert's proposed solution—a protracted international cold war against Serbia—is unreal. Serbia is not like the Soviet Union or white-ruled South Africa. Even so, it is well to remember that U.S. administrations did not have an easy go of convincing Americans that containing the Soviet Union was necessary. For South Africa, there was a domestic political constituency that demanded sanctions, and there was never the prospect of sending American troops there.

Serbia's neighbors—Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Hungary, Austria, and even Albania—have suffered enough economically because of the sanctions to make sanctions-busting significant. No American administration could convince Congress to lay out the countless dollars that it would take to

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keep those countries in tow over the long pull. With the possible exception of Albania, these nations do not see Serbia as a threat to them.

The so-called information war that Gompert proposes to wage against the Serbs is ridiculous. The Serbs do not need the outside world to tell them that communism and Slobodan Milošević are bad. They know what they have been enduring for the last 50 years better than we do. It is precisely the West's failure to be evenhanded in the Yugoslav tragedy that has made Milošević a hero, and it is the West's policy that has let him pose as the sole defender of Serbian interests.

Given the Serbs' defiance of Hitler in 1941, at the height of his power, why wouldn't they react violently if Gompert's policy was adopted? His is a prescription for more carnage, not for peace.

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To the Editor:

Will Russia be involved in the resolution of the Balkan conflict as the West's indispensable partner or as its rival? David Gompert did not address this key question, as if there is nothing east of the Danube except the Pacific. It is no longer possible for the West to hope to deal with the Balkans without Russia, or to take it for granted that Russia will follow the West's lead. Defeating the Serbs at all costs and infinitely prolonging a cold war against them, as Gompert suggests, is no basis for cooperation between Russia and the West.

Moreover, Gompert's proposals would drop right into the midst of Moscow's domestic infighting like a stick shoved into an anthill. Russia's liberals call for a process of cooperative conflict resolution sponsored by Russia and the West. Conservatives, who accuse the West of having an unfair anti-Serbian policy and excluding Russia, propose to follow the Yugoslav example in dealing with the 25 million ethnic Russians left as minority communities in other former Soviet states. And the outright nationalists point to the West's policy as part of an imminent anti-Slavic crusade by the United States and its allies. They advocate a one-sided pro-Serbian policy for Russia, including a unilateral lifting of the U.N. embargo and massive supplies of oil and arms—and if this means an end to good U.S.-Russian relations and Western aid, so much the better for their aspirations at home and in the "near abroad."

If Gompert's proposals were followed, with their impact on Russia's precarious domestic balance, the messy conflicts in the former Soviet states, and Russian-Western relations, a new cold war might inadvertently arise—and it might not be confined just to relations between the West and the Serbs.

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